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1994 Jurisprudence of Successful Treason
Nothing succeeds like success; and this is particularly true of revolutions. 1
But Treason is not own'd when tis descry'd;
Successfull Crimes alone arejustifT"d.2
Introduction
Orderly transfer of power contemplated by the constitutional order is the
exception rather than the norm in most post-colonial societies. A change
of government often issues from the threat or use of force against the
incumbent regime, a phenomenon designated as a coup d'etat.3 Coup
d'etat is "the most visible and recurrent characteristic" 4 of the political
experience of post-colonial societies, and "its endemicity shows no sign of
foreseeable abatement."5 Since an incumbent regime forms part of the
constitutional order, its extra-constitutional overthrow is not only illegal
but amounts to the high crime of treason. 6
A successful coup d'etat raises some complex legal questions. Are per-
petrators of coups d'etat guilty of treason? Should (or can) they be tried
and punished for the high crime? Does the constitutional order survive a
coup d'etat? What is the constitutional foundation of a regime born of a
coup d'etat? What is the source of validity, legitimacy, and legislative
power of an extra-constitutional order? Can the courts validate usurpation
of state power? These and other related questions have long occupied
political scientists and sociologists. 7 For scholars and practitioners of law,
these are not questions of mere academic interest. Often in the wake of
coups d'etat, courts in common law jurisdictions are called upon to
resolve issues of the survival of the constitutional order and the validity,
1. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Afr. L.R. 284, 325 (Rhodesia App.
Div.) (Beadle, CJ.).
2. John Dryden, The Medalk A Satyre Against Sedition, in 1 POEMS oFJoHN DRYDEN
250, 259 (James Kinsley ed., 1958).
3. WEBSTER'S NEW TwENrTm= CENTURY UNABRmGED DianoNuw 418 (2d ed.
1979), defines "coup d'etat" as "a sudden, forceful stroke in politics; especially, the
sudden, forcible overthrow of a government."
4. SAMUEL DECALO, Coups & ARY RULE iN AFRcA: MOTIVATIONS & CONsTRAINTs I
(2d ed. 1990). By one count there were 232 coups d'etat in the world between 1945
and 1978, and all but 11 of these were in post-colonial societies. EDWARD LuTrwAK,
COUP D'ETAT: A PRAGrIcAL HANDBOOK 190-207 (2d ed. 1979).
5. BEN 0. NWABuEZE, CONSTrTmoNAUSM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 219 (1973).
6. Treason is "the offense of attempting by overt acts to overthrow the government
of the state to which the offender owes allegiance." BLAcK's LAW DICnoNARY 1501 (6th
ed. 1990).
7. See, e.g., Charles H. Kennedy & DavidJ. Louscher, Civil-Military Interaction: Data
in Search of a Theory, 26 J. AsIAN & Arm STUD. 1 (1991); DECALo, supra note 4; THE
PoLmcAL Dn.EmmAs OF MILIARY REGIMs (Christopher Clapham & George Philip eds.,
1985); Kim Q. Hill, Military Role and Military Rule, 11 CoMP. POL. 371 (1979); Gwyn
Harries-Jenkins & Charles C. Moskos,Jr., Trend Report: Armed Forces and Society, CuRRENT
SOCIOLOcY, Winter 1981, at 1; Robert W. Jackman, Explaining African Coups dEta4 80
AM. Poi- Sci. REv. 225 (1986); Arturo Valenzuela, A Note on the Military and Social Science
Theoy, 7 THnR WoRL Q. 132' (1985); THE ARMED FORCES IN CoNTEMPORARY ASIAN
SocETIEs (Edward A. Olsen & StephenJurika eds., 1985); ARmIEs AND PoLmcs IN LATN
AMErucA (Abraham F. Lowenthal &J. Samuel Fitch eds., 1986).
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legitimacy, and legislative power of usurper regimes.8 This article aims at
a critical examination ofjudicial responses to coups d'etat in post-colonial
common law jurisdictions.
Existing literature on the subject9 suffers from various shortcomings.
First, much of this literature is dated. The last article dealing with this
issue was published in 1986; much has happened since. Second, most of
the literature focuses on a single jurisdiction, or a selected few jurisdic-
tions, and thus fails to discern the recurring themes in common law juris-
prudence dealing with coups d'etat. Third, most of this literature, like the
courts in common lawjurisdictions, fails to make a distinction between the
validity and the legitimacy of extra-constitutional regimes, a distinction
that is pivotal in formulating an appropriate judicial response to successful
coups. Fourth, while many scholars recommend what they consider to be
the appropriate judicial response to constitutional ruptures, other possible
responses are not explored and evaluated. This article aims to remedy
these shortcomings by surveying all post-colonial common law cases deal-
ing with the aftermath of coups d'etat and evaluating all options available
to a court when confronted with a successful coup.
The first part of this article is a survey of all known judicial responses
to coups d'etat in post-colonial common law settings. The cases included
8. Extra-constitutional regimes in post-colonial civil-law settings do not consider
their legitimacy and validity open to judicial or international question. This is particu-
larly true in Latin America where the Estrada Doctrine posits that foreign states cannot
affect the legitimacy of an incumbent regime by withholding recognition, even if the
regime is of extra-constitutional origin. Jurisprudentially, the doctrine rests on the
premise of unfettered state sovereignty and implies that success is the only yardstick of
validity of illegal usurpation. See Philip C. Jessup, Editorial Comment, 77w Estrada Doc-
trine, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 719 (1931); BuRN H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW &
WoRI_ ORDER 954-55 (2d ed. 1990); BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TIUMBLE, INTErRNA-
TioNAL LAW 422-23 (1991).
9. See, e.g., Stanley A. de Smith, Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionay Situations, 7
W. ONTARIo L. Rxv. 93 (1968); BEN 0. NWABuEZE, JUDICIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH
AFRcA: TM ROLE OF THE Cours IN GovERNMENT 154-90 (1977); NwABum, supra note
5, at 219-56; Anthony M. Honore, Refections on Revolutions, 2 IRISH JuIsT 268 (1967);
Claire Palley, TheJudicial Process: U.D.I. and the Southern RhodesianJudiciay, 30 MOD. L.
REv. 263 (1967); R.W.M. Dias, Legal Politics: Norms Behind the Grundnorr, 26 CAMBRIDGE
LJ. 233 (1968); J.M. Eekelaar, Principles of Revolutionaiy Legality, in OxFOR EssAys IN
JuRIsPRUDENCE 23 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter Eekelaar, Principles];
John M. Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in id.; 1KS. Welsh, The Function of the
Judiciary in a Coup dEtat 87 S. AFR. L.J. 168 (1970); F.M. Brookfield, The Courts, Kelsen,
and the Rhodesian Revolution, 19 U. ToRoNTo LJ. 326 (1969); J.M. Eekelaar, Rhodesia:
Abdication of Constitutionalism 32 MOD. L. REV. 19, 22-23 (1969) [hereinafter Eekelaar,
Rhodesia] ;J. W. Harris, When and My Does the Grundnorm Change?, 29 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 103
(1971) T.C. Hopton, Grundnorm and Constitution: The Legitimacy of Politics, 24 McGiL,
LJ. 72 (1978); LEsuE WoLF-PHILIP, CONSITrUTIONAL LEGITIMACY. A STUDY OF THE Doc
TRINE OF NECESSITY (1979); Mark M. Stavsky, The Doctrine of State Necessity in Pakistan, 16
CORNEI INT'L LJ. 341 (1983); Farooq Hasan, Ajuridicial Critique of Succful Treason: A
Jurisprudential Analysis of the Constitutionality of a Coup dEtat in Common Law, 20 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 191 (1984); Deiter Conrad, In Defense of the Continuity of Law: Pakistan's Courts
in Crises of State, in PASr.AN IN THE 80s: LAw & CONsTrruToN (Wolfgang Peter Zingel
& Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallemant eds., 1985); Simeon C.R. McIntosh, Legitimacy, Valid-
ity and the Doctrine of Necessity: The Case of Andy Mitchell and Others Considered, 10 W.
INDIAN LJ. 127 (1986).
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are from Pakistan, Ghana, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Uganda,
Nigeria, Cyprus, Seychelles, Grenada, Lesotho, Transkei, and Bophuthat-
swana. In each case, the article identifies the context of the constitutional
crisis and examines the judicial response, including the doctrinal posture,
rhetorical style, and evidentiary bases of the judicial pronouncements.
Although these different coups unfolded in diverse contexts and
resulted in regimes with varied political agendas, the courts validated all
incumbent usurper regimes with one exception. Hans Kelsen's theory of
revolutionary legality furnished the primary doctrinal vehicle to reach this
result. While there was extensive doctrinal cross-pollination among the
different jurisdictions, enunciation of the doctrine lacked uniformity.
While some courts adopted Kelsen's proposition that efficacy of a coup
bestows validity in an unadulterated form, others modified this with or
substituted it by doctrines of state necessity, implied mandate, and public
policy. Kelsen's language permeates the judicial pronouncements; the
courts insist that their decisions are grounded in legal principles and not
in political and personal expedience. Following Kelsen, they fail to distin-
guish between legitimacy and validity of a legal order, using the terms
interchangeably. The evidence invoked to justify findings of efficacy of
coups d'etat by different courts is remarkable for its paucity and diversity,
with the evidence of choice being self-serving affidavits by public officials
under the control of usurpers and judicial notice of facts designated as
being notorious.
The second part of the article evaluates all the options available to a
common law court when confronted with a successful usurpation of polit-
ical power through a coup d'etat. First, the article identifies salient fea-
tures of the non-legal context within which courts are forced to fashion
responses to successful coups. The article then evaluates the four possible
judicial responses: validation and legitimation of usurpation, strict consti-
tutionalism, resignation of office, and declaration of the issue to be a non-
justiciable political question. It is proposed that declaring the validity and
legitimacy of a regime born of a coup d'etat a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion is the most appropriate judicial response because it is doctrinally con-
sistent and principled, morally sound, politically neutral, and
institutionally prudent. The article argues that the legitimacy of a usurper
regime is a political and moral issue to be resolved through the political
processes of a society, and that the validity of a successful coup d'etat is a
meta-legal question which belongs to the province of legal theory. As
such, both the legitimacy and validity of a regime born of a successful
coup d'etat fall outside the jurisdiction and competence of the courts.
Designation of these as nonjusticiable political questions will insulate the
courts from turbulent politics, deny the usurpers judicially pronounced
validity and legitimacy, and facilitate the survival of the courts and the rule
of law.
Cornell International Law Journal
I. Common Law Jurisprudence of Successful Treason
This section embodies a survey of all known cases of judicial determina-
tion of the validity of coups d'etat in a post-colonial setting. The cases are
presented in chronological order to highlight doctrinal cross-pollination
between various jurisdictions. 10
A. The Dosso Case: Pakistan 1958
1. The Context
A prolonged political crisis in Pakistan came to a head in 1958 as the gen-
eral election, scheduled for February 1959, threatened the non-represen-
tative political elite with a loss of power."i To forestall this eventuality, on
October 7, 1958, President Iskandar Mirza issued a proclamation in which
he abrogated the Constitution, dissolved the National and Provincial
Assemblies, declared martial law, and appointed the Commander-in-Chief
of the army as the Chief Martial Law Administrator.1 2 The President then
issued the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, whereby all laws were to
remain in force and the country was to be governed "as nearly as may be in
accordance with the late Constitution" subject to the unfettered legislative
capacity of the martial law regime.13 While the declared objective of the
coup was to "devise a Constitution more suitable to the genius of the Mus-
lim people"1 4 and return to democracy "but of a type that people can
understand and work,"1 5 the real motive was to forestall initiation of rep-
resentative democratic governance.16
2. The Judidal Response: Triumph of Kelsen
Four consolidated criminal appeals afforded the Supreme Court of Paki-
stan the opportunity to examine the validity of the coup d'etat in State v.
10. Post-colonial common law jurisdictions treat case law and authoritative texts of
other common law jurisdictions as persuasive authority. The cases reviewed are rife
with citations to each other and to relevant English and American cases.
11. For details of the political and constitutional context in which the coup d'etat
took place, see MoHAMMAD WAsEEM, PoLmcs AND THE STATE IN PA isTAN 116-52 (1989);
AVESHAJALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL RuLE: PmusrAN's PoLmCL ECONOMY OF DEFENsE
194-276 (1990).
12. HERBERT FEDmmA.N, REVOLUTION IN PasrAN: A STUDY OF THE MARTIAL LAW
ADMNISTRAION 1 (1967). The proclamation of martial law read, inter alia:
My appraisal of the internal situation has led me to believe that a vast major-
ity of the people no longer have any confidence in the present system of Gov-
ernment.... The Constitution... is full of dangerous compromises so that
Pakistan will disintegrate internally if the inherent malaise is not removed. To
rectify them, the country must first be taken to sanity by a peaceful revolution
.... [T]he Constitution is sacred. But more sacred ... is the country and the
welfare and happiness of its people.
Id. at 214.
13. This section of the Order is quoted in State v. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. S. Ct. 533,540-
41 (Pakistan).
14. Proclamation of October 7, 1958, reprinted in FEiLDAN, supra note 12, at 214.
15. October 8, 1958 broadcast of General Ayub, quoted in id. at 4.
16.' WAsEEM, supra note 11, at 246.
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Dosso.17 The ChiefJustice, author of the main opinion, considered it "nec-
essary to appraise the existing constitutional position in the light of the
juristic principles which determine the validity or otherwise of law-creating
organs in modem States."1 8 The Court turned to Hans Kelsen's theory of
revolutionary legality, which it termed "one of the basic doctrines of legal
positivism, on which the whole science of modern jurisprudence rests,"19 and
adopted the proposition that the efficacy of a coup d'etat is the basis of its
validity.20 The Court held that the coup d'etat, "having been successful[,]
... satisfies the test of efficacy," and has become a "basic law creating
fact."21 Therefore, the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, "however tran-
17. 1958 P.L.D. S. CL 533 (Pakistan). The appeals concerned proceedings and con-
victions under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, Act I of 1901, a holdover from the
colonial administrative scheme for the tribal areas, which two different High Courts in
1957 had struck down as violating the due process and equal protection provisions of
the 1956 Constitution. The issue before the Court was whether the writs issued by the
High Courts had abated in light of the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution.
18. Id. at 538.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. The Court summarized Kelsen's position on the relationship between a consti-
tution and revolution:
[A] jurist... [must] presuppose the validity of historically the first Constitution
whether it was given by an internal usurper, an external invader or a national
hero or by a popular or other assembly of persons. Subsequent alterations in
the Constitution and the validity of all laws made thereunder is determined by
the first Constitution .... It sometimes happens, however, that a Constitution
and the national legal order under it is disrupted by an abrupt political change
not within the contemplation of the Constitution. Any such change is called a
revolution, and its legal effect is not only the destruction of the existing Consti-
tution but also the validity of the national legal order.... [A] change is, in law,
a revolution if it annuls the Constitution and the annulment is effective.
Id. at 538-39.
21. Id. at 540. The Court explained the metamorphosis of the crime of treason into
a valid legal order.
If the attempt to break the Constitution fails[,] those who sponsor or organize it
are judged by the existing Constitution as guilty of the crime of treason. But if
the revolution is victorious in the sense that the persons assuming power under
the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform
to the new regime, then the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact
because thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled
Constitution but by reference to its own success .... Thus the essential condition to
determine whether a Constitution has been annulled is the efficacy of the change.
Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
According to the Court, a coup d'etat brings about
no change in the corpus or international entity of the State and the revolution-
ary government and the new constitution are, according to International Law,
the legitimate government and valid Constitution of the State. Thus a victori-
ous revolution or a successful coup d'etat is an internationally recognised legal
method of changing a Constitution.
Id.
The Court underscored the amoral posture of the doctrine of revolutionary legality.
[F] rom ajuristic point of view the method by which and the persons by whom a revolu-
tion is brought about is wholly immaterial The change may be attended by violence
or it may be perfectly peaceful. It may take the form of a coup d'etat by a
political adventurer or it may be effected by persons already in public positions.
Equally irrelevant in law is the motive for a revolution, inasmuch as a destruction of
Cornell International Law Journal
sitory or imperfect it may be, is a new legal order and it is in accordance with
that Order that the validity of the laws and the correctness ofjudicial deci-
sions has to be determined."22 In the aftermath of a successful coup, "the
national legal order must for its validity depend upon the new law-creating
organ,"23 and "[e]ven Courts lose their existing jurisdictions, and can func-
tion only to the extent and in the manner determined by the new constitu-
tion."24 Therefore,
[u] nder the new legal Order any law may at any time be changed... and...
there being no restriction on the [coup makers'] law-making power... [the
fundamental rights] test to determine the validity of the laws and fetters on
the power of the legislature to make laws have both disappeared. 25
It is important to note that the Court, deciding the case only twenty days
after the coup, did not refer to any evidence which formed the basis of its
determination that the coup was efficacious.
The Dosso judgment, termed "a carte blanche for treasonable con-
duct" 26 by one commentator, is a landmark in common lawjurisprudence
regarding the validity, legitimacy, and legislative capacity of extra-constitu-
tional regimes. It provided the first express transformation of Kelsen's
theories of constitution and revolution into a judicially pronounced com-
mon law doctrine of revolutionary legality. Before Dosso, the doctrine of
state necessity had furnished common law courts with the framework to
validate extra-constitutional acts of lawful regimes. 27 But the recognition
the constitutional structure may be prompted by a highly patriotic impulse or
by the most sordid of ends.
Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 539.
24. Id. Shahabuddin, J., also relied on Kelsen for his position on the status of the
courts and the new order:.
According to the Proclamation which is not and cannot be called or permitted
to be called in question[,) as well as in actual effect[,] the late Constitution
stands abrogated, and the new order under which the Courts are exercising
their respective jurisdictions at present takes its place with regards to the mat-
ters to which it relates.
Id. at 546.
Amiruddin Abmad, J., also cited Kelsen for the proposition that "the continued laws
receive their validity exclusively from the new order, subject to limitations put by the
new order." Id. at 569. Cornelius, J., dissented on "certain points," id. at 548, but did
not question the authority of Kelsen.
25. Id. at 541. According to the Court, the unfettered legislative power of the new
regime implied that"there is no such thing as a fundamental right," and "[unless there-
fore the [coup maker] expressly enacts the provisions relating to fundamental rights,
they are not a part of the law of the land and no writs can issue on their basis." Id. at
541. The Court held that the writs issued by the High Courts, the subject of the
appeals, had abated. Id. at 542.
26. Hasan, supra note 9, at 217.
27. For the historical evolution of the doctrine in English law, see Glanville Wil-
liams, TheDefense of Necessity, 6 Cuiu r, LEGAL PRoBs. 216 (1953). For the development
of the doctrine in the United States, see Stavsky, supra note 9, at 347-54. Only three
years before Dosso, Pakistan's Supreme Court had itself used the doctrine of state neces-
sity to resolve a constitutional crises in Special Reference by His Excellency the Gover-
nor-General, 1955 P.LD. F. Ct. 435 (Pakistan) [hereinafter Govemor-Generals Case]. The
Vol. 27
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of usurpation of extra-constitutional power by the doctrine of state neces-
sity came with narrowly circumscribed limits regarding who could exercise
such powers, to what ends, and for how long. In the Governor-General's
Case, the Pakistani court had itself limited the doctrine to acts taken by the
existing lawful sovereign,2 8 confined the scope of extra-constitutional
power to acts immediately necessary for the preservation of the state,2 9
and limited its duration to the period necessary to recreate appropriate
constitutional legislative organs.8 0
As discussed below, common law courts relied upon Dosso whenever
they felt the need to bestow judicially pronounced legitimacy upon coups
d'etat. The doctrine of revolutionary legality is attractive to both coup
instigators and sympathetic courts because it unfetters the legislative
capacity of extra-constitutional regimes and cloaks such regimes with legit-
imacy simply on the basis of the success of the underlying treason.
B. The Matovu Case: Uganda 1966
1. The Context
Uganda's first constitutional crisis grew out of the ethnic diversity and con-
flict that was compounded by the colonial legacy of centralization and
underdevelopment. 3 ' After the first post-independence elections in April
crisis arose from the dissolution of the constituent assembly and assumption of extra-
constitutional emergency powers by the Governor-General. In a three-to-two decision,
the Court upheld the Governor-General's assumption of extra-constitutional power,
resting the decision on the doctrine of state necessity. Id. at 520-22.
28. Id. at 485.
29. Id. at 486. The Court expressly stated that the extra-constitutional power "can-
not extend to matters which are not the product of the necessity, as for instance,
changes in the constitution which are not directly referable to the emergency." Id.
30. Id. Once the constitutional legislative organ was in place, it could determine
the validity of the exercise of emergency powers. Id. at 521. Cornelius, J., said in his
dissent that the doctrine of necessity is "recognised but only in relation to matters fall-
ing within the police powers of the State... but it is clearly very far removed from the
power of interference with constitutional instruments." Id. at 511 (emphasis in origi-
nal). In Attorney-General v. Ibrahim, 1964 C.L.1L 195 (Cyprus), the Cypriot Supreme
Court laid down the following prerequisites to invoke the doctrine of necessity:. "(a) an
imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional circumstances; (b) no other remedy
to apply; (c) the measure taken must be proportionate to the necessity;, and (d) it must
be of a temporary character limited to the duration of the exceptional circumstances."
Id. at 265. In Hassan v. State, 1969 P.L.D. Lah. 786 (Pakistan), the Court construed the
doctrine of necessity restrictively to assertjurisdiction of civil courts over acts and orders
of martial law authorities in defiance of express martial law regulations.
31. Uganda's estimated population of 11 million is divided among twenty-one
major ethnic groups, and the country is the geographical junction of four diverse Afri-
can language families. DECALO, supra note 4, at 153. For analyses of ethnic diversity
and conflicts, see CoNFuCr REsOLUTION rN UGANDA (Kumar Rupesingle ed., 1989);
UGANDA: THE Dn wm OF NAboINHOOD (G.N. Uzoigwe ed., 1982); SAMwnu RuBABAZA
KARUGmE, A PoLrrcAL HISTORY OF UcANDA 144-69 (1980). Decalo's description of
Uganda's political evolution is not atypical of most post-colonial societies:
The political evolution of Uganda is essentially the history of the tug-of-war
between Bugandan separatism and the idea of a Ugandan nation; between
modem political authority based upon non-Baganda regional ethnic alliances
and the concept of the supremacy of the kabaka and traditional authority.
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1962, two parties, the Ugandan People's Congress led by Milton Obote
and the Kabaka Yekka led by Daubi Ocheng, formed a coalition govern-
ment, but the coalition remained unstable.3 2 The Kabaka Yekka members
of the cabinet, through a motion in the National Assembly, called for
investigation of corruption charges against Prime Minister Obote, the
ministers of planning and defense, and Colonel Idi Amin, the second-in-
command of the armed forces.5 3 In response, on February 26, 1966, the
Prime Minister, with the support of the military, assumed full powers of
government, suspended the National Assembly, and abrogated the 1962
Constitution.3 4 On April 15, 1966, the National Assembly was reconvened
hastily to approve a new constitution that provided for an executive presi-
dency and a unitary state. Opposition to these developments prompted
Obote to declare martial law on May 20, 1966.35
2. The Judicial Response: Kelsen and Dosso Found "Irresistible and
Unassailable"
On August 11, 1966, Michael Matovu, a Buganda county chief, was served
with a detention order under provisions of Article 31(I) of the 1966 Con-
stitution. Matovo filed a habeas corpus application, arguing that the
detention order violated the fundamental rights provisions of section 28 of
the 1962 Constitution, which remained the supreme law of the land. This
furnished the High Court of Uganda with the opportunity to examine the
validity of the new regime in Uganda v. Matovu 3 6
In a unanimous decision, the Court first rejected the regime's plea
that the new oath of allegiance administered under the new Constitution
precluded the Court from inquiring into the validity of that Constitu-
tion.3 7 The Court also rejected the plea that "the court had no jurisdic-
tion to enquire into the validity of the Constitution because the making of
a constitution is a political act and outside the scope of the functions of
Intertwined with this struggle are center-periphery, Catholic-Protestant, civil-
military, and personality competitions.
Id. at 150.
For details of the context of the 1966 coup, see i& at 150-55. See also, e.g., Amnt
OMARA-OT NNu, PoLrrcs & Tm MxUTARY IN UGANDA, 1890-1985 (1987); JAN JELMERT,
UGANDA: A MODERN HIsToRY (1981); AL A. MAZRUi, SourERs AND KINSMEN IN UGANDA:
TaE MAKING OF A MUiTARY ETHNoCRACY (1975); AMn OmARA-OTuNNu, PoLrrcs AND
THE M=urARY IN UGANDA 1890-1985 (1987); A.G.G. GNGYERA-PINYCWA, APOLO MILTON
OBoTE AND His TIMEs (1978).
32. DEcALo, supra note 4, at 152-53.
33. Id. at 154.
34. Id. at 155.
35. Id.
36. 1966 E. Afr. L.R. 514 (Uganda). For comment on the case, see ANxuAL SURvEY
OF CoMMoNwEALTH LAw 1967 82-83 (H.M.R. Wade ed., 1968).
37. The Court stated that both the 1962 and 1966 oaths spoke of "the Constitution,"
and
since it is the duty of thejudges of this court to do right to all manner of people
in accordance with the Constitution ... as by law established, it must follow as
the night follows the day, that it is an essential part of the duty of the judges of
this court to satisfy themselves that the Constitution of Uganda is established
according to law and that it is legally valid.
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the court."38 The Court relied expressly upon and quoted extensively
from both Kelsen and Dosso, which it found "irresistible and unassaila-
ble."39 The Court designated the events from February 22 to April 1966 as
"law creating facts appropriately described in law as a revolution," 4°
because "there was an abrupt political change, not contemplated by the
existing Constitution, that destroyed the entire legal order and was super-
seded by a new Constitution .... and by effective government."4 ' Resting
its holding expressly on Kelsen and Dosso, the Court said:
Applying the Kelsenian principles, which incidentally form the basis of the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the above [Dosso] case, our
deliberate and considered view is that the 1966 Constitution is a legally valid
constitution and the supreme law of Uganda; and that the 1962 Constitu-
tion having been abolished as a result of a victorious revolution in law does
no longer exist nor does it now form part of the Laws of Uganda, it having
been deprived of its de facto and de jure validity. The 1966 Constitution,
we hold, is a new legal order and has been effective since April 14, 1966,
when it first came into force.
42
While the Dosso court did not feel obliged to refer to any evidence to
support its holding of efficacy of the coup, the Matovu Court referred to "a
large number of affidavits sworn to by a large number of officials, the pur-
pose of which is to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the new Con-
stitution is efficacious and that it has been accepted by the people since it
came into force."43 The Court also relied upon its extrapolation of inter-
national law principles to examine the validity of an extra-constitutional
regime. The Court held that "[a]lthough the product of a revolution, the
[1966] Constitution is none-the-less valid in law because in international
law revolutions and coups d'etat are the recognized methods of changing
governments and constitutions in sovereign states."44 Dosso had said this
much, but Matovu emphasized that because Uganda was "a well-estab-
lished independent state, the question of its recognition since the installa-
tion of the new Head of State by other nations is of considerable
importance,"45 and noted that "recognition has been accorded to the new
Government by all foreign countries with which Uganda deals."4 6 Accord-
Matovu, 1966 E. Afr. LR. at 530.
38. Id. at 527. After examining American case law on the subject, the Court con-
cluded that the question of the validity of a constitution is not a nonjusticiable political
question. Id at 530-34.
39. Id at 535-38. The Court also quoted with approval the statement ofJames Bryce
that "Knots which the law cannot untie may have to be cut by the sword." Id. at 537
(citation omitted).
40. Id. at 515.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 539.
43. Id. The Court noted that the affidavits "have not been in any way challenged or
contradicted... there is not before us any evidence to the contrary." Id.
44. I. at 537.
45. Id. at 539.
46. I& Curiously, the Court also said that "the question of the recognition of the
new Head of State of Uganda by foreign nations is not strictly within the scope of this
enquiry." Id. at 540.
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ing to the Court, the validity of the 1966 Constitution rested on satisfying
four "cardinal" requirements in international law:
1. That there must be an abrupt political change, i.e. a coup d'etat or a
revolution.
2. That change must not have been within the contemplation of an existing
Constitution.
3. The change must destroy the entire legal order except what is preserved;
and
4. The new Constitution and Government must be effective.4 7
In upholding the Emergency Powers Act of 1963, under which the
Emergency Powers (Detention) Regulations of 1966 had been enacted,
the Court adopted Kelsen's language, stating that "[l]aws which derive
from the 'old order' may remain valid under the 'new order' 'only because
validity has expressly or tacitly been vested in them by the new constitu-
tion'; '... only the contents of these [old] norms... remain the same, not
the reason of the validity.'" 48 The Court dismissed the habeas corpus
application accordingly.
C. The Madzimbamuto Case: Southern Rhodesia 1968
1. The Context
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11,
1965, by the white minority government created a constitutional crisis in
Southern Rhodesia.49 At the time, Rhodesia was governed under the 1961
Constitution whereby it remained a British colony but enjoyed extensive
self-rule under a white minority regime. Independence required assent of
the British Parliament and the Constitution envisaged a gradual advance
towards majority rule.50 The Constitution also contained a declaration of
rights including the right of appeal to the Privy Council.51 Specially
entrenched provisions of the Constitution, including the declaration of
fundamental rights, separation of powers, and security and tenure of
judges of the High Court, could be amended only by a referendum of the
four major racial groups.52
Along with the UDI, the minority government promulgated a new
constitution. 53 The new constitution departed from the 1961 Constitution
in two significant respects. The provisions for eventual majority rule were
omitted and the entrenched clauses could now be amended by the legisla-
47. Id. at 534.
48. 1& at 538.
49. For constitutional history of Southern Rhodesia, see CLAIR PALLEY, THE CONSTI-
TUioNAL HISTORY & LAw OF Soumxmi RHODESIA 1888-1965 (1966). See also Dias, supra
note 9; Welsh, supra note 9, at 169-72.
50. ROBERT BLAKE, A HISTORY Or RHODESIA 333-34 (1977); ZIMBABWE: A COUNMr
STUDY 39-44 (Harold D. Nelson ed., 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter ZIMBABWE]; Welsh, supra
note 9, at 169-70; NWABUEzE, supra note 9, at 162.
51. BLAKE, supra note 50, at 333-34; Welsh, supra note 9, at 169-70.
52. Welsh, supra note 9, at 170.
53. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, 1966 R.L.R. 756, 777 (Rhodesia Gen. Div.).
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ture.5 4 The government also changed the manner of appointment to the
judiciary, the structure of the High Court, and abolished the right of
appeal to the Privy Council.55 The Governor reacted swiftly to the UDI by
dismissing the Cabinet from office and calling upon on all public servants,
including the judiciary, not to assist the UDI but to carry on with their
normal tasks and to assist in maintaining law and order.56 On November
16, 1965, the British Parliament enacted the Southern Rhodesia (Constitu-
tion) Act of 1965, which removed and reverted to Britain all the legislative
powers of the Rhodesian legislature. 57 By this time, however, the extra-
constitutional regime effectively controlled the government, including
both the civil service and the military.58
2. The Judicial Response: Nothing Succeeds Like Success
For some time, the courts avoided the issue of the legality of the UDI and
the 1965 Constitution.5 9 The courts finally confronted the issue in
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke,60 a case which some have termed, "[m]ana
for jurisprudes." 61 The government had detained two political activists
under the 1961 Constitution just prior to the UDI. On the expiration of
the state of emergency in February 1966, the government continued their
detention under Regulation 47(3), which derived its authority from the
1965 Constitution. The detainees challenged the legality of their deten-
tion and, by implication, that of the UDI and the 1965 Constitution.
The General Division of the High Court rejected the regime's posi-
tion that it was a dejure government by virtue of its effective control of the
country and the complete overthrow of the old order.62 The Court saw no
54. ZIMBABwE, supra note 50, at 45-48.
55. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke [1968] 2 S. Aft. LR. 284, 425 (Rhodesia App.
Div.); Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke (2), [19681 2 S. Aft. L.R. 457,461-62 (Rhodesia
App. Div.); Dhlamini v. Carter (2), [1968] 2 S. Afr. LR. 464, 466 (Rhodesia App. Div.);
Regina v. Ndhlovu, [1968 4 S. Mr. L.R. 515, 537.
56. Governor's announcement is quoted in full in Madzirnbamuto v. Lardner-
Burke, [1968] 2 S. Afr. L.R. 284, 303 (Rhodesia App. Div.).
57. NwABUEZE, supra note 9, at 163, 208-09.
58. Brookfield, supra note 9, at 329.
59. See Palley, supra note 9, at 269-75, for a review of cases where the courts avoided
confronting the issue.
60. 1966 R.L.R. 756 (Rhodesia Gen. Div.).
61. Palley, supra note 9, at 263.
62. Madzimbamuto, 1966 R.L.R. at 756. GoldinJ., said that "this court is sitting•...
'in medias res'... [consequently] the submission... that a successful revolution is now 'a
law-creating fact,' is based on confidence and not reality .... [T]he court is not entitled
to speculate concerning the future and must consider the present position on the facts
before it." Id. at 863. He then offered a sobering assessment of the balance of power
between the usurpers and the courts:
There is no substance in the submission that by refusing to give effect to meas-
ures of this [revolutionary] government, those responsible for the [revolution]
... would by order of court revert to... constitutional Government .... [I]t
would be completely unrealistic to even assume that the present situation can
be altered by a decision of this court.
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difficulty in accepting Kelsen's doctrine of revolutionary legality63 and
approved of Dosso.64 But the Court distinguished the situation at hand on
the ground that Rhodesia was not a sovereign independent state.65 The
Court held that the "1965 Constitution is not the lawful constitution...
and the Government of this country set up under it is not the lawful gov-
emment" 66 However, the Court upheld the actions of the extra-constitu-
tional regime on the basis of the doctrine of state necessity by one judge67
and on the basis of "the doctrine of public policy" by the other.68
On appeal, five judges of the Appellate Division delivered their judg-
ments on January 29, 1968.69 Two of the judges held that the regime was
a "de facto government" which could lawfully do anything which its prede-
cessor could lawfully have done under the 1961 Constitution.70 Two of
them held that the regime had acquired "internal de jure status" and was
entitled to do anything which the 1965 Constitution permitted.71 The
fifth judge held that the regime had neither de facto nor de jure status
because it had not usurped the functions of the judiciary,, and the High
Court remained a court constituted under and deriving its authority from
the 1961 Constitution. On grounds of necessity, however, he held that an
Id. at 866.
63. See id. at 782-88. However, the doctrine applied only to "the normal situation
where one has a state which is already a sovereign independent state changing its form
of government or its constitution by a successful internal revolution, whether peaceful
or otherwise." Id. at 788 (Lewis,J.). The doctrine "can only apply where the revolution
has not only succeeded internally but has also had the effect of successfully untying the
apron-strings of sovereignty of the mother state. An obvious example of such a revolu-
tion is to be found in the American War of Independence." Id. at 790 (Lewis, J.).
64. Along with Dosso, the Court referred to similar events in Zanzibar, Ghana, and
Nigeria, accompanied by the remark that "in each of those countries... the change of
its Constitution or form of government by means of a revolution was entirely its own
affair, and the successfid overthrow of the old order brought with it lawful status to the new
regime" Id at 790 (Lewis, J.) (emphasis added). Regarding Dosso, the Court wondered
"[n]on constat that the learned judges would have reached the same decision if Pakistan
had been still tied to British sovereignty at that time." Id.
65. Id. Consequently, the Rhodesian court did not have the option exercised by
"the [Dosso] court [that] joined' the revolution which destroyed and replaced the
existing order." Id. at 862 (Goldin, J.).
66. Id. at 848 (Lewis, J.).
67. Lewis, J., held that:
[T]he Government is, however, the only effective government of the country,
and therefore on the basis of necessity and in order to avoid chaos and a vacuum in
the law, this court should give effect to such measures of the effective govern-
ment, both legislative and administrative, as could lawfully have been taken by
the lawful government under the 1961 Constitution for the preservation of
peace and good government and the maintenance of law and order.
Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 867 (Goldin,J.). He also described it as "'the doctrine of the public good
or the public safety' ... or the 'good of the state.'" Id. (citations omitted). The judge
found that "the fact that no state has given Southern Rhodesia recognition.., either de
facto or de jure, is not crucial or even relevant to the discussion." Id. at 857.
69. See Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Afr. L.R. 284 (Rhodesia App.
Div.).
70. Id. at 290 (Beadle, C.J.); id. at 416 (Jarvis, A.JA).
71. Id. at 361 (Quenet, J.P.); id. at 376 (Macdonald, J.A.).
1994 Jurisprudence of Successful Treason
act of the regime may be upheld as long as it did not defeat the rights
guaranteed by the 1961 Constitution.72
Chief Justice Beadle, who declared himself to be a positivist, 73
reviewed "the status of the present Government,"7 4 guided by Kelsen,
Dosso, and Matovu, which "show clearly enough that success alone is the
determining factor."75 Mindful of the efforts of Britain to undermine the
UDI, he concluded that while the UDI regime was "a fully de facto Govern-
ment in the sense that it is in fact in effective control of the [State's] terri-
tory and this control seems likely to continue,"76 it was dear that "[a] t this
stage.., it cannot be said that it is yet so firmly established as to justify a
finding that its status is that of a de jure Government." 77 He declined to
apply the doctrine of state necessity on the grounds that it "is so imprecise
in its application,"78 and he refused to apply the fundamental principle
that "nobody may take advantage of a necessity of his own making."79 The
distinction between dejure and de facto regimes led the ChiefJustice to,
in Eekelaar's phrase, "split[ ] the Grundnorm:"80
The present Government has effectively usurped all the governmental pow-
ers under the old Grundnorm, but has not yet succeeded in setting up a
new Grundnorm in its place... until the present Government has achieved
the status of a de jure government, and the revolutionary Grundnorm
becomes the new Grundnorm, it must govern in terms of the old
Grundnorm .... [T]herefore... the present Government... can now
lawfully do anything which its predecessor could lawfully have done, but
until its new constitution is firmly established, and has thus become the de
jure constitution of the territory, its administrative and legislative acts must
conform to the 1961 Constitution.8 1
Justice Quenet was more forthright in his acceptance of "Kelsen's the-
72. Id. at 422 (Fieldsend, A.J.).
73. Id. at 326-27.
74. Id. at 313.
75. Id. at 318. "[A] successful revolution which succeeds in replacing the old
Grundnorm (or fundamental law) with a new one establishes the revolutionaries as a new
lawful government." Id. at 315.
76. Id. at 359.
77. Id. He had earlier elaborated the difference between a de facto and a dejure
government
The difference between the two types of government is the degree of certainty
with which one can predict the likelihood of the regime continuing in 'effective
control.' The difference between the two types of government may be nar-
rowed down to the difference between 'seems' and 'is' likely because a Govern-
ment which 'is' likely to continue in effective control could be said to be 'firmly
established.' The difference here then is the difference between 'seems' and 'is, 'a differ-
ence purely of the degree of certainty with which the future can be predicted.
Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 330.
79. Id.
80. J.M. Eekelaar, Splitting the Grundnom, 30 Mon. L. REv. 156 (1967). See also Eeke-
laar, Rhodesia, supra note 9, at 19.
81. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Ar. LR. 284, 351-52 (Rhodesia
App. Div.). Regulation 47(3) was found to be ultra vires of the Emergency Powers Act,
of 1960, and thus of the 1961 Constitution. Id. at 360.
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ory as applied in the Pakistani and Ugandan cases,"8 2 and concluded that
"the present Government is the country's de facto government; it has, also,
acquired internal de jure status; its Constitution and laws (including the
measures here in question) have binding force."85 According to Justice
Macdonald, "So far as a municipal court is concerned a de facto govern-
ment is a de jure government in the sense that it is the only lawmaking
and law-enforcing government functioning 'for the time being' within the
state."8 4 Consequently, because "[t]he 1965 Constitution is the de facto
constitution under which the de facto government operates... [it] is the
dejure constitution."85 Justice Fieldsend, who believed that a court "is not
a creature of Frankenstein which once created can turn and destroy its
maker,"8 6 did not accept that judges could sit "to determine whether the
constitution under which [the Court] was created has disappeared. Nor
can [the Court] continue to exist to enforce some other constitution."87
While his position was that "the present authorities... are a fully neither
de facto, nor a dejure government and this Court remains a Court consti-
tuted by and deriving its authority from the 1961 Constitution,"8 8 he rec-
ognized the need for limited recognition of certain acts of the present
authorities on the grounds of necessity.
89
Upon appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council rejected
the concepts of de facto and de jure as inappropriate in dealing with the
legal position of a usurper and held that while the legitimate government
was trying to regain control it was impossible to hold that the usurper
regime was for any purpose a lawful government.9 0 Dosso and Matovu were
accepted as valid though not applicable to Rhodesia.9 1 Consequently, the
82. Id. at 368. While judges "perform the judicial function they must give effect to
the laws and the constitution of the effective government." Id. at 365.
83. Id. at 375.
84. Id. at 415-16.
85. Id. at 416.
86. Id. at 430.
87. Id. at 429.
88. Id. at 443-44.
89. Id. at 444. In upholding a law on grounds of state necessity, a court must be
satisfied that:
(a) any administrative or legislative act is directed to and reasonably required
for the ordinary orderly running of the country,
(b) the just rights of citizens under the 1961 Constitution are not defeated; and
(c) there is no consideration of public policy which precludes the Court from
upholding the act, for instance if it were intended to or did in fact in its opera-
tion directly further or entrench the usurpation.
Id.
90. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 3 All E.R. 561, 573-74, 578 (P.C.).
91. According to Lord Ried,
Their lordships would not accept all the reasoning in these [Dosso and Matovu]
judgments but they see no reason to disagree uith the result .... It would be very
different if there had been still two rivals contending for power... because that
would mean that by striving to assert its lawful right the ousted egitimate govern-
ment was opposing the lawfid ruler.
Id. at 574 (emphasis added). The distinction made between a legitimate and a lawful
ruler by Lord Ried is useful, as will be discussed in part III.E.ii, infra. Recognition of
Dosso stemmed from the Court's view that "[i]t is a historic fact that in many countries
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Council held that "the determination of the High Court of Southern Rho-
desia with regards to the validity of [the UDI regime] . . . [was]
erroneous."
92
The Rhodesian High Court was quick to react to this rebuff. In
Regina v. Ndhlom, 93 it portrayed the Privy Council's approach as unrealis-
tic and legalistic, 94 and held that "the present Government [of Rhodesia] is
now the dejure government and the 1965 Constitution the only valid con-
stitution .... The judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil is not binding on the present High Court of Rhodesia."95 This holding
rested on Beadle's view that it could now be predicted with reasonable
certainty that the British government would not, in the foreseeable future,
succeed in unseating the UDI regime. Consequently, the character of the
Court had "undergone a transmogrification, as it were,"96 and it was no
longer sitting under the 1961 Constitution which had been "annulled by
the efficacy of the change."97
D. The Sallah Case: Ghana 1970
1. The Context
On February 24, 1966, the armed forces of Ghana staged a coup d'etat and
toppled the government of President Nkrumah.98 Two days later, the mil-
itary, by proclamation, suspended the 1960 Constitution, dismissed the
President, dissolved the national assembly, and established the National
Liberation Council as the new sovereign authority with power to legislate
... there are now regimes which are universally recognized as lawful but which derive
their origins from revolutions or coups d'etat The law must take account of that fact."
Id.
92. Id. at 578. The Council noted: "Beadle, CJ., frequently invokes 'political reali-
ties.' It is difficult to avoid saying that in so doing he departs from the terms of his
judicial oath since he appears to prefer 'political realities' to the law." Id. at 670.
93. [1968] 4 S. Afr. L.R. 515 (Rhodesia App. Div.).
94. Id. at 517-23.
95. Id. at 535-37 (emphasis added). The Court had already stated, while denying a
death penalty appeal to the Privy Council, in Dhlamini v. Carter, [1968] 4 S. AfT. LIR.
445 (Rhodesia App. Div.) that "no judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council would be of any value inside this territory." Id. at 465-66. The Prime Minister
and the Minister ofJustice had filed affidavits to the effect that the UDI regime would
not in ariy way recognize, enforce or give effect to any adverse decision of the Privy
Council and would forbid and prevent its officers from doing any act which would assist
or enable any person to bring an appeal from the Appellate Division. Beadle, CJ., said
that in light of the regime's posture any adverse decision of the Privy Council "would be
a mere brutumfidmen," and "merely an academic exercise." Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-
Burke, [1968] 4 S. Aft. LR. 457,462. The denial of the right to appeal led Fieldsend,J.,
to resign from the court on March 4, 1968. Young, J., resigned on August 12, 1968.
Fieldsend was appointed the first ChiefJustice of Zimbabwe after that country's inde-
pendence and the establishment of one-person-one-vote majority rule.
96. Ndhlovu, [1968] 4 S. Afr. LR. at 522.
97. Id. at 532.
98. For details of the political context, see generally TR-VORJoNEs, GHANA's FIRST
REPUBuc 1960-66: THE PuRsurr OF THE PoLrncAL KNGDOM (1976); ROBERT PINKNEY,
GHANA UNDER MrrAY RULE 1966-69 (1972); SIMON BAYNHAM, THE M IrAwAND Pou-
Tics rn NKRuMAH's GHANA 153-203 (1988).
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by decree.9 9 The proclamation contained a continuation in force provi-
sion.1 00 In 1969, the military rule was terminated and civilian rule was
established under a new Constitution. The transitional provisions of the
new Constitution provided for, among other things, the termination of
any office "established" by the National Liberation Council. 1 1
E.K. Sallah was appointed in October 1967 to a managerial post at the
Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC), a corporation established
under the Statutory Corporations Act of 1961, and re-established under
the new Statutory Corporations Act of 1964. On February 21, 1970, the
new civilian government dismissed Sallah, under the transitional provi-
sions of the 1969 Constitution. He challenged the validity of his dismissal
before the Ghana Court of Appeals in Sallah v. Attorney-GeneraL'0 2
2. The Judicial Response: "Remote" and "Doctrinaire" Kelsen Rejected
It is significant to note that this was the first instance ofjudicial determina-
tion of the validity of a coup d'etat undertaken after the extra-constitu-
tional regime had expired. The Attorney-General, relying on Kelsen,
argued that the 1966 coup d'etat, due to its success, had destroyed not
only the existing Constitution but also the entire legal order and estab-
lished a new legal order.'0 3 He argued that, with the suspension of the
1960 Constitution, the Act that established the GNTC also lost its validity
and lapsed.' 0 4 It regained its validity only by virtue of the Proclamation of
February 26, 1966.105 Similarly, all public offices in Ghana stood abol-
ished by virtue of the successful coup d'etat, and were "established" anew
by the Proclamation of February 26, 1966.106 Consequently, Sallah's office
could be terminated as it fell within the purview of the transitional provi-
sions of the 1969 Constitution. 10 7 The majority of the Court spurned the
government's reliance upon Kelsen. The Court felt that it "will not derive
much assistance from the foreign theories,"' 08 and that the
99. NWABUEZ_, supra note 5, at 229.
100. The provision read in part:
[A] ny enactment or rule of law in force in Ghana immediately before the 24th
of February 1966 shall continue in force and any such enactment or rule of law
may by decree of the National Liberation Council be revoked, repealed,
amended (whether by addition, omission, substitution or otherwise) or
suspended.
Id. at 229.
101. For a full text of the provision, section 9(1) of Schedule A of the Constitution
of 1969, see id. at 230.
102. Unreported opinion delivered on April 20, 1970, re7rinted in 2 S.O. GYANOH,
JR. &J. G rmrTHs, A SOURCEBOOK OF THE CONSnTUnONAL LAw OF GHANA 493 (1972),
summarized in 1970 CuU R CAsEs (Ghana) 55; case comment in ANNUAL SURVEY OF
CommoNw.mTH LAw 1970 49 (H.M.R. Wade ed., 1971).
103. GYANDOH & GisrrHs, supra note 102, at 494, 504-05.
104. Id.
105. Id,
106. Id. at 497, 504-05, 508.
107. Id. at 494, 504-05.
108. Id. at 505 (Sowah, J.).
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experience of the world teaches one that there is often considerable diver-
gence between theory and practice; between the process of authorship and
judicial adjudication. The literature of jurisprudence is remote from the
immediate practical problems that confront judges called upon to inter-
prete [sic] legislation or indeed to administer any law.10 9
The Court declined to designate the coup d'etat a valid revolution.
Instead, it proffered the view, "What happened in Ghana on 24 February
1966 was just the beginning of a revolution which culminated in the pro-
mulgation of the 1969 Constitution which annulled or revoked the 1960
Constitution."1 10 Archer, J.A., rested his rejection of Kelsen in the diffi-
culty of locating the new grundnorm:
Suppose we apply this [Kelsen's] juristic reasoning to the present case, it
follows that when the proclamation suspended the Constitution of 1960, the
old Basic Norm disappeared. What was the new Basic Norm? Was it the
proclamation? It was not because it was not a constitution. How then do we
trace the Basic Norm? Is the Basic Norm the people of Ghana who sup-
ported the armed forces and the police or is the Basic Norm to be detected
from the armoured cars at Burma Camp?111
For the majority, the question was one of statutory interpretation:
whether the members of the Constituent Assembly wanted the word
"establish" to embrace not only offices created for the first time by the
extra-constitutional regime, but also old offices retained by virtue of the
Proclamation? Apaloo, J.A., answered the question in the following way
I believe members of the Constituent Assembly approached and performed
their task as practical men of business guided by the experience of our
recent past and informed by an understanding of ordinary English words. I
cannot accept that in using the word "establish" in section 9(1) they had in
mind any juristic theories on the principle of legitimacy. If that be right, it
would be, in my opinion, subversive of their intention to interprete [sic]
their declared will by reference to any such theory.
112
109. Id. at 509 (Apaloo, J.). Characterizing the Kelsenite line of argument as
"highly artificial," Apaloo, J.A., said:
I cannot believe that with the known pragmatism that informs judicial attitudes
towards questions of legislative interpretation, the Attorney-General can have
thought an argument such as this was likely to carry seasoned judicial minds.
We should fail in our duty to effectuate the will of the Constituent Assembly if
we interpreted the Constitution not in accordance with its letter and spirit but
in accordance with some doctrinaire juristic theory.
Id. at 508-09. Sowah, JA, was similarly insistent on irrelevance of theories of law:
[O]ne is entitled to ask whether theories propounded by the great jurists rang-
ing from the time of Plato, Marx and to Hans Kelsen are immutable and of
general application and whether those theories must necessarily fit into the
legal scheme of every country and age? I do not think so.
Id. at 505.
110. Id. at 495 (Archer, J.).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 509. Sowah,J.A., declared that "it is a fundamental rule of interpretation
whether the subject-matter be a Constitution or an Act, that words and phrases must be
interpreted to convey the meaning of those who drafted them." Id. at 506.
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The majority found that Sallah's office had been established in 1961,
not by the extra-constitutional regime, and declared his dismissal invalid.
Anin, J.A., however, adopted Kelsen's view as espoused by the attorney-
general, and opined that by virtue of the coup d'etat, "the old legal order
founded on the 1960 Constitution yielded place to a new legal order
under an omnipotent, eight-member, military-cum-police sovereign-a
veritable octopus whose tentacles covered the whole gamut of executive,
legislative, and powers of the state."1 13 He took the position:
Notwithstanding the fact that public offices which were in existence prior to
the coup bore practically the same names before as after the coup, the true
legal position is that these public offices and services were the creation of
the National Liberation Council and they existed by virtue of, and in pursu-
ance of, this Proclamation and in certain specific cases, in pursuance of
subsequent N.L.C. Decrees.
1 14
Any evaluation of Sallah must consider the fact that serious allegations
of personal bias were raised against two of the five judges who heard the
case. 115 Moreover, the case arose in a context "beclouded with deep emo-
tion" because over five hundred public officers had lost theirjobs with the
enforcement of the provision in question which formed part of the
regime's "widely advertised" anti-corruption drive and which was "viewed
with disfavor by many."116 Sallah and the two judges belonged to minority
113. Id. at 499.
114. Id Anin,JA, also reminded the Court that the majority in Gbedemah v. Awoo-
nor-Williams, decided on December 8, 1969, had takenjudicial notice of the "notorious
fact" that the National Liberation Council had suspended the 1960 Constitution and
vested in itself all executive, legislative andjudicial powers of the state; had recognized
that conferral ofjudicial power on the courts "was subject to any law that the National
Liberation Council might choose to pass. Thus it would be accurate to say thatjudicial
power was exercised by the courts during the years of the National Liberation Council
on sufferance;" and had held that "no Decree which was passed by the National Libera-
tion Council could have been struck down by the courts as unconstitutional." Id. at 499.
See Gbedemah v. Awoonor-Williams (unpublished opinion of the Supreme Court)
(delivered Dec. 8, 1969), reprinted in GYANDoH & Gmrrrs, supra note 102, at 442.
Siriboe, J.A., indicated at the judgment conference that he too would dissent, but did
not deliver hisjudgment. See Statement By President AfterJudgment, reprinted in GYANDOH &
GRIrnrrs, supra note 102, at 511. One does not know whether he too was persuaded by
Kelsen's theories. See also S. 1L Date-Bah, Jurisprudences day in Court in Ghana, 20 ITrr'L
& Comp. L.Q. 315, 321 (1971).
115. A motion by the defendant sought disqualification of Apaloo and Sowah,.J.A.,
Attorney-General v. Sallah, S.C. Motion No. 1/1970, unreported, reprinted in GVANDOH
& GRaFrrHs, supra note 102, at 487, summarized in 1970 CuRErNr CASEs (Ghana) 54, S.C.
The allegation against Apaloo, JA, was that he was a close personal friend of Sallah,
and it was alleged that Sowah,JA., had an interest in the matter since his brother-in-law
was also affected by the legislation in question. Affidavits, testimony of witnesses, and
Sallah's own testimony about his long-standing friendship with Apaloo,J., supported
the allegations. A new five-member bench was impaneled to decide the motion. In a
four-to-one decision the Court found that on the evidence adduced there was no real
likelihood of bias by the two judges. See also E. A. Osew, Legal Bias and the Reasonable
Man, 3 REv. GuN L. 145 (1971) (analyzing whether the Sallah Court was right in
holding that the mere fact of a relationship between a party and a judge did not dis-
qualify the latter in law).
116. Osew, supra note 115, at 157.
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tribes who opposed the majority tribal group of the regime. 11 These fac-
tors raise questions about the weight of personal, political, and tribal con-
siderations in the final decision.
E. The Lakanmi Case: Nigeria 1970
1. The Context
On January 15, 1966, some army officers attempted a coup d'etat in Nige-
ria which resulted in the death of the Prime Minister and some other
members of the cabinet.118 The remaining federal cabinet and the acting
President turned over the administration of the country to the General
Officer Commanding of the Army, General Aguiyi-Ironsi. The military
regime suspended the provisions of the Constitution dealing with the
executive and legislature and declared that, while the Constitution "shall
have the force of law throughout Nigeria,"119 the military government
"shall have power to make laws ... with respect to any matter whatso-
ever,"120 and that "this Constitution shall not prevail over a decree, and
nothing in this Constitution shall render any provision of a decree void to
any extent whatsoever." 121 The jurisdiction of the courts was ousted from
reviewing any act or order of the military regime.12 2 On July 29, 1966,
there was another coup d'etat in Nigeria and the new military regime con-
tinued to govern by decree'12 3
2. The Judicial Response: Usurpers Defied
Before 1970, the Nigerian Supreme Court had faced the question of the
nature of the usurper regime on two occasions. In Boro v. Republic,1 24 the
Court implicitly recognized the military regime as a lawful government but
took the position that the regime was not a creature of any new source of
117. Id.
118. For the political context of the 1966 constitutional crisis of Nigeria, see gener-
ally WmLAM D. GRAF, THE NiGERIAN STATE: PoLmcAL EcONOMY, STATE, CLAS AND
PoLrrmcAL SYSTEM IN Thr Posr-CoLoNIAL ERA (1988); LARRY DIAMoND, CLAss, ETmnIrrY
Am DEMocRAcY IN NIGERIA: THE FALuRE OF THE FRsT REPUBIuc (1988).
119. Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1, 1966, quoted in Abi-
ola Ojo, The Search for a Grundnorm in Nigeria-The Lakanmi Case, 20 INT'L & CoMY. L.Q.
117, 120-21 (1971).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 121.
122. The ouster ofjurisdiction was coupled with the inapplicability of constitutional
provisions: "For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that the validity of any
order... or of any other thing whatsoever done... [by the military regime] shall not be
inquired into any court of law, and accordingly nothing in the [individual rights] provi-
sions... of the Constitution... shall apply...." Section 2 of Decree 45 of 1968, quoted
in Lakanmi v. Attorney-General, 1971 U. Ife L.R., 201, 206 (Nigeria).
123. General Aguiyi-Ironsi was arrested and Colonel Gowon took over control of the
country. Gowon himself was deposed onJuly 29, 1975. The next head of state, General
Rumat Mohammad, was assassinated during an abortive coup on February 13, 1976; he
was succeeded by General Obasanjo. A Constituent Assembly was convened in October
1977 and adjourned onJuly 5, 1978, having completed its work on a Draft Constitution
prior to a return to civilian rule in October 1979, some thirteen years after the forma-
tion of the "interim government."
124. 1967 Nigerian Monthly LR. 163 (decided Dec. 5, 1966).
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authority, because "[f] ollowing the events of mid-January, 1966, the former
civilian government of Nigeria handed overpower to the military authorities,
and the government of Nigeria became the Federal Military Govern-
ment."1' In Council of the University of lbadan v. Adamolekun,126 the Court
termed the change in government a "military take over of the Government
of Nigeria,"' 27 which nevertheless "keeps the Constitution of the Federa-
tion alive subject of course to the suspension and modifications made by
the Decree."128 The Court took the position that it was not inquiring
whether the military regime "could legislate by Edict but only whether...
the [particular] Edict is inconsistent with the Constitution of the
Federation."'
The question of validity and legislative capacity of the extra-constitu-
tional regime was squarely confronted in Lakanmi v. Attorney-GeneraL'3
0
The issue was whether military decrees could legally keep the courts from
reviewing orders issued by tribunals of inquiry established by the military
regime.' 3 ' The Court rejected the government's position that "what took
place in January 1966 was a revolution and the Federal Military Govern-
ment is a revolutionary Government .... It accordingly has an unfettered
right.., to rule by force and by means of Decrees .... "1 3 2 The govern-
ment argued that it was relying upon Kelsen's theory of revolutionary
legality as espoused by Dosso and Matovu. 33 The Court did not question
Kelsen's position and acknowledged the merit of Dosso and Matovu, but
distinguished them from the situation in Nigeria. In Dosso and Matovu,
the existing Constitutions were nullified and new legal orders introduced,
which was an "abrupt political change" tantamount to a revolution. How-
ever, in Nigeria, necessity dictated an "agreed" partial suspension of the
Constitution and the formation of an "interim Military Government,"13
4
which in turn effected the transfer of power from the old to the new
order.
The decision of the Court turned on the question of whether the mili-
tary takeover of 1966 was a revolution, which created a new legal order
and bestowed unfettered legislative power upon the extra-constitutional
125. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
126. [1967] 1 All N.LR. 213 (Nigeria) (decided Aug. 7, 1967).
127. I. at 221.
128. Id. at 223.
129. Id. at 224.
130. 1971 U. Ife LiL 201 (Nigeria).
131. The specific issue in the case concerned a conflict between the Forfeiture of
Assets (Public Officers and other Persons) Validation Decree, No. 45 of 1968, and the
non-suspended sections of the 1963 Constitution providing for protection of funda-
mental human rights and the establishment and jurisdiction of the superior courts.
132. Lakanmi, 1971 U. Ife Lit at 212.
133. Id. at 212.
134. Id. at 214-17. The Court characterized the "invitation" by the Council of Minis-
ters to the head of the Army in the following manner:. "your men have started a rebel-
lion, which we fear may spread; you have the means to deal with them. We leave it to
you to deal with them and after this, return the administrative power of the Govern-
ment to us." Id. at 215. The purported meeting of the Council of Ministers, which itself
was unconstitutional, was validated on the ground of necessity. Id. at 214.
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regime. The Court said that the 1963 Constitution remained the funda-
mental and operative norm against which the courts could measure acts of
the "interim Military Government." 3 5 Although the Court recognized
that extra-constitutional acts of a regime could be validated on the ground
of necessity, it found no necessity for limiting the courts' jurisdiction, or
the passing of ad hominem decrees in this case, and held the decrees
invalid.1 3 6
The Court found the decrees invalid on two grounds. First, preclu-
sion ofjudicial review violated the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution.'3 7 Second, in specifically naming individuals against whom
orders were issued, the decrees constituted ad hominem laws, thus violat-
ing the fundamental principle that only a court can find a person
guilty.138
The Court's decision is vulnerable to criticism as it rests on the dubi-
ous assumption that the Prime Minister was alive when the remaining cabi-
net decided to turn the government over to the military.'5 9 As Abiola Ojo
points out, "In the absence of the Prime Minister or of a duly appointed
acting Prime Minister, there was no one competent under the Constitu-
tion to call a valid meeting of the Cabinet," hence the gathering that
decided to "voluntarily" hand over the government to the military was not
the Cabinet as recognized by the 1963 Constitution. 40 Furthermore, the
Court "chose a singularly inappropriate and unpopular measure on which
to challenge the authority of [the military] government."x4 1 The decree in
question was intended to appropriate gains of widespread corruption in
Nigerian public life, a measure backed by considerable popular support.
Consequently, the decision led to "the impression that fraud is being
encouraged by legal technicalities." 142
135. The Court rested its "interim government" holding upon General Aguiyi-
Ironsi's broadcast ofJanuary 16, 1966, in which he claimed that, "The Government of
the Federation of Nigeria having ceased to function, the Nigerian Armed Forces have
been invited to form an interim military government .... This invitation has been
accepted...." Id. at 214.
136. Id. at 217-22. The Court said:
The necessity must arise before a decree is passed ousting any portion of the
Constitution. In effect, the Constitution still remains the law of the country and
all laws are subject to the Constitution excepting so far as by necessity the Con-
stitution is amended by a Decree. This does not mean that the Constitution of
the country ceases to have effect as a superior norm. From the facts of taking
over... the Federal Military Government is an interim government of necessity
Id. at 217.
137. I. at 218-19.
138. Id. at 222.
139. Id at 214. The Court recognized that if the Prime Minister was dead "the situa-
tion might have been different." Id.
140. Ojo, supra note 119, at 127. By its statement that "[i] t must be accepted that the
Council of Ministers validly met at the time," Lakanm=4 1971 U. Ife LR. at 214, the Court
appears to imply that necessity validated the otherwise unconstitutional meeting.
141. Laws and Super Laws, NEw NIGERIAN, May 12,1970, quoted in Ojo, supra note 119,
at 135.
142. Id.
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3. The Aftermath: Rebuke and Capitulation
The military regime reacted sharply and quickly to the Lakanmi decision
and to the holding that "the Federal Military Government is not a revolu-
tionary government."143 The judgment of April 24, 1970, was followed on
May 9, 1970, by the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and
Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 28 of 1970, which reasserted the
unfettered and unlimited legislative competence of the military regime; in
explicitly Kelsenite language, it declared that the events of January and
July 1966 were
revolution [s] ... [that] effectively abrogated the whole pre-existing legal
order in Nigeria... involved an abrupt political change which was not
within the contemplation of the Constitution... [and] established a new
government... with absolute powers to make laws .... No question as to
the validity of any Decree or any Edict... shall be entertained by any court
of law in Nigeria .... [A]ny decision ... by any court ... which has pur-
ported to declare.., the invalidity of any Decree... is... null and void and
of no legal effect whatsoever as from the date of the making thereof.14 4
The Supreme Court felt constrained to capitulate in the face of this
express rebuke by the usurper regime. In Adejumo v.Johnson,145 the Court
acknowledged the validity of Decree No. 28 and, by implication, that of
the military regime.146 Interestingly, the Court said that Decree No. 28
"establishes and otherwise confirms the already existing ouster of the jurisdic-
tion of courts of law .... ."147 By saying that the new Decree was only declara-
tory in nature, the Court in effect said that Lakanm4 Bow, and University of
!badan were all wrongly decided.
The aftermath of Lakanmi is very instructive for any study that aims at
identifying suitable judicial responses to successful coups d'etat. It clearly
demonstrated the practical limitations a court confronts when faced with
143. Lakanm4 1971 U. Ife L.R. at 217.
144. Decree No. 28 of 1070, reprinted in D.O. AiHE & PA. OLUYEDE, CASES & MATERI.
ALS ON CoNSTrITUnONAL LAw IN NIGE~iA 258-59 (1979). See also A. G. Kairibi-Whyte,
Federal Militaiy Government (Supremacy & Enforcement of Powers) Decree No. 28 of 1970, 1
NiGEurANJ. CoNrme. L. 284 (1970).
145. [1972] 1 All N.L.R. 159 (Nigeria).
146. For discussion of Adejumo, see Abiola Ojo, Public Law, the Military Government &
the Supreme Court, in SUPR.ME COURT OF NIGMEA 1956-1970 90, 102-04 (A. B. Kasunmu
ed., 1977). For text of the underlying case in Lagos High Court, see AHnE & OLUYEDE,
supra note 144, at 237-40.
147. See Ojo, supra note 146, at 103. Ojo, who is very critical of the Lakanmi decision,
calls the decree "legitimately expected" and "obvious," Ojo, supra note 119, at 134, and
quotes with approval a newspaper remark that "the Supreme Court took its stand on a
banana skin. And not surprisingly, it has been helped to slip." Id. at 135. The Nigerian
courts did not forget the aftermath of Lakanmi When the question of the validity of a
subsequent coup d'etat, that of December 31, 1983, came before the Nigerian Court of
Appeal, it held that decrees of the usurper regime were the "grundnorm or fundamental
law of Nigeria as of today." Nigerian Union of Journalists v. Attorney-General, 1986
L.R.C. Const. 1,8 (Nigeria). The court refused to follow Lakanmi, saying "[w]e are con-
cerned with the law as it is, not as it ought to be." Id. at 9. The complete ouster of
jurisdiction of courts from examining the validity of decrees and edicts of the usurper
regime was upheld. Id. at 13. See generally ToYrN FALOJ.A &Jutuus IHONVBERE, THE RISE
ANDm FALL OF NIGEIA'S SECOND REPUBLIC, 1979-84 (1985).
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the fait accompli of usurpation. The usurper's monopoly of coercive
power allows them to ignore any adverse pronouncement by the judiciary
or even to browbeat it into submission.
F. The filani Case: Pakistan 1972
1. The Context
The extra-constitutional regime in Pakistan validated by Dosso remained in
power for eleven years.' 48 Following prolonged civil disobedience, the
President resigned and handed over the administration of the country to
the military on March 25, 1969.149 That same evening, the military pro-
claimed martial law and abrogated the 1962 Constitution. 150 The mili-
tary's refusal to recognize the results of general elections held in
December 1970 led to a civil war and dismemberment of the country in
December 1971.151 On December 20, 1971, the military handed over the
government to the party which had won the election in the remaining part
of the country.152 Due to the constitutional void, the civilian government
took over as a martial law regime. 153
2. The Judicial Response: Kelsen Renounced and Substituted by the Doctrine of
Implied Mandate
Two pending criminal appeals, consolidated asaflani v. Government of Pun-
jab,'5 4 furnished the opportunity to test the validity of the 1969 coup
d'etat. The Supreme Court held the assumption of power by the military
an illegal usurpation. 155 The Court, after an extensive analysis of Kelsen
and Dosso, renounced the doctrine of revolutionary legality and expressly
148. For political and constitutional developments in Pakistan between 1958 and
1969, see generally LAWRENCE ZIRING, THE AVUB KHAN ERA: PoLrrics IN P EesTA 1958-
1969 (1971); HERBERT FE.LDMAN, FROM Casis TO Camsis: PA iSTAN 1962-1969 (1972).
149. ZIRING, supra note 148, at 112-13.
150. FErLMA, supra note 148, at 271.
151. WAsEEM, supra note 11, at 285-92. See also KHAim B. SAVEED, PoLmcs IN PAm-
sTAN: THE NATURE AmD DmarrON OF CHANGE 65-83 (1980) (analyzing causes of Paki-
stan's disintegration).
152. WASEEM, supra note 11, at 305. For a detailed account of the transfer of power,
see STANLEY WOLPERT, ZULFI Brn-ro OF PAiasTAN: His LuE AND TimEs 170-71 (1993).
153. WAsEEM, supra note 11, at 310-11.
154. 1972 P.L.D. S. Ct. 139 (Pakistan). The legislative capacity of the military regime
had come up before the Lahore High Court in Hassan v. State, 1969 P.L.D. Lah. 786
(Pakistan) (decidedJune 30, 1969). The Court found that the outgoing President had
transferred the powers of government to the military for the constitutional purpose of
"'restoring and saving the country from internal disorder and chaos' and to 'ensure
that administration resumes its normal functions to the satisfaction of the people.'" Id
at 808. Therefore, the 1962 Constitution was preserved and everyone, including the
martial law regime was subject to it. Id at 810-11. Martial law regulations aimed at the
ouster ofjurisdiction of civil courts were declared void. Id.
155. filan, 1972 P.L.D. S. Ct. at 183-85. The Court argued that the military was sim-
ply called upon to discharge their "legal and constitutional responsibility ... to defend the
country [and) ... to save it from internal disorder and chaos." I&. at 183-84. Declara-
tion of martial law and abrogation of the 1962 Constitution went beyond these terms of
reference. Id.
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overruled Dosso.15 6 The Court advanced several reasons why it considered
Dosso's adoption of Kelsen improper. First, the Dosso ruling of efficacy of
the coup was premature when the regime found to be "effective" one day
was overthrown the next.15 7 Second, Kelsen's is a descriptive theory of
law, not a normative principle of adjudication. 15 8 Third, validity of an
extra-constitutional regime flows not from successful assumption of power
but from habitual obedience by the citizens. 159 Fourth, since the theory
of revolutionary legality presupposes the primacy of international law over
municipal law, that theory is of little use to domestic courts.160 Finally, the
Court noted that the main author of Dosso was involved with drafting the
very martial law order which was at issue in the case.16 1
The Court acknowledged the role judicial pronouncements play in
bestowing legitimacy to extra-constitutional orders: "However, [sic] effec-
tive the Government of a usurper may be, it does not within the National
Legal Order acquire legitimacy unless the Courts recognize the Govern-
ment as de jure."1 62 The Court also recognized that the Courts do not
156. Id. at 162-83.
157. Id. at 161.
158. Both the interpretation and application of Kelsen by Dosso came under attack:
Kelsen's theory was, by no means, a universally accepted theory nor was it a
theory which could claim to have become a basic doctrine of the science of
modernjurisprudence .... [Kelsen] was only trying to lay down a pure theory
of law as a rule of normative science consisting of "an aggregate or system of
norms." He was propounding a theory of law as a "mere jurists' proposition
about law." He was not attempting to lay down any legal norm or legal norms
which are "the daily concern ofJudges, legal practitioners or administrators."
Id. at 179 (Hamoodur Rahman, C.J.).
159. As the Court put it:
It was, by no means, [Kelsen's] purpose to lay down any rule of law to the effect
that every person who was successful in grabbing power could claim to have
become also a law-creating agency. His purpose was to recognise that such
things as revolutions do also happen but even when they are successful they do
not acquire any valid authority to rule or annul the previous grund-norm until
they have themselves become a legal order by habitual obedience by the citi-
zens of the country. It is not the success of the revolution, therefore, that gives
it legal validity but the effectiveness it acquires by habitual submission to it from
the citizens.
Id at 180 (Harnoodur Rahman, C.J.).
160. Id. at 181. The Court went on to say.
[Kelsen] overlooked that for the purposes of International Law the legal person
is the State and not the community and that in International Law there is no
"legal order" as such. The recognition of a State under International Law has
nothing to do with the internal sovereignty of the State, and this kind of recog-
nition of a State must not be confused with the recognition of the Head of a
State or Government of a State. An individual does not become the Head of a
State through the recognition of other States but through the municipal law of
his own State.
Id (Hamoodur Rahman, CJ.).
161. Id. at 246-47. On the question whether ChiefJustice Munir, due to his involve-
ment with the coup d'etat was in principle precluded from sitting in judgment on its
validity, Yaqub AliJ., commented: "I can only venture to observe that no one was more
deeply initiated in judicial propriety than the learned ChiefJustice." Id.
162. Id. at 229 (Yaqub Ali, J.).
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have a free hand in this regard. 163 By the time filani was decided, the
military regime had fallen and had been replaced by an elected govern-
ment. Because the elections of 1970, on which the validity of the suc-
ceeding elected government rested, were held under a framework
pronounced by the military regime; the Court felt compelled to give legal
effect to certain acts of the illegal usurper regime.16 The Court
employed the doctrine of implied mandate, first enunciated by Hugo Gro-
tius, according to which courts may validate certain necessary acts of a
usurper done in the interest of preserving the state because the lawful
sovereign would have also wanted these acts to be undertaken. 165 Further-
more, relying upon Lord Pearce's dissent in the Privy Council decision in
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke,166 the Court pronounced a catalog of four
independent grounds of "condonation" of acts of an illegal usurper
regime:
(1) all transactions which are past and closed, for, [sic] no useful purpose
can be served by reopening them, (2) all acts and legislative measures which
are in accordance with, or could have been made under, the abrogated
Constitution or the previous legal order, (3) all acts which tend to advance
or promote the good of the people, (4) all acts required to be done for the
ordinary orderly running of the State and all such measures as would estab-
lish or lead to the establishment of, in our case, the objectives mentioned in
the Objectives Resolution of 1954.167
The cogently argued critique of Kelsen remains a major contribution
of filani It forced other jurisdictions to re-examine the theory of revolu-
tionary legality. But the Court's combined use of the doctrines of implied
mandate and state necessity, notwithstanding the Court's insistence that
this was "a principle of condonation and not legitimation,"'68 makes the
163. The interface of extra-constitutional political reality and judicial review was
acknowledged:
May be, that on account of his holding the coercive apparatus of the State, the
people and the Courts are silenced temporarily, but let it be laid down firmly
that the order which the usurper imposes will remain illegal and the Courts will
not recognize its rule and act upon them as dejure. As soon as the first oppor-
tunity arises, when the coercive apparatus falls from the hands of the usurper,
he should be tried for high treason and suitably punished. This alone will serve
as a deterrent to would be adventurers.
Id. at 243 (Yaqub All, J.).
164. Id. at 204-05.
165. Id. at 205. See also Huco GRoTrus, DEJURE BraiT. Ac PAcds LiRi T .s [THE LAw
OF WAR & PEAC E Bk. 1, Ch. 4, § 15 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925).
166. [1968] 3 All E.RI 561 (P.C.).
167. flani, 1972 P.L.D. S. Ct. at 207. The Objectives Resolution, adopted by the first
constituent assembly in 1949, contains the guiding principles for the constitution of the
country. The Resolution envisaged a representative government, a federal system with
extensive provincial autonomy, guaranteed fundamental rights, the rule of law, and an
independent judiciary.
168. Id. at 207. Expressly excluded was
any act intended to entrench the usurper more firmly in his power or to
directly help him run the country contrary to its legitimate objectives... [and]
anything which seriously impairs the rights of the citizens except in so far as
they may be designed to advance the social welfare and national solidarity.
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decision vulnerable to criticism. First, condoning wrongdoing is an execu-
tive function not within the purview of the judiciary. Second, the rule of
decision, fashioned by Grotius, came from an era of absolute monarchies
before constitutional representative governance, rule of law, and separa-
tion of powers were established. Finally, the inclusion of the omnibus pro-
vision-"an acts which tend to advance or promote the good of the
people"-is troublesome. Besides being very close to constructs like
"peace and good government," traditionally used to denote unfettered leg-
islative power of sovereign legislatures, it does not provide any verifiable
standard of "good of the people" and is silent as to who shall judge the
same. This provision opened the door for the Court to use this construc-
tion to bestow unfettered legislative capacity on a military regime five years
later.
G. The Liasi Case: Cyprus 1975
1. The Context
On July 15, 1974, a coup d'etat took place in Cyprus. 169 Greek military
officers, who were in Cyprus for service in the Cyprus National Guard, led
and organized the coup in collaboration with the National Guard and an
outlawed paramilitary organization. 170 The elected President was forced
to flee, and the coup makers installed one Nicolaos Sampson as President
of the Republic. 17' The coup prompted the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey
onJuly 20, 1974.172 There was a cease-fire agreement onJuly 23, 1974.173
That same day, the usurper President resigned and the President of the
House of Representatives assumed the duties of the President. During the
.eight days that the usurpers held office, a number of public officials were
removed from their jobs and others appointed in their place. 174 Some
police constables whose service was terminated by an officer appointed by
the usurpers challenged their dismissal in Liasi v. Attorney-GeneraL175
2. The Judicial Response: Success Plus Popular Acceptance and the Doctrine of
De Facto Organ
The applicants' plea that their termination "was an act non-existent in law
and without any legal effect whatsoever as made by a person acting in usur-
pation of power,"' 76 turned on whether the coup d'etat regime had legal
validity. On this question "both parties agree [d] as to the legal position" 177
Id.
169. For the background and context of the coup, see HAUL IBRA-M SAaH, CYPRUS:
THE IMPAcT OF DVERSE NATIONAuSM ON A STATE (1978); 1LR. DENKTASH, THE CYPRUS
TRtANGLE (1982); CYPRUS: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsen ed., 4th ed. 1993).
170. SAuH, supra note 169, at 88.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 91.
173. CYPRUS: A CoUNTRY STUDY, supra note 169, at 43.
174. Liasi v. Attorney General, 1975 C.L.R. 558 passim (Cyprus).
175. Id. at 568.
176. Id. at 571.
177. Id.
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in that the Deputy Attorney-General "made clear the position of the state
... that the subjudice decision is legally non-existent and illegal as emanat-
ing from... the act of a public authority, which in itself was legally non-
existent." 178
The Court, whose search for applicable principles took it as far back
as Roman Law, advanced the following proposition:
According to the case law and legal theories, two are the basic tests whereby
a coup d'etat is legalized. The first, the substantial test, is popular accept-
ance, even if a tacit one, of the change and the legal values thereby invoked
and the second, the formal test, is the legalization of the "Coup d'Etat Gov-
ernment" through the recognition of its actions by the next lawful
Government.1 79
Examining the "real facts and circumstances of the coup d'etat," the
Court noted that violence accompanied the coup, resulting in many dead
and injured; a curfew was imposed and kept in place; and strong resistance
was offered by state agencies and the people.' 8 0 The Court opined:
According to the generally accepted principles of Law, it was indispensable,
that further to the submission there would have been active acceptance, or a persist-
ently long and conscious silence under the appropriate conditions, and there
were not existing appropriate conditions for an opportunity to be given for
manifesting, if it would have ever been manifested, a conscious recognition,
or a tacitly manifested respect of the coup d'etat.18 1
The Court held that the coup failed to meet the substantial test of
legality: "The violently imposed will did not manage to inspire the respect
and the obedience to the values which it invoked and called upon society
as a whole to recognize." 182 As for the formal test, i.e., recognition of
actions of a usurper regime by the subsequent lawful government, the
Court noted that the lawful government had reinstated many public offi-
cials dismissed by the usurpers and the legislature had enacted the coup
d'etat (Special Provisions) Law, 1975 (No. 57 of 1975), which expressly
provided that "the coup d'etat and the 'coup d'etat Government' had no
legal basis whatsoever."' 83 The Court thus held that the usurper regime
178. Id. Furthermore, by consent "an extensive study by the Deputy Attorney-Gen-
eral on the Legal Consequences of the coup d'etat" was placed before the Court, and "a
number of facts of public nature were declared as agreed upon by counsel or were
proved by documents put in by consent." Id.
179. Id. at 573.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
182. Id.
183. Id. The Court quoted the reasoning accompanying the Bill:
[T]he intention of the Bill was the restoration of the lawful order which was
disturbed as a result of the coup d'etat by applying according to the Topar
Doctrine of the principle of constitutional order and the nonrecognition,
according to the Stimson Doctrine of illegal situations created as a result of
illegal violence in the course of the coup d'etat .... [Precedents for similar
legislative action were found] in France by the Ordinance of the 9th August,
1944, "in relation to the acts of the government of Vichy and in Greece by the
constituent act 58/1945 in relation to the enactments during the time of the
Cornell International Law Journal
failed the formal test too.
The Court then considered whether the doctrine of the de facto
organs applied to the case. This doctrine, which is prompted by "reasons
of social order and stability... [and is] combined with the legal principle
that 'common misconception creates law,'"'18 4 provides that acts of a de
facto, though illegal, public organ be deemed valid if it constitutes "a plau-
sible appointment... [and does] not suffer from such an illegality so as to
be rendered as non-existent in law."185 The "plausible appointment" is to
be tested on an objective standard of "whether in the opinion of a reason-
able and prudent man, under the circumstances, in which in the particu-
lar case the appointee was exercising his duties, it was possible and
reasonable to be taken that he was legally possessing the capacity of the
organ."186
The Court held that the element of plausibility was lacking because
appointment of the Police Chief who dismissed the applicants constituted
"a local extension of usurpation of power and overthrow of the constitu-
tional order."187 Moreover, because the circumstances of the illegal
appointment "were known to everyone," the case falls within an exception
to the de facto organ doctrine, namely that the doctrine "does not apply
where the circumstances responsible for the legal defect, are known to
everybody."' 88
Both the fact that the short-lived usurper regime had already fallen
and the fact that the new regime had also joined the petitioner's plea to
designate the coup d'etat illegal, made this an easy case to decide. While
filani had only implied some desirable modifications of Kelsen's doctrines,
Liasi introduced the "popular acceptance" test for legalization of a coup
d'etat. But, as discussed below, this only exacerbated the evidentiary
problems for a court attempting to determine the success of a coup d'etat
and further confused the separate issues of legitimacy and validity of a
legal order.
enemy occupation and by the constituent acts as from 1.8.1974 to 7.8.1974 and
of the Fourth resolution of the Fifth Revisional Assembly [of Greece] in relation
to the enactments and acts during the time of the dictatorship from 21.4.1967
until 23.7.1974."
Id at 574-75.
184. Id at 576 (citation omitted).
185. Id (citation omitted).
186. 1L (citation omitted). In establishing that the doctrine of de facto organs is not
unknown to the English common law, the Court cited Adams v. Adams, [1970] 3 All E.R.
572,589, and R v. Bedford Level Corporation, [1805] 6 East 356 ("An officer de facto is
one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good
officer in point of law.").
187. Liasi, 1975 C.L.R. at 576.
188. id. at 577.
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H. The Bhutto Case: Pakistan 1977
1. The Context
Following the repudiation of revolutionary legality by filani, Pakistan
started its first experiment with representative democracy under a Consti-
tution adopted in 1973.189 However, the experiment was short lived. Fol-
lowing charges of organized rigging of the general elections of early 1977,
mass protests and civil disobedience ensued. On July 5, 1977, the military
declared martial law, removed and detained the Prime Minister and dis-
solved the Parliament. Mindful of the holding offilani and Article 6 of the
1973 Constitution, which designated subversion of the Constitution as
treason, the military regime took the position that "the Constitution has
not been abrogated. Only the operation of certain parts of the Constitu-
tion has been held in abeyance."19 0 Detention of the Prime Minister
under Martial Law Order No. 12 of 1977, was challenged before the
Supreme Court in Bhutto v. Chief of Army Stafl'9 x as a violation of funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
2. The Judicial Response: Constitutional Deviation Dictated by Necessity
The Supreme Court admitted the petition for hearing in defiance of
express ouster ofjurisdiction from martial law orders. As an expression of
its disapproval, the regime removed the Chief Justice within two days of
admission of the petition.' 92 The petitioner urged the Court to follow
filan4 and to designate the coup an illegal usurpation. The regime,
besides pointing to the ouster ofjurisdiction and the suspension of funda-
mental rights by the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977,193 relied
on Kelsen to argue that the proclamation of martial law had brought a
new legal order into being, and this new legal order, even if it were only
temporary, had displaced the former legal order.'9 4 While the Court
189. For details of political and constitutional developments from 1969 to 1977, see
WASEEM, supra note 11, at 239-361; SAt-EDr, supra note 151, at 84-112.
190. Announcement of the Chief Martial Law Administrator, quoted in Bhutto v.
Chief of Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. S. Ct. 657, 714-15 (Pakistan). He added, "I hold the
judiciary of the country in high esteem .... However,... if and when Martial Law
Orders and Martial Law Regulations are issued, they would not be challenged in any
Court of law." Id.
191. 1977 P.L.D. S. Ct. 657 (Pakistan).
192. The Laws (Continuance in Force) (Fifth Amendment) Order, 1977, revoked
the 5th and 6th Constitutional Amendment Acts insofar as they amended Article 179 of
the Constitution. As a result, Yaqub Ali, C.J., was retired. See Pakistani Military Ruler
Ousts the ChiefJustie N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 23, 1977, at A5. Justice Yaqub Ali had proffered a
scathing denunciation of coups d'etat in his concurring opinion in filani, and was
rewarded with appointment as the ChiefJustice by the elected government upon the
retirement of Hamoodur Rahman. The Constitution was later amended to give him an
extraordinary extension of tenure.
193. The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 (CMIA Order No. 1 of 1977),
amended by CMLA Orders Nos. 2-6 of 1977, reprinted in Leslie Wolf-Phillips et al., 77w
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, in 13 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 123-
33 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1986) (edition superseded).
194. According to the regime, "the grundnorm of the old Legal Order, as provided by
the 1973 Constitution, has given way to a new grundnormn," and the transition to the new
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refused to resurrect Dosso and rejected the argument that "effectiveness of
the political change [is] the sole condition or criterion of its legality,"1 95 it
also declined to follow filani and hold the coup d'etat an illegal usurpa-
tion.' 9 6 While recognizing its own inability to determine "the factual cor-
rectness or otherwise of the several allegations and counter allegations
made by the parties against each other,"197 the Court, after considering
"the total milieu in which the change [was] brought about,"' 9 8 concluded
that the coup d'etat was "an extra-constitutional step, but obviously dic-
tated by the highest considerations of State necessity and welfare of the
people,"' 99 and christened the new legal order "a phase of constitutional
deviation dictated by necessity."200 While insisting that "the 1973 Consti-
tution still remains the supreme law of the land, subject to the condition
that certain parts thereof have been held in abeyance,"20 1 and that "the
superior Courts continue to have the power of judicial review,"20 2 the
Court held that the legislative capacity of the military regime included the
"power to amend [the 1973 Constitution]." 203 This, coupled with the vali-
dating "acts which tend to advance or promote the good of the people,"
20 4
amounted to bestowing unfettered legislative power on the extra-constitu-
tional regime, and ignored the traditional limits of the doctrine of neces-
sity which the Court claimed it was applying.
Qaisar Khan, J., however, was of the view that due to the success of the
coup, a "de facto new Legal Order" had displaced the 1973 Constitution
completely, and the Judges of the Supreme Court by taking a new oath of
office prescribed by the military regime "have conceded the de facto exist-
ence of the new Legal Order."2 0 5 Quoting Kelsen and Madzimbamuto
order "has not been brought about by any means recognised or contemplated by the
1973 Constitution," and therefore, "it constitutes a meta-legal or extra-Constitutional
fact, attracting the doctrine of 'revolutionary legality.'" Bhutto, 1977 P.L.D. S. Ct. at 671.
195. Id. at 692. Kelsen's theory was criticized for "exclud[ing] from consideration
sociological factors of morality and justice," because according to the Court "validity of
the grundnom has an ethical background... an element of morality is built in it as part
of the criterion of its validity." Id.
196. Id. at 706. The Court reasoned thatfilani applies only to situations where there
is no necessity for extra-constitutional assumption of power, which was not the case with
the 1977 coup. Id. at 708.
197. Id. at 693.
198. Id. at 692. This was defined as "the objective political situation prevailing at the
time, its historical imperatives and compulsions; the motivations of those responsible
for the change, and the extent to which the old Legal Order is sought to be preserved
or suppressed." Id. at 692-93.
199. Id. at 703. In reaching this determination the Court relied primarily on, and
quoted extensively from, a speech made by the chief of the army on the day of the
coup. Id. 703-04.
200. Id. at 716.
201. Id. at 715.
202. Id. at 716.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 742. The Chief Justice, author of the main opinion, however, took the
position that taking of the "fresh oath" did not preclude the Court's examination of
"the validity of the new Legal Order," rather, "it only indicates that the superior judici-
ary, like the rest of the country, has accepted the fact, which is even otherwise also
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extensively, he argued, "The municipal Courts have always to enforce the
laws of the de facto Government as it is such a Government which can
enact law, can appoint Judges and can enforce the execution of law."20 6
He concluded that because the Court "derives its jurisdiction from the
new Legal Order," it cannot assert jurisdiction in defiance of provisions of
the new order.20 7
The "phase of constitutional deviation" sanctioned by Bhutto lasted
over eight years; martial law was lifted on December 30, 1985. As for the
survival of judicial review, the Supreme Court in Bhutto v. State,208 held
that once a regime had been validated by the doctrine of necessity, its
individual actions had to be construed as being necessary if they reason-
ably fell within the categories enumerated in Bhutto, and the executive had
broad discretion in this regard. The military regime made a clean break
with even the minimal limitations upon its legislative capacity implied by
Bhutto by promulgating the Provisional Constitutional Order, 1981 [PCO],
whereby the earlier pretense of keeping the 1973 Constitution alive
though in abeyance was dispensed with.20 9 This was prompted by Quetta
High Court's invalidation of the Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1980
(P.O. No. 1 of 1980), which oustedjurisdiction of superior courts to ques-
tion proceedings or orders of military courts and tribunals.210 The PCO
expressly provided:
Notwithstanding any judgment of any court, including any judgment in
respect of the powers of the courts relating to judicial review, any court,
including the Supreme Court and a High Court, shall not ... make an
order relating to the validity or effect of any Order... made by the Chief
Martial Law Administrator or a Martial Law Administrator or of anything
done, or action taken, or intended to be done or taken, thereunder.211
This blanket ouster of the courts' jurisdiction was coupled with the
requirement that all superior courtjudges take a new oath of office pledg-
ing fidelity to the PCO2 12 and inviting only selected judges to take the new
oath.213 Furthermore, the military regime expressly assumed the power to
evident, that on the 5th of July 1977, a radical transformation took place in the pre-
existing Legal Order." Id. at 674.
206. Id. at 743.
207. Id. at 740, 748.
208. 1978 P.L.D. S. CL 40 (Pakistan).
209. For complete text of the PCO, see Wolf-Phillips et al., supra note 193, at 149-58.
210. Suleman v. President Special Military Court, 1980 N.LR. Civ. Quetta 873 (Paki-
stan). The Court said that attempts to take away the power of the superior courts to
judge the existence of necessity warranting the actions of the military regime signal "the
stage where doubts would be cast as to the continued validity of Constitutional devia-
tion." Id. at 888. Significantly, the Court said that "the interim Government is not
entitled to make basic changes in the Constitution so as to alter the fundamental struc-
ture of the Constitution." Id. at 891.
211. Wolf-Phillips et al., supra note 193, at 156.
212. For text of the new oath, see id. at 157.
213. Those not invited and those who refused to take the oath, in all nineteen
judges, automatically lost their office. This included the author of the main Bhutto opin-
ion, Anwarul Haq, C.J. See Della Denmon, Pakistan: Crack Down on the Courts, FAR E.
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amend the Constitution at will.2 14 The PCO thus "sealed the defeat of the
Court's constitutional endeavors."
2 15
I. The Valabhaji Case: Seychelles 1981
1. The Context
Upon gaining independence, Seychelles adopted the Independence Con-
stitution of 1976, which provided for a parliamentary form of government.
On June 5, 1977, a coup d'etat deposed the constitutional government.
The coup leaders charged that the deposed President intended to alter
the Constitution and postpone until 1984 elections due in 1979.216 A
Proclamation by the coup leaders onJune 13, 1977, suspended the Consti-
tution and vested the power to make laws by decree in France Albert Rene,
the ex-Prime Minister, who the coup makers installed as President.
Another Proclamation on June 28, 1977, revoked the constitution and
replaced it with one that eliminated the parliament and transferred unfet-
tered legislative powers to the President. The extra-constitutional regime
formulated another Constitution in 1979. This regime purported to
become the constitutional government in 1981 by elections deemed to
have endorsed the new constitution. Free multi-party elections were not
held until July 1993.217
2. The Judicial Response: Kelsen Rehabilitated
Valabhaji v. Controller of Taxes2 18 furnished the Seychelles Court of Appeal
the opportunity to examine the validity of the usurpation. The appellant,
who had been served notices of amended assessments of income tax under
the Income Tax Decree of 1978, argued that the Decree, and in effect all
legislation enacted in Seychelles in 1977 and 1978 by the President as the
sole legislative authority, was unconstitutional. The attorney-general, rep-
resenting the State, relied on the application of Kelsen in Dosso and
Matovu to propose, "When a Government in power has effective control
with the support of a majority of the people and is able to govern effi-
ciently that Government should be recognized as legal."219 The attorney-
general also reminded the court of de Smith's admonition, "Legal theo-
rists have no option but to accommodate their concepts to the facts of
political life. Successful revolution sooner or later begets its own legal-
ECON. REv., Apr. 3, 1981, at 14; Mm KHuDA BAYASH MAmU, AJUDGE MAY SPEAK 71-120
(1990).
214. See Article 16, PCO, reprinted in Wolf-Phillips et al., supra note 193, at 156 ("The
President as well as the Chief Martial Law Administrator shall have, and shall be
deemed always to have had, the power to amend the Constitution.").
215. Conrad, supra note 9, at 124.
216. For a brief account of the coup, see ANNUAL SURvEY OF COMMONWEALTH Law
1977 61 (J. M. Fmunis ed., 1979).
217. See L.A. TMEs, July 27, 1993, World Report, at 1.
218. Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1980, Seychelles Court of Appeals, (Unreported opinions
of Hogan, P., LavoipierreJ.A., and MustafaJ., on file with the author), summarized in
7 COMMONWEALTH L BuLL. 1249 (1981).
219. Valabhaji, Civ. App. No. 11 at 9 (opinion of Haynes, P.).
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ity."220 The Court's survey of "judicial consideration in recent years" of
"abrupt changes in Government," demonstrated that there was "some vari-
ety of opinion," but that "frequently the differences lie more in the assess-
ment of fact or the application of principle to fact than in the substance of
the principles themselves."22 1 The Court found:
Throughout the decisions and the relevant literature there is an acceptance
of the need to preserve the fabric of society.... If the State and society are to
survive, a gulf cannot be permitted to open between what the executive arm and the
judiciary believe to be the legal basis of authority in the country, the 'grund' norm
as it has been called.2 22
Review of the case law and scholarly literature led the President of the
Court, Sir Michael Hogan, to conclude:
Central to nearly all thinking on this subject is the belief that sovereignty
ultimately depends on consent or acceptance by the people, manifested by
obedience to the precepts of those claiming authority. Most of the disputes
have turned on whether that acceptance had been established or at what
point it had been established, but once firmly established there appears to have
been little dispute as to its consequences. . . .Acceptance, consent or its
equivalent remains a touchstone,
223
Hogan, P., then raised the question: "How is [consent] to be ascer-
tained?" 224 After noting the diversity of positions on this central issue,225
he concluded that, "whether the term chosen is success or submission,
consent or acceptance, efficacy or obedience there appears to be a consen-
sus or at least a strong preponderance of opinion that once the new regime is
firmly or irrevocably in control it becomes a lawful or legitimate government and
entitled to the authority that goes with that status."226 He then dealt with the
220. Id. at 10 (quoting STANLEYA. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL & ADmNsTRATIvE LAW
76 (4th ed. 1981)).
221. ValabhajW4 Civ. App. No. 11 at 10 (opinion of Hogan, P.).
222. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added). But compare justice Fieldsend's rejection of the
proposition that "the repository of one part of the sovereign power must acquiesce in
the illegal assumption of power by the repository of the other part." Madzimbamuto v.
Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Afr. L.R. 284, 428 (Rhodesia App. Div.).
223. Valabhaji, Civ. App. No. 11 at 12 (opinion of Hogan, P.) (emphasis added).
After considering Hamoodur Rahman, C.J.'s statement in filani, that the "de facto sov-
ereign ... could become dejure only by 'election or ratification' by the people... [and
that the] physical force he possesses can never by itself give him the legal right," Hogan,
P., commented: "Whether that statement can be reconciled with the facts of history
must depend on the measure and weight given to the expression 'by itself.'" Valabhaji,
Civ. App. No. 11 at 12 (citingJilani v. Government of Punjab, 1972 P.L.D. S. Ct. 139,
174 (Pakistan)).
224. Id. at 13.
225. According to Hogan, P.,
Elections, held underfair conditions, probably provide the most convincing proof but...
regimes have been accepted as legitimate even when they lacked that authentication. Obe-
dience, when manifest, has also been recognized as a form of ratification. Hamoodur
Rahman, C.J., infilani suggested it should extend over a period but experience
indicates that, on occasion, it has been so widespread and complete as to leave
no doubt as to its existence virtually from the outset.
Id. (emphasis added).
226. Id. (emphasis added).
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timing of validity and legitimacy of a usurper regime and asked, "But what
about the interval if any, before it is firmly established and is merely en
route to that position?" 227 Relying on the American case of Williams v.
Bruffy, 2 28 he held that "when a regime is firmly established and accepted
as legitimate this legitimation is extended back to cover legislation exacted
by the regime from the inception of its control." 229 He noted that the
Court had the advantage of not having to decide this case "in mediis rebus,"
but after an interval of some four years, "during which the new revolution-
ary regime has enjoyed unchallenged authority and maintained stable and
effective government in the Seychelles, with little or no interruption in the
ordinary life of its citizens. But, even if I did not have the benefit of this
hindsight I believe I would have come to the conclusion from the smooth-
ness and efficacy of the revolutionary transition that the new regime had
by the 28th June 1977 received such widespread and unqualified accept-
ance and consent that it was already a legal authority at that time."
23 0
The Court ultimately held that the decrees enacted in 1977 and 1978,
including the Income Tax Assessment Decree of 1978, were valid and
enforceable because the extra-constitutional regime had acquired legiti-
macy and validity.2 3 '
J. The Mitchell Case: Grenada 1986
1. The Context
Grenada became an independent state in 1974, with a Constitution that
provided for a parliamentary system and fundamental human rights.
23 2
The Constitution also established a Supreme Court of Grenada and the
22 7. Id.
228. 96 U.S. 176 (1878).
229. Valabhaji, Civ. App. No. 11 at 14 (opinion of Hogan, P.). While Hogan, P.,
spoke of legitimacy, and opined that the tenure of a revolutionary regime cannot be
divided into legitimate and illegitimate portions, id. at 13-14, Williams confined itself to
validity. Williams, 96 U.S. at 186 ("The validity of... [the de facto government's] acts,
both against the parent state and its citizens or subjects, depends entirely on its ultimate
success.").
230. Valabhaji, Civ. App. No. 11 at 14 (opinion of Hogan, P.).
231. Id. Lavoipierre, J.A., concurred with the opinion of Hogan, P., on the ground
that"[t]he coup d'etat did not meet any opposition and ... there has been a stable and
effective government." Id. at 3 (opinion of Lavoipierre,J.A.). Mustafa,JA., considered
the criticisms directed at Kelsen byfilani and Bhutto and was "not convinced that these
criticisms seriously impair the validity of Kelsen's doctrine." Id. at 11 (opinion of Mus-
tafa, J.A.). Insisting that "in dealing with such situations .... pragmatism must inform
any judicial attitude," he was "satisfied that the successful coup or revolution had
acquired effectiveness through habitual submission to it by the people of Seychelles."
Id. at 15. Noting that the petitioner acknowledged that the 1979 Constitution, itself a
product of the 1977 coup, was valid, MustafaJA., said that "a coup Government which
continues in office and existence must be viewed as a whole, and if it has become legiti-
mate and valid, then such legitimacy relates back to its inception, that is, it becomes
legitimate and valid ab initio.... I do not think such a Government can be divided into
legitimate and illegitimate portions." Id. at 16.
232. For the constitutional history of Grenada, see Sm FRaF PHILLIPS, WEsr INDIAN
CONsTrrtuONS: Pos-IuNDEPzENzuc REFORMs 21-22 (1985); Mitchell v. Director of Pub-
lic Prosecutions, 1986 L.R.C. Const. 35, 41-50 (Grenada).
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West Indies Associated States and the right to appeal to the Privy Council.
On March 13, 1979, the New Jewel Movement, a leftist political party,
staged a coup d'etat against the notoriously corrupt Prime Minister Sir
Eric Gairy, and assumed power as the People's Revolutionary Government
(PRG). 233 The PRG suspended the Constitution, although the Queen
remained the Head of State, and the Governor-General remained in
office. 234 The PRG also took all executive and legislative power and abol-
ished appeals to the Privy Council, and established new superior courts.23 5
Existing laws continued in force, except as amended or repealed by the
PRG.23 6
On October 19, 1983, following dissension within the PRG, the Prime
Minister and other Ministers were killed, and General Austin, head of the
army, assumed power, declaring himself Chairman of a Revolutionary Mili-
tary Council (RMC).237 Six days later, armed forces of the United States
and some Caribbean states invaded Grenada and arrested members of the
RMC.238 Following the cessation of hostilities on October 31, 1983, the
Governor-General issued a proclamation whereby he assumed executive
control of the government of Grenada.2 39 By another proclamation, the
Governor-General declared a state of emergency, assumed legislative pow-
ers, declared continuation of all laws in force before October 19, 1983,
subject to modifications, and retained the judicial system created by
PRG.240 On November 9, 1984, the Governor-General promulgated the
Constitution of Grenada Order 1984, which brought the 1973 Constitu-
tion back in force except as amended by the Governor-General. 241 Follow-
ing new elections, the new legislature enacted Act No. 1 of 1985, "to
confirm the validity of laws made during the period between March 1979
and November 1984 [when the Constitution of Grenada was
suspended]."242
In August 1984, 19 leaders of the RMC were charged with murder and
were bound over to stand trial before the High Court of Grenada. In a
pretrial motion, the defendants challenged the legal existence, constitu-
tionality, and validity of the High Court. They claimed that the High
Court formed part of the judicial system which the PRG had created in a
233. Mitchell 1986 L.R.C. Const. at 46.
234. Id. at 46-47.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 47.
238. For analyses of international legal issues involved in this intervention, see John
Quigley, The United States Invasion of Grenada: Stranger than Fiction, 18 U. MiMI INTE.R-
AMERIcAN L. Rnv. 271 (1986-87); Symposium, The United States Action in Grenada, 78 AM.
J. INT'L L. 131 (1984).
239. Proclamation by the Governor-General, published in an Extraordinary issue of
the Grenada Government Gazette, Vol. 101, No. 49 of October, 31, 1983, reprinted in
PHMLIPS, supra note 232, at 21-22.
240. See id. at 22-39; Mitchell, 1986 L.R.C. Const. at 48.
241. Id. at 49.
242. People's Laws, Interim Government Proclamations & Ordinances, Confirma-
tion of Validity Act, 1985, reprinted in Mitchell; 1986 L.R.C. Const. at 49-50.
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manner contrary to the 1973 Constitution and was hence invalid. Further-
more, they claimed the Governor-General's confirmation of the PRGjudi-
cial system was also an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power.
Finally, insofar as Act No. 1 of 1985 purported to accord validity to PRG's
judicial system legislation and the Governor-General's later confirmation
of the same, it constituted an amendment of deeply entrenched provisions
of the Constitution by way of ordinary legislation.
243
2. The Judicial Response: Kelsen Modified-Effective Control Plus Popular
Support
In the High Court, ChiefJustice Sir Archibald Nedd started with the ques-
tion: "Did the PRG establish its own grundnorM?"2 4 4 He answered the
question in the negative because PRG's Declaration of Revolution had
pledged an early return to constitutional rule and its changes in the judi-
cial system were minor.2 45 However, because the PRG had overthrown a
repressive, though constitutional, regime, "There is no doubt that the
revolution was a popular one and welcomed by the majority."24 6 Thus, it
was not "a usurper in the filani sense but rather a usurper in the sense [of]
... the Seychelles [Valabhajil case.., that is to say with a right to have his
acts validated or condoned by the application of the doctrine of neces-
sity."2 4 7 The Court held that "the situation at the time of the seizure of
power and the effectiveness of the rule... [while] the PRG held power go
to make valid and/or legitimate acts of the PRG."2 48 The Court further
ruled that the High Court was legal and valid and had jurisdiction to hear
and determine the indictments preferred against the accused. The Court
based this determination on grounds of necessity. Because the pre-revolu-
tionary court, the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court, had
ceased to function in Grenada in the wake of the coup, it was a matter of
public necessity that the PRG should have instituted its own system of
courts.249 The Governor-General's actions were likewise validated.2 50
Consequently, the High Court, though admittedly extra-constitutional,
243. For the defendants' position and relief sought, see id. at 95-96.
244. Mitchell v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1985 L.R.C. Const. 127, 137 (Gre-
nada High Ct).
245. Id. at 138-48. The Court quoted with approval the holding of Bhutto that "the
theory of revolutionary legality can have no application or relevance to a situation
where the breach of legal continuity is of a purely temporary nature and for a specified
limited purpose." Id. at 149.
246. Id. at 143.
247. Id. at 150-51.
248. Id. at 152. While the Court noted that the conclusion in usurpation cases
"always rested on the circumstances or if you prefer it, the facts which were applied to
the principle," id. at 157, its factual findings underlying the holdings were the result of
judicial notice and as Nedd, C.J., put it "because I was a part of the system and I know." Id.
at 146 (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 146, 152. The rule of decision was summarized to hold that acts of a
usurper may be
validated... or legitimated according to the circumstances obtaining at the
time which should include the acceptance by the people of his acts, the exist-
ence of an urgent and pressing need for the act done and of a proper motive by
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was nevertheless valid and had jurisdiction over the matter on grounds of
public necessity.
On appeal, Haynes, President of the Court of Appeals, held that,
while he was unable to find that the PRG had ever attained de jure sta-
tus,2 51 the High Court was "temporarily" valid on grounds of state neces-
sity, until such time as the current government took appropriate steps to
reinstate the Court contemplated by the 1973 Constitution.252 Peterkin,
J., concurred with both conclusions.2 53 Liverpool, J., concurred with vali-
dation of the High Court on grounds of necessity,2 4 but also held that the
PRG had become "legitimate or lawful government."255
which the acts are being activated plus the absence of any alternative means of
achieving the desired end.
Id. at 152.
250. Id. at 157.
251. Mitchell v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1986 LR.C. Const. 35, 74
(Grenada).
252. Id. at 94. In order to determine the nature and scope of the doctrine of state
necessity, Haynes, P., conducted an extensive survey of the English case law, adoption
of the doctrine in other common law jurisdictions, and the practice in France, Greece
and Italy. Id. at 76-88. He then listed the requisite conditions for the application of the
doctrine:
(i) an imperative necessity must arise because of the existence of exceptional
circumstances not provided for in the constitution, for immediate action to be
taken to protect or preserve some vital function to the State; (ii) there must be
no other course of action reasonably available; (iii) any such action must be
reasonably necessary in the interest of peace, order, and good government; but
it must not do more than is necessary or legislate beyond that; (iv) it must not
impair the just rights of citizens under the constitution; (v) it must not be one
the sole effect and intention of which is to consolidate or strengthen the revolu-
tion as such.
Id. at 88-89. As for the duration of the temporary legality, Haynes, P., said: "[U]ntil
either effective steps shall have been taken to resume the State's participation in the
pre-revolution Supreme Court or constitutional legislation shall have been passed... to
establish another Supreme Court in its place. Of course it is assumed the Government
will act with reasonable despatch." Id. at 94.
253. Id. at 116. His grounds for denying dejure status rested on the fact that the
revolution was referred to as a period of transition, the Constitution was suspended but
never abolished, the Governor-General was retained, and "the PRG failed to publish or
establish any form of Constitution of its own, nor did it ever canvass the approval of the
people of Grenada in any form of elections." Id. at 118.
254. Id. at 109.
255. Id. at 116. While Liverpool, J., lamented the fact that in the case "neither side
thought it fit to swear to and file an affidavit as to facts," id. at 109, his review of the case
law led him to hold that "when a government in power has effective control with the
support of a majority of the people and is able to govern efficiently, that government
should be recognized as legal." Id. at 115. He expressed the position that, "sovereignty,
or revolutionary legality, or de jure status, by whatever name it is called ultimately
depends on consent or acceptance by the people... which is manifested by the obedi-
ence to the precepts of those claiming to exercise authority over them." Id. Accord-
ingly, he found that: "The acceptance of the PRG by the people who gave obedience to
it, the smooth functioning of Government, the recognition of that Government by
innumerable countries and institutions, the imposition and collection of taxes without
resistance, altogether establish there was unqualified support for the PRG." Id. at 116.
This led him to hold that "the regime of the PRG was firmly in control of the country
throughout its tenure of office and could be regarded as having become a legitimate or
lawful government." Id.
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To determine the "twin questions of the legitimacy of a revolutionary
regime and/or the validity of any of its 'laws,'" Haynes, P., noted that the
PRG was recognized by many states, but opined that "such recognition
could and did not per se confer dejure status on the regime."256 He then
undertook an exhaustive though cautious review of Kelsen, Dosso, and its
commonwealth progeny.257 He found "the right principles of revolution-
ary legality ... from a distillation" of these cases, but he "modified or
qualified or amplified [them] for application here in Grenada or in the
Caribbean as a whole." 258 He listed four conditions for a revolutionary
regime to become valid and legitimate:
(a) the revolution was successful, in that the Government was firmly estab-
lished administratively, there being no other rival one; (b) its rule was effec-
tive, in that the people by and large were behaving in conformity with and
obeying its mandates; (c) such conformity and obedience was due to popu-
lar acceptance and support and was not mere tacit submission to coercion
or fear of force; and (d) it must not appear that the regime was oppressive
and undemocratic.
259
Characterizing each of these conditions as "a question of fact,"26 0
Haynes, P., found that, while the PRG met the first two conditions,26 1
there was insufficient proof of popular acceptance and support.262 He
256. Id. at 51. This position was premised on the position that "Rules or practices of
international law cannot decide the internal legitimacy or otherwise of the Government
of a State. That is a matter for the municipal law applicable in that State." Id.
257. Id. 53-71. The caution stemmed from his view.
[W]e must bear in mind that they [the Commonwealth Cases] are not binding
on this Court They can be persuasive only .... We must not assume that the
principles of law any of them adopted.., are right .... We must... satisfy
ourselves that they are right and acceptable to Caribbean jurisprudence. For
an approach and result acceptable in Pakistan or in Uganda or in Cyprus or in
Rhodesia or in the Seychelles might well not be socially acceptable to our
regional society. Caribbean political interests and public policy maight well be involved
and affect judicial coetualization ....
Id. at 50-51 (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 71. According to Haynes, P., the revolutionary legality cases "can and
should be able to guide Caribbean judges in the formation of principles of revolutionary
legality judicially sound and at the same time consistent with our political democratic ideology."
Id. (emphasis added).
259. Id. at 71-72. For Haynes, P., the rationale to modify Kelsen's formula was that
"Court[s] should not take an approach which might encourage power-seeking politi-
cians or over-ambitious army officers to believe that, if by force of arms they can grab
and retain governmental power for a few years, their government will become conse-
quently lawful and legitimate." Id. at 72.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 73. Haynes, P., was "prepared to regard as a notorious fact that there was
no sustained or effective or organized behavioral opposition to the regime." Id. at 51.
262. Id. at 74. He emphasized that "the legitimacy of the regime was not really in
issue between the parties in the Court below. But the ChiefJustice did and we felt we
had to consider it, and, at least, state our view on the relevant law." Id. at 75. He
elaborated on the last two conditions:
A revolutionary regime should not be accorded legitimacy by this Court unless
it is satisfied that, on the whole, the regime had the people behind it and with
it. Legality should be achieved only if and when the people accept and approve,
for in them lies political sovereignty and the Court so finds. This approval they
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rejected the High Court's determination that "the revolution was a popu-
lar one and welcomed by the majority of the Grenadans," 2 63 because there
was insufficient evidence from which to infer popular support.2 6 He was
neither "prepared to infer [legitimacy] from the mere length of time [in
power]," nor infer it from "the Governor-General's recognition and con-
tinuation of most of the laws promulgated by the [PRG] regime and/or
from Parliament's 'confirmation' of their 'validity' and like continu-
ance."26 5 He wondered, "[I]f the revolution had popular support, why the
substantial delay in going to the people for a mandate to rule?" 266 This
led him to conclude that "mine is not a judgment that the regime never
actually became a dejure government .... It is only a finding that, on the
limited material before us, I feel that I cannot find that it did... -"267 The
appeal was nevertheless dismissed because the High Court was found to be
temporarily valid on grounds of state necessity.268
may give ab initio or subsequently. Length of time might or might not be suffi-
cient to infer it. It might be expressed or tacit approval. But it is that which
should give legitimacy to a successful and effective revolutionary regime. The
support of a real majority is sufficient. This should be shown by its majority vote
at a general election or a referendum or a majority percentage at polls. In
Court it can be proved by agreed statements of fact (as in Valabhaji) or by affida-
vits (as in Matovu). And these modes are not exhaustive. If a Constitution was
abrogated, a new one should be substituted forthwith as happened in both
those cases.
Id. at 72.
263. Id. at 73 (quoting Nedd, C.J.).
264. Id. at 73. Haynes, P., noted that insufficiency of proof was "not surprising since
no Counsel invited this Court to reach a conclusion of legitimacy. It was not a part of
anybody's case." I. He was not prepared to accept that Nedd's position rested on
judicial notice of notorious facts, and said that the ChiefJustice "might well have been
expressing a personal opinion only." Id.
265. Id. at 73-74.
266. Id. at 74.
267. Id. at 75.
268. Id. at 94. The defendants then appealed to the Privy Council, which, in an
opinion by Lord Diplock, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Mitchell v.
Director of Public Prosecutions, 1986 L.R.C. Const. 122 (P.C.). Lord Diplock reasoned
that jurisdiction of the Privy Council to hear appeals required recourse to the Constitu-
tion of Grenada as currently in force, and the absolute and unambiguous terms of Peo-
ple's Law No. 84 of 1979, as confirmed by the 1985 Act, did not confer such
jurisdiction. Id. at 12325. Before the murder trial could get underway, the defendants
filed another constitutional motion arguing that the recognition of the High Court in
MitcheU was confined to criminal and civil matters and constitutional issues required a
separate constitutional court. The defendants further argued that the temporary
period for which validity of the High Court was recognized in Mitchelhad expired. The
Court of Appeal rejected both these arguments in Mitchell v. Director of Public Prose-
cutions, 1987 L.R.C. Const. 127 (Grenada). After an extensive review of the doctrine of
necessity as developed by common law courts, the Court said that its previous decision
in Mitchell on the continuing recognition of the High Court imposed no limitation on
the jurisdiction of that court and there was no other court with jurisdiction over consti-
tutional matters in Grenada. Id. at 140-51. The Court said that MitcheU Court
"expected that the need for continued legality and recognition of the High Court
would cease within a reasonable time .... What is a reasonable time to discharge any
obligation will depend on all the circumstances of the case existing at the time when
the obligation was imposed and on possible supervening relevant events." Id, at 139.
After noting that following recommendations of the Constitution Commission, the gov-
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K. The Mokotso Case: Lesotho 1988
1. The Context
Lesotho gained independent status in 1966, by virtue of the Lesotho Inde-
pendence Act 1966, enacted by the British Parliament. 269 A Westminster
model Constitution took effect on October 4, 1966, which provided for a
sovereign democratic kingdom, a bicameral parliamentary system, and
protection of fundamental human rights which formed part of the
entrenched provisions of the Constitution. The first general elections
were held on January 27, 1970, which resulted in the defeat of the incum-
bent Prime Minister, Chief Jonathan. Chief Jonathan's response was to
nullify the elections, suspend the Constitution, proclaim a state of emer-
gency and assume dictatorial powers while retaining the King as a figure-
head.2 70 For the next 16 years this extra-constitutional regime remained
in power and became notorious for abuses of political and individual free-
doms. OnJanuary, 20, 1986, the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LDF) staged
a coup d'etat. While the King remained in office, the LDF established a
Military Council. The King, acting on the advice of the Military Council,
assumed all executive and legislative authority. Existing laws were to
remain in force unless inconsistent with Orders of the Military Govern-
ment and the courts were to retain their jurisdiction. 271
In Mokotso, the plaintiffs, who alleged that the military regime had
denied their freedom of association guaranteed by the 1966 Constitution,
challenged the validity of the military regime and sought a declaration
that regimes established by both the 1970 and 1986 coups were
unlawful.2 72
2. The Judicial Response: Pure Kelsen Rehabilitated
The High Court of Lesotho, in a 168-page opinion by Cullinan, C.J.,
started with an acknowledgment that both the 1970 and 1986 coups were
extra-constitutional and proceeded to inquire whether they could be vali-
dated under any legal principles.273 The Court first examined Kelsen's
theory of revolutionary validity and summarized it as "the old truism, noth-
emiment was engaged in negotiations with other countries in the region to revive the
pre-1979 court, the Court found that "necessity has continued and is continuing up to
the present time... so that the [High] Court shall continue to be valid and beyond
challenge." Id. at 151.
269. For a general introduction to the history and politics of Lesotho, see JOHN E.
BARDiLu &JAMEs H. COBBE, LEsoTHo: DiLEMMAS OF DEPENDENCE iN SouTiERN AIuCA
(1985); GABRiiLx WmAI-STRoM, DEVELOPMENT & DEPENDENCE iN LEsoTHo: THE
ENCLAVE OF SouTH AFRcA (1978); Richard F. Weisfelder, The Basotho Nation-State: What
Legay for the Future? , 19J. MOD. Ara. STUD. 221, 247 (1981).
270. For an exhaustive study of the 1970 coup, see B.M. KHAKnTLA, LEsoTHo 1970:
AN AnmcAN Coup UNDER THE MicRoscoPr- (1972). For constitutional developments
since 1970, see James S. Read, Revolutionay Legality in Lesotho: A Fresh Look at Constitu-
tional Legitimay, 1991 J. AFR. L 209.
271. See Mokotso v. King Moshoeshoe II, 1989 L.R.C. Const. 24, 54-56 (Lesotho).
272. d. at 56-57. The Court termed the plaintiffs as a "farmer," a "tailor" and an
"accountant" who "describe themselves as politicians." Id. at 39.
273. Id. at 83-86.
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ing succeeds like success."2 74 The Court then surveyed the application of
Kelsen, 275 and the doctrine of State Necessity,27 6 in differentjurisdictions.
The Court concluded that, while the doctrine of state necessity was well-
established, its application indicates "confusion as to identifying where the
necessity lies in each case."277 The major problem identified was that,
although some courts "point to the necessity facing the Court, rather than
the necessity, if any, which gave rise to the unconstitutional action in the
first case ... [others] seem.., to place more emphasis upon the necessity
giving rise to the unconstitutional action."27 8 Finding that "the true test is
that of the necessity, if any, which faces the court,"2 79 i.e., that of avoiding
a legal vacuum and chaos and preserving the fabric of society, the doctrine
was held to be "appropriate to the case of a national emergency during the
administration of a lawful government."280 While the doctrine applies to
"the unconstitutional assumption of power by a constitutional authority,
where such action is taken to preserve rather than to destroy the old legal
order," after a successful revolution "[t]he likelihood is there, as the clash
of arms throughout the course of history establishes, that there never will
be any return, at least not to the old legal order as such."28 ' The Court
concluded:
In brief the question for the Court... as far as the doctrine of necessity is
concerned, is not whether to validate [unconstitutional] assumption of
power, for in truth it cannot do so on the basis of necessity, but whether to
validate the subsequent invalid but necessary actions of the power-assuming
authority, in order to preserve the fabric of society.... Thus to speak of the
doctrine operating to validate a new regime, rather than its action, is ... in
essence to apply the doctrine of the successful revolution.282
The Court then turned to Kelsen and observed that "[t]o deny Profes-
sor Kelsen's theory of the successful revolution is simply to turn one's back
on the course of history."28 3 The Court examined the criticisms leveled
against Kelsen by Sallah, filani, Bhutto and Mitchell, and countered that
these cases failed to recognize that while a revolution requires acceptance
to be deemed effective,28 4 acceptance does not mean that the new order
has to be popular, but simply involves "acquiescence... submission...
274. Id. at 90.
275. Id at 91-97. Cases examined included Dosso, Matou, Madzimbamuto, Sailah, and
Valabhaji.
276. Id. at 97-118. Cases examined included the Govemor-Gmeral, Ibrahim,
Madzimbamuto, Lakanmi, flani, Bhutto, and MitchelL
277. Id. at 118.
278. Id. at 120.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 121.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 123.
283. Id. at 124. Cullinan, CJ., noted that Kelsen's works have been translated into
more than sixteen languages, id. at 91, and that "Kelsen lent his name to the doctrine:
there are other advocates. Nonetheless as the leading advocate he bears the brunt of
fashionable criticism, a fashion which seemingly finds some origin in the judicial
dilemma." Id. at 124.
284. Id. at 127.
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obedience... [and] acceptance." 285 The Court then fashioned the test of
legitimation:
A court may hold a revolutionary Government to be lawful, and its legisla-
tion to have been legitimated ab initio, where it is satisfied that (a) the Gov-
ernment is firmly established, there being no other government in
opposition thereto; and (b) the.Government's administration is effective, in
that the majority of the people are behaving, by and large, in conformity
therewith.286
The Court placed the burden of proof of legitimacy on the new regime.287
The Court then considered the question of a court's "jurisdiction or
competence to decide on the legitimacy of a revolutionary regime."288
After reviewing the treatment of the question in Madzinbamuto, the Court
concluded:
Whether therefore the Judge is appointed under the old or the new legal
order, the situation is equally anomalous. One is called upon to pronounce
that the source of his authority has lost its validity, the other to pronounce
that the source of his authority never had any validity. I do not see that the
necessary inquiry is inconsonant with the particular judicial oath: on the
contrary, the oath binds the judicial conscience in the most difficult of cir-
cumstances. If, as a result of such inquiry the particular Judge finds his
position untenable, then that is also a matter for the judicial conscience.
But there can be no disclaimer of jurisdiction:, there can be no recusal.
Decide he must. 2
89
Applying the test of legitimation first to the 1970 coup d'etat, the
Court took "judicial notice" of "the notorious fact" that the coup was suc-
cessful.2 90 The Court cited and quoted with approval two unpublished
cases which held that the 1970 coup had proved to be a successful revolu-
tion establishing a lawful government.29 ' In view of this prior judicial rec-
285. Id. at 130-31 (quoting Ivor Jennings, filani and ValabhajO. The Court noted
that this proposition finds its origin "in the most reliable of all authorities, the course of
history." Id. at 131.
Cullinan, CJ., explained the proposition further.
[Tihe people may well accept without necessarily approving .... If they decide to
accept the new regime, even if that decision is based on weakness or fear, such a
decision may not be gainsaid, The Judge's... function ... goes no further than
giving effect to the will of the people. Ultimately it is the will of the people,
however motivated, which creates a new legal order and the Court must recog-
nize this fact and give effect thereto.
Id. at 132 (emphasis added). Cullinan, CJ., expressly rejected the last two prongs of the
Mitchell test that require conformity to be the result of popular support and not the
result of submission to coercion and that the regime not be oppressive and undemo-
cratic. Id. at 129.
286. Id. at 133.
287. Id. at 132 ("No presumption of regularity can operate in the regime's favor.
indeed there must be a presumption of irregularity.").
288. IM. at 133.
289. Id. at 139.
290. Id. at 140.
291. Id. at 140-42. The cases cited are Moerane v. R., C. of A. (CRI) No. 1 of 1975
(unreported) and Khaketla v. Prime Minister, Civ. App. Nos. 145 & 187 of 1985
(unreported).
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ognition, and the operation of stare decisis, the Court did not consider
any further discussion necessary.
Turning to the 1986 coup, the Court found that since the govern-
ment was firmly established and functioning effectively, it was the lawful
government.292 The Court first insisted that "[i]t is the people, not this
Court, who in reality by their acceptance have conferred legality upon the
Government."2 93 In making the determination of the efficacy of the coup
d'etat, the Court relied on an affidavit by the Attorney-General stating that
the government has effective control, its laws are enforced and obeyed,
and decisions of Courts are enforced.294 The Court proceeded to take
'judicial notice" of "notorious facts," which included the fact that the gov-
ernment is in effective control; that it has adopted a "formidable body of
legislation;" that it has facilitated effective functioning of the judiciary;
that the rule of law is firmly established; "that the vast majority of the peo-
ple are behaving in conformity with the Government's administration;"
and "that peace and stability now reign."2 95
The Court then assessed the popularity of the revolution.2 96 It again
took judicial notice of facts which included: the government's promotion
of health and education, establishment of peace and stability and jubila-
tion in the streets after the people had heard news of the coup d'etat.2 97
L. The Matanzima Case: Transkei 1988
1. The Context
Prior to 1976, Transkei formed part of the Republic of South Africa. 298 In
1976, it was granted independence by the Status of Transkei Act 100 of
1976.299 The Act gave the legislative assembly of Transkei the power to
adopt a Constitution for the new state. Such a Constitution was adopted
and came into effect on the day of independence, October 26, 1976.300
The Constitution, which envisaged a parliamentary form of government,
provided for a non-executive President, elected for seven years by the
National Assembly, who acted on the advice of the Executive Council
which consisted of the Ministers of State.3 0 ' Parliament, consisting of the
292. Mokotso, 1989 L.R.C. Const. at 144.
293. Id. at 164.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 164-66.
296. This inquiry is strange in light of the Court's view that "popularity oft revolution-
ary regime may be contributoy to, but not essential to its acceptance by the people." I& at 168
(emphasis added). Again, "popularity ... is not the issue." Id. at 131-32. Though the
Court acknowledged that "it was such popularity and acceptance by the people...
which influenced the Judges in deciding to remain in office, or to accept office." Id.
297. Id. at 161-68.
298. Matanzima v. President of the Republic of Transkei, [1989] 4 S. Mr. L.R. 989,
990 (Transkei Gen. Div.). For the general commentary on the history and politics of
Transkei, see ROGERJ. SouTinii, SoUTm Anac's TRANsxm: TH-E PorcA.L ECONOmy
OF AN "NmEPENDENT" BANrusrAN (1983).
299. Matanzima, [1989] 4 S. Mr. L.R. at 990-91.
300. Id. at 991.
301. Id.
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President and the National Assembly, was the sovereign legislative author-
ity. 3°2 The National Assembly consisted of the five Paramount Chiefs, sev-
enty Chiefs representing enumerated districts, and seventy-five elected
members3 03 The judicial power was vested in an "independent"
judiciary. 3° 4
On September 24, 1987, the military forced the resignation of eight
cabinet ministers, announced that Prime Minister George Matanzima had
fled the country, and formed a "caretaker" government 3 0 5 The Transkei
National Independence Party, whose government had been removed and
which still commanded a substantial majority in the National Assembly,
elected Miss Stella Sigcau as its leader8 0 6 On October 8, 1987, she
became Prime Minister and a new cabinet was appointed.3 0 7 On Decem-
ber 30, 1987 the Commander of the Transkei Defense Forces declared
martial law, suspended the Constitution and removed the government.3 0 8
He announced that the country would be run by "an interim government"
consisting of a Military Council supported by an appointed Council of
Ministers.3 0 9 The next day martial law was lifted.31 0 On January 5,1988, a
decree was published in the Government Gazette which provided, among
other things, that
the executive and legislative authority ... is vested in the President and he
shall exercise such authority on the advice of the Military Council ....
[E]very instrument signed by the President shall be counter-signed by a
member of the Military Council .... The President shall by decree make
laws ... and may amend or repeal any law .... No court of law shall be
competent to inquire into or to pronounce upon the validity of any decree.
No action or other legal proceeding, whether civil or criminal, shall be insti-
tuted in any court of law against (a) the President; [and] (b) any officer or
member of the TDF... by reason of any action taken or thing done in
order to effect the military takeover of power on 30 December 1987.311
The deposed Prime Minister moved the High Court of Transkei to
declare the decree null and void and to direct the President to summon
the Parliament into session in accordance with the Constitution in
Matanzim&3 12
2. The Judicial Response: Kelsen Unmodified
In deciding whether or not the present Military Government and its
Decrees were legally valid, the Court turned to the Lesotho case of
302. Id
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. I&
309. Id.
310. Id. at 992.
311. The Decree is reproduced in full in id. at 992-94.
312. Id. at 990.
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Mokotso, one it thought was "very much in point."-3 3 It noted that the
Order at issue in Mokotso was so similar to the Decree in question in
Matanzima, "that it seems likely that the latter was modeled on the former
for guidance."3 14 Relying on the discussion in Mokotso of cases concerning
extra-constitutionality, the Court found that, when faced with a similar
problem, judges in other countries have either invoked the doctrine of
revolutionary legality or the doctrine of State necessity, "although in some
instances there seems to have been a tendency to merge the two doc-
trines."3 15 The Court found Cullinan, CJ.'s reasoning in Mokotso that
came "down very firmly on the side of doctrine of revolutionary legality...
convincing."3 16 The Court considered the Mokotso test, but preferred "to
formulate [the Mokotso test] in what is perhaps a more positive manner
.".317 The Court then stated:
A revolutionary Government becomes lawful and its legislations legitimated
ab initio when (a) it is firmly established, there being no real danger that it
will itself be ousted from power, and (b) its administration is effective, in
that the people, by and large, have acquiesced in and are behaving in con-
formity with its mandates.3 18
The Court then dealt with the petitioner's argument that before a
revolutionary government could claim to be "firmly established," it should
have to show that it "is likely to continue" in power, and that, since the
military regime claims that it is an "interim government" and intends to
return the country to civilian rule in due course, it by definition is not
"likely to continue" in power.3 19 The Court noted that Beadle, CJ.'s dis-
tinction between de facto and de jure governments proffered in
Madzimbamuto, upon which petitioner's argument relies, had been criti-
cized by the Privy Council. It then opined that the Rhodesian judge "had
in mind not the possibility that a revolutionary Government might volun-
tarily relinquish power but the possibility that it might be forced out of
power."3 20 The Court concluded that "if a revolutionary Government is so
entrenched that the only way in which it can reasonably be expected to
313. Id. at 994.
314. Id. at 994-95.
315. Id. at 996.
316. Id. The Court sought to buttress its choice of doctrine by noting that counsel
for both sides "founded their main submissions on the basis that the doctrine of revolu-
tionary legality should be invoked by this Court, although they differ in one respect as
to its meaning." Id.
317. Id. at 997. The Court also summarized its understanding of Kelsen's theory.
If the [coup d'etat] attempt fails, the old grundnorm and legal order remain
valid. If, however, it succeeds, then the old grundnorm and the laws derived
from it loose validity and the new grundnorm comes into existence. The revolu-
tion, however, cannot be said to have succeeded unless the people are, by and
large, behaving in accordance with the new legal order it purports to introduce,
that is to say, unless this legal order also becomes efficacious.
Id. at 996.
318. Id. at 997.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 998.
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lose office is if it voluntarily relinquishes power, that fact in itself proves
that it is indeed 'firmly established.'" 2
1
The Court proceeded to apply its two prong test of legitimation. It
held that the regime was "firmly established" because "there is no evidence
whatsoever that any group of persons is trying to oust the Government
from power, let alone any evidence to suggest that there is any danger that
the Government may be forced out of power."3 22 As to whether the
regime was "effective," the Court refused to put credence in the appli-
cants' affidavits which referred to strikes by postal workers, nurses, and
medical employees to establish a lack of public acceptance of the
regime. 2 3 Instead, the Court favored the answering affidavits, which
claimed that the strikes resulted from conditions of service inherited from
the deposed government 3 2 4 The Court cited affidavits by heads of each
governmental department averring that there had been no opposition
among public servants or members of the public to the new regime, and
that the regime's decrees had been given effect and the general adminis-
tration of each department had proceeded smoothly.3 25 Finally, the
Court took judicial notice of the "plain fact" that there had been no sign
of civil disobedience or rejection by the people of the new government.3 26
This judicial notice lead the Court to answer the "effectiveness" question
in the affirmative and to be "satisfied that we can properly find that the
Military Government is a lawful Government and that the laws that it has
introduced have validity ab initio."3 27
M. The Banda Case: Bophuthatswana 1989
1. The Context
On February 10, 1988, sections of the military of Bophuthatswana
attempted a coup d'etat 3 28 The President and Cabinet were taken into
custody and forced to resign their posts. Some military bases and the
broadcasting center were occupied and a new President and Cabinet were
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 998-99.
324. I. at 999. The Court found:
[T]he fact that isolated strikes have occurred would in no way justify the infer-
ence that the people who went on strike have not acquiesced in the present
administration; afortiori, such fact would notjustify any inference that the peo-
ple, by and large, are not behaving in accordance with mandates of the Military
Government.
id
325. Id The Court added, "[b]ut even apart from their averments, we, as a Court,
cannot ignore the plain fact that at no stage since the coup d'etat has there been any sign
of civil disobedience or of rejection on the part of the people of the Military Govern-
ment." Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. State v. Banda, [1989] 4 S. Mr. LR. 519, 520 (Bophuthatswana Gen. Div.). For a
general commentary on the history and politics of Bophuthatswana, see JEnmRY BunER
Er AL., THE BLAcK HoMEiANDs OF SouTH An c TiH PoLTrcs AND ECONoMic DEvW-
OPMENT OF BOPHLrrHATSWANA AND KwAzLuU (1977).
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appointed.3 29 The South African military intervened, subdued the coup
makers, and reinstated the deposed government.330 Sando Johannes
Banda, the leader of the attempted coup, and 194 others were brought to
trial on the charge of high treason.331 The defense objected on the
grounds that the indictment disclosed no offense against the accused.33 2
ProfessorJohn Dugard, appearing for the defendants before the Supreme
Court of Bophuthatswana, argued that the crime of high treason by defini-
tion can only be committed against a state possessing majestas (sover-
eignty), aa3 Since Bophuthatswana was a creation of the South African
legislature as part of the Pretoria regime's policy for the separate develop-
ment of racially defined sections of the South African population
(apartheid), it lacked the capacity of statehood in international law and
consequently the attribute of sovereignty. 33
2. The Judicial Response: Failed Coup d'Etat is Treason
The threshold issue of the case was whether a court established by the
Constitution of Bophuthatswana was precluded from inquiring whether
Bophuthatswana was a sovereign state. Friedman, J., could not "find any
authority or logical reason precluding [him] from considering" the
issue.335 In order for the state to succeed on the charge of high treason,
he wanted to "be satisfied that an integral part of the offence, namely that
the State possesses sovereignty or majestas, has been proved by the State
.... I must decide where the quality of majestas resides."33 6 The Court
relied on Madzimbamuto 37 and various South West African (Namibia)
cases338 for this position.
The Court first reviewed the constitutional history of the creation of
Bophuthatswana. It noted that Bophuthatswana became a sovereign
independent state on December 6, 1977, by an act of the legislature of
South Africa.339 On the same day the legislative assembly of Bophuthat-
swana promulgated the Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution Act 18
of 1977.340 Thus, Bophuthatswana became sovereign and independent;
329. Banda, [1989] 4 S. Afr. LR. at 520.
330. J. D. van der Vyer, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMoRY INT'L L. REv. 9, 9
(1991).
331. Banda, [1989] 4 S. AfT. LR. at 520.
332. Id. at 521.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 521.
335. Id. at 527.
336. Id.
337. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Aft. L.R. 284 (Rhodesia App.
Div.).
338. See, e.g., R. v. Christian, 1924 A.D. 101, 105, 108 (the court examined the status
of the government in South West Africa to determine whether it had the requisite inter-
nal sovereignty to convict the accused on the charge of high treason, with the burden of
proof being on the State).
339. Banda, [1989] 4 S. AfT. L.R. at 522-23. According to the Court, South Africa,
being a sovereign state, had the right to dispose of its territory as it pleases, including
allocating it to a specific group of people. Id. at 524-25.
340. Id. at 523.
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its parliament having unfettered legislative powers and over which the
Republic of South Africa "cease[d] to exercise any authority."3 41 Further-
more, section 1 (1) of the Constitution provided that "Bophuthatswana is a
sovereign independent State ...."342 Finally, the Court cited as "weighty
permissive authority,"3 43 S v. Marwane3a44 in which the Appellate Division
of South Africa recognized, accepted, and applied the principle of sover-
eign independence of Bophuthatswana. This Court concluded that
"according to law of this country and that of South Africa, Bophuthat-
swana is an independent sovereign State having majestas."a45
Curiously, the Court did not stop the inquiry there, but instead
agreed with the defense counsel's position that "the fact that [the] Consti-
tution declares in Section 1 that Bophuthatswana is a sovereign and
independent state is not conclusive proof of [its] statehood," and that
"whether or not Bophuthatswana is a State for the purposes of the crime of
high treason must be determined by international law."3 46 This position is
problematic on three counts.
First, the inquiry started as one to determine whether the State "pos-
sessed majestas or sovereignty."3 47 A simple reference to the Constitution
under which the Court sits should resolve this inquiry. After the interna-
tional law divergence, the Court itself came around to the same conclu-
sion at the end of the opinion: "These provisions [of the Status Act and
the Constitution] are clear and unambiguous and I must apply them. It
would be incorrect and contrary to legal principle to disregard the clear
declaration of the sovereignty of Bophuthatswana ... ."3 4 8 What would
have been the implication of a contrary holding? The Court would have
questioned the validity of the Constitution to which it owed its very exist-
ence.3 49 Such a position has been characterized as a "judicial 'revolution'
against the Constitution."3 50
Second, the inquiry purported to determine "where the quality of
majestas resides."3 5 ' This is a legitimate inquiry for a court to undertake,
as it would involve ajudicial decision on the distribution of sovereignty, or
separation of powers, within a particular state under a particular constitu-
tional order. But this was not a problem in this case and the Court never
341. Id.
342. Id. at 524.
343. Id. at 526.
344. [1982] 3 S. Aft. L.RL 717 (South Africa App. Div.).
345. Banda, [1989] 4 S. Aft. L.R. at 526.
346. Id. at 526 (emphasis added).
347. Id. at 527. "For the purpose of deciding on the objection, I need only consider
the element of majestas .... " Id. at 521.
348. Id. at 550.
349. As one commentator put it, Friedman, J.'s "predicament was that Professor
Dugard's submissions required him to judge himself out of a job." Rosalind H.
Thomas, 'Through the Looking Glass'- The Status of Bophuthatswana in International Law, 6
S. Am J. oN Hum. Ris. 65, 76 (1990).
350. D. J. Devine, Banda's Case 1989: The Implications For the Municipal Law of
Bophuthatswana, 107 S. An. LJ. 184, 187 (1990).
351. Banda, [1989] 4 S. Aft. L.R. at 527.
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actually undertook any such inquiry. Third, the Court collapsed the
municipal law status and international law status of a state and its sover-
eignty. The two statuses do not necessarily coincide. The former is deter-
mined by the municipal law of the state in question while the latter is
guided by the rules of international law. The quintessence of the
defense's challenge was the question of statehood; the question of sover-
eignty arises only after the question of statehood has been settled. How-
ever, the Court dealt with sovereignty first, and took an affirmative
determination of this issue as being determinative of the statehood ques-
tion as well. Finally, having determined that Bophuthatswana is sovereign,
the international law inquiry was disingenuous in light of the Court's posi-
tion that "[t]he law[s] of this country must take predence [sic] over interna-
tional law, where they are in conflict."
3 52
Turning to the issue of statehood, the court examined the two tradi-
tional schools of recognition: the constitutive school, which holds that
recognition alone exclusively confers international personality on a state
and makes it a subject of international law;353 and the declaratory school,
which holds that states become subjects of international law the moment
they acquire the essential features of statehood independent of the will or
actions of other states.35 4 The Court adopted the position of the declara-
tory school and proceeded to ascertain whether Bophuthatswana con-
forms to essentials of statehood as enumerated by the 1933 Montevideo
Convention on Rights and Duties of States.8 5 5 The Court determined that
the essential attributes of statehood were met: a permanent population; a
defined territory; an independent government and the capacity to enter
352. Id. at 528. As for international legal instruments, Friedman, J., said:
[T]his Court can consider and takejudicial notice of international conventions
such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the United Nations Charter,
and the Mandate for South West Africa. By doing so, it must not be construed
that I regard these Charters and Mandates as being part of the law of this coun-
try, or in any way binding on me. I have a discretion whether to apply them or
not. I must, however, apply the law of this countiy in the final analysis.
I& (emphasis added).
353. See Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM.
J. INT'L L. 605 (1941); LASsA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955); HERScH LAUmERACH'T, RECOGNITION I INTERNATIONAl LAW (1947); GER-
HARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 91-92 (2d ed. 1970).
354. SeeJAMEs L. BRIERLY, LAw OF NATIONS 39 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
1963); Tr-CmHAN CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION WITH SPECIAL REFER-
ENCE TO PRACTICE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THm UNITED STATES (L C. Green ed., 1951);
WrLIAm E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 19-20 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th
ed. 1924); MICHAEL B. AxEmuusr, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-
68 (5th ed. 1984); JAMEs CRAXWFoa, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1979); RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF Tm FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF =a UNITED STATES,
§§ 201, 202(1) (1987).
355. The Court noted that "[t]he constitutive theory is positivistic in nature .... The
declaratory theory on the other hand is a natural law doctrine .... " Banda, [1989]
4 S. Afr. L.R. at 531 (citation omitted). The Court found that "the fact of non-recogni-
tion is immaterial .... No good reason exists and indeed little is to be gained by
denying recognition to a functioning government." Id. at 544-47.
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into relations with other states.356 It concluded that Bophuthatswana "is
therefore a sovereign State, not only according to the law of this country
... but also according to the principles of customary international law."
35 7
The Court rejected defendants' plea that an entity does not qualify as
a state, notwithstanding that it has the essential attributes of statehood
expounded in the Montevideo Convention, if its creation is "a result of a
violation of a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens)."358 Rely-
ing upon the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations, the defense
argued that the creation of Bophuthatswana was unlawful because it issued
from a policy of racial discrimination and apartheid and constituted
denial of self-determination.3 59 The Court responded that Resolutions of
the General Assembly do not have the force of law and "they certainly do
not form part of the law of this country."360 The right of self-determina-
tion of the people "is ensured by being citizens of the State of Bophuthat-
swana."361 The Court concluded that Bophuthatswana did possess
majestas, and the perpetrators of a failed coup d'etat could rightfully be
tried for the high crime of treason.
1. The Options Available to a Court when Confronted with Successful
Coups d'Etat
When ajudiciary established under the constitution survives a coup d'etat,
it is faced with the question of the validity of the usurper regime. Theoret-
ically, any court called upon to address this question, has four options
available to it:
(i) validate the usurpation of power;
(ii) declare the usurpation unconstitutional and hence invalid;
(iii) resign, thereby refusing to adjudicate the legality of the demise
of the very constitution under which the court was established; or
(iv) declare the issue a nonjusticiable political question.
356. Id. at 539-44.
357. Id. at 544.
358. Id. This theory of recognition, which rests on the premise that statehood
depends on recognition, goes further in asserting that the right to recognize has been
relinquished by the international community to the United Nations. Thus the act of
recognizing an entity, in the sense of affording it the condition of statehood, is now a
collective matter. SeeJoHN DuOARD, RECOGITION & THE UNmED NATIONS (1987); van
der Vyer, supra note 330, at 9. According to Dugard, "the practice of the United
Nations on the subject of non-recognition seems to be premised on the violation of
peremptory norms rather than on the failure to meet the conditions of statehood."
DucARD, supra, at 132.
359. Banda, [1989] 4 S. Aft. L.R. at 544-45.
360. Id. at 545. The court pointed out that these Resolutions are frequently disre-
garded by members of the United Nations. Id.
361. Id. The defense's reliance on GUR Corp. v. Trust Bank of South Africa Ltd.,
[1986] 3 All E.R. 449 (Eng. CA.), where the Court held that the Republic of Ciskei is "a
subordinate body set up by the Republic of South Africa to act on its behalf," id. at 466,
and therefore is not an independent state, was rejected on the ground that the House
of Lords treated an executive certificate of the British Foreign Office addressing the
issue as binding on them. Banda, [1989] 4 S. Aft. LR. at 547-49.
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This section explores the suitability of each of these options to facili-
tate recommendations about desirable judicial responses towards coups
d'etat in post-colonial societies. Before this examination, it is important to
take note of the context within which the encounters between coups d'etat
and judiciaries unfold. The article proceeds with the premise that all con-
stitutional adjudication is "applied politics."3 62 This premise is a basic one
when one focuses upon constitutional adjudication in the midst of and
pertaining to political upheaval not contemplated by the constitutional
order.
The life of the law has not been logic: It has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed. 63
Consequently, any examination of, and prescription about, constitutional
adjudication that is not informed by the social and political context of the
exercise remains deficient. Before examining the options available to a
court when confronted with a coup d'etat, this article considers some
important contextual features within which the interface of coups d'etat
and the judiciary takes place in post-colonial settings.
A. A Note on the Context of the Coup d'Etat/udiciary Interface
Conventional understanding about constitutional jurisprudence generally
takes for granted some basic features of the political culture drawn from
the historical experience of Western Europe and colonial settler states.
These include a substantial measure of ethnic unity, linguistic uniformity,
cultural homogeneity, political stability, and representative governance.
All these lead to an assumption of general consensus about the constitu-
tional order and legitimacy of the political order. Constitutional adjudica-
tion, consequently, is rendered less problematic in that judicial review of
conduct of the political organs of the state proceeds within generally
agreed parameters.
The socio-political context in the post-colonial settings, however, does
not accord with the conventional understanding. First, as the territorial
boundaries of the states are often the result of arbitrary colonial policies,
they do not correspond with any natural ethnic, linguistic, religious, or
cultural demarcations and, consequently, realization of the concept of a
nation-state remains elusive. 36 Second, a remarkable feature of these
362. Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist & theJudiciay, reprinted in LAw & PoLITrcs: OccA-
sIONAL PAPERS OF FEux FkANKuxTR 1913-1918 3, 6 (Archibald MacLeish & E. F.
Princhard, Jr. eds., 1962).
363. OLrvER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1909). Compare Harold Laski's
designation of Kelsen's pure theory of law as "an exercise in logic and not in life." de
Smith, supra note 9, at 93.
864. This has led some to designate post-colonial settings "state nations." Arnold
Hughes, The Nation-state in Black Africa, in THE NATIoN-STATE: THE FoRMATIoN OF MoD-
FaN PoLrrcs 122 (Leonard Tivey ed., 1981). See also Walker Connor, Nation-Building or
Nation-Destroying?, WORLD POL. Oct. 1971-July 1972, at 319; BAsEL. DAVIDSON, THE BLAcx
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societies is their underdevelopment, in which pockets of prosperity exist
amidst pervasive structural underdevelopment 65 Third, the institutions
of the state, typically inherited from colonial times, are overdeveloped rel-
ative to the civil society, and the coercive apparatuses of the state are over-
developed relative to other state agencies.8 66 Fourth, institutionalized
representative government remains the exception rather than the rule,
and the state is typically allied with a particular class, region, ethnicity,
religion or linguistic group to the exclusion of others.8 67 All these factors
contribute to a lack of consensus about the constitutional frameworks.
Thus, the legitimacy of the political order remains elusive. The judicial
institutions, located as they are in the midst of this context, cannot exist
without being affected by it.
It is important for this inquiry to maintain a distinction between a
revolution and a coup d'etat. Most legal scholars and courts tend to treat
all political changes not contemplated by the constitution in the same
light and use the terms revolution and coup d'etat interchangeably.8 68
This uniform treatment rests upon a formalistic legal posture. Revolutions
involve the "rapid tearing down of existing political institutions and build-
ing them anew on different foundations." 69 This envisages a complete
metamorphosis that affects both civil society and the entire state; the trans-
formation is so pervasive that legitimacy of the new order is completely
autonomous of the processes and institutions of the old order. The con-
tent of the legal order and the structure ofjudicial institutions are typically
changed.3 7 0
MAN'S BURDEN: ARucA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE (1992); ANTHONY D.
SMITH, THE ETHNIC ORIGINs OF NATIONS (1986); ANTHoN D. SMrrH, NATIONAL IDENTrly
(1991); ANOUAR ABDEL-MALx, NATION & REVOLUTION: VOLUME 2 OF SOCIAL DIALErlcs
(1981).
365. See, e.g., SAmn AMiN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRmTIQUE OF THE
THEORY OF UNDEVELoPMENT (Brian Pearce trans., 1974); SAMIR AMIN, IMPERIALISM &
UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT (Brian Pearce trans., 1977).
366. See, e.g., Malori J. Pompermayer & William C. Smith, Jr., The State in Dependent
Societies: Preliminay Notes, in STRUCrURES OF DEPENDENCY (Frank Bonilla & Robert
Girling eds., 1973); Hamza Alavi, The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangla-
desh, NEw LEFr R.,July/Aug. 1972, at 59; CLvE Y. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE AuTHoRI.
TARIAN STATE N PERIPHERAL SoclmI (1984). Of course, in many post-colonial
societies authoritarian tendencies predated colonialism. See KARL A. WrTFOGEL, ORIEN-
TAL DESPOTIsM: A CoMPARATIW STUDY OF TOTAL PoWER (1957); PERRY ANDERSON, LIN-
EAGES OF THE ABSOLUTISr STATE (1974).
367. See, eg., SAM.i AMrN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT. AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL FoRMA-
TIONS OF PERIPHERAL CAPrrALISM (Brian Pearce trans., 1976); MAHMOOD MAMDAMI, PoLi-
TICS AND CLASS FORMATION IN UGANDA (1976); THOMAS CLrE, THE RISE OF THE
AUTHoRirARAN STATE IN PERIPHERAL SocaErTES (1984).
368. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 117 (Anders
Wedberg trans., 1961) [hereinafter KEISEN, GENERAL THEORY]; HANS KEISEN, PuRE THE-
ORY OF LAw 209 (Max Knight trans., 1967) [hereinafter KmsEN, PURE THEORY].
369. Claude E. Welch & Mavis B. Taintor, Introduction, in REVoLUTION AND PoLrnCAL
CHANGE 2 (Claude E. Welch, Jr. & Mavis B. Taintor eds., 1972).
370. See generally REVOLUIONs: A CoMxARATnv STUDY (Lawrence Kaplan ed., 1973);
STAN TAYLOR, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND REVOLUTIONS (1984).
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A coup d'etat, on the other hand, typically aims only at capturing
political power extra-constitutionally. Only that part of the Constitution
which bears on the formation of political organs of the state is sub-
verted.3 7 ' The functional framework of the state, the judicial branch, and
the wider legal order are typically kept in place. 372 As a result, the legiti-
macy of the new regime is not completely autonomous of the pre-existing
processes and institutions. In all the cases examined above, the judiciary
survived the coups d'etat that destroyed the executive and legislative
organs of the state. Beyond letting it survive institutionally, the judiciary
was allowed to determine the validity of the new regime, even in the face
of express preclusion of such review contained in proclamations and
decrees of usurper regimes. 373 Usurpers appear to recognize thatjudicial
pronouncements about the nature and merits of the change and quantum
371. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 27 (1963); Finnis, supranote 9, at48 ("[i]n
a mere coup d'etat only the rules governing the succession of persons to legal office are
affected; the rules concerning the powers and hierarchy of the offices themselves are
unaffected."). Karl Olivecrona's reading of revolutions is similarly non-formalistic, and
in the tradition of Scandinavian realism, presented largely in terms of psychology.
New leaders step in and proclaim that they have 'assumed power'.... They
begin to issue laws and administrative decrees. To succeed they need, of
course, organization and a special political and psychological situation in the
country .... But in actual fact, the revolutionaries make use of much of the
foundations of the old order. Most of the law is left as it is; only the constitu-
tion is put aside .... [But] the respect for the previous constitution may easily
be transferred to the new one .... A new constitution, enacted without refer-
ence to an old constitution, therefore, needs no other justification than its
being willed by the people.
KARL OvcEcONA, LAw As FAc" 104 (2d ed. 1971).
372. Typically the very first act of usurpers after assuming power following a coup
d'etat is to proclaim that, except for a few specified ones, the laws of the land will
remain in force, and the state will function as far as possible in accordance with the old
Constitution. Se4 e.g., Laws (Continuation in Force) Order, 1977 of Pakistan, in Wolf-
Phillips et al., supra note 193, at 123-24. Fieldsend,J., however, saw in this fact a prob-
lem for the usurpers:
In order that a de facto Government be set up it is necessary that all the powers
of sovereignty or government should be actually exercised by the body purport-
ing to be a de facto Government.... The usurper of a government constituted
under a written Constitution must take the responsibility of replacing the legiti-
mate Court and its Judges-yet a further illegal act before he can be said to
have usurped all powers of sovereignty. To hold otherwise is merely to assert
that the repository of one part of the sovereign power must acquiesce in the
illegal assumption of power by the repository of another part.
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Afr. LR. 284, 427-28 (Rhodesia App.
Div.).
373. For example in Rhodesia, the usurper regime first acquiesced in the refusal of
the judges to take a new oath of office and then in the examination of the validity of
UDI notwithstanding Decrees to the contrary. See Palley, supra note 9, at 269-70. Mac-
donald, JA, accurately noted the importance of judicial posture for any usurper
regime: "Indeed, it was only the uncertainty which existed in regards to the attitude of
the High Court which cast doubt upon the status of the Government." Madzimbamuto,
[1968] 2 S. Aft. L.R. at 412. In Pakistan, while Proclamation of Martial Law of July 5,
1977, expressly precluded judicial review of the validity or conduct of the usurper
regime, the regime acquiesced in the Supreme Court's decision to engage in this
inquiry in Bhutto. See supra note 192 and accompanying text; Stavsky, supra note 9, at
380.
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of their legislative capacity have an impact on the legitimacy of the new
regime, because words like "law" and "legality" function as titles of
honor,3 74 and in common-law settings, "For all practical purposes a legal
system or a constitution is valid when the judges have unambiguously
accepted it as valid. To this extent the constitution is what the judges say it
is."3 75 Securingjudicial recognition appears to be the key to gaining polit-
ical legitimacy. Given the social respect enjoyed by the judiciary, recogni-
tion by courts of the old order furnishes a source of credibility for usurper
regimes. Those in power "know only too well the advantage which the seal
of legality carries."3 76 The usurper's need for legitimacy and judicial rec-
ognition implies that the courts may not be entirely powerless when con-
fronted with a coup d'etat and may be in a position to secure concessions
in exchange for judicial recognition.
This, however, must be tempered by the fact that in the aftermath of a
successful coup d'etat, judges "who have been used to placing a 'check' on
legislative excesses and a judiciary that had always seen itself as a potent
and effective 'control' on the other organs of government are now con-
fronted with afait accompli expressed in Decrees and Edicts."3 77 Coups are
typically carried out by, or with the support of, the military establishment
of the state. Because the military enjoys a preponderance, even a monop-
oly, of coercive power in the society, it can enforce its will on any section
of the state or civil society while it remains relatively immune from coun-
tervailing pressure from any other quarter. Consequently, notwithstand-
ing the usurpers' desire for judicial recognition and hence the motivation
to placate the judiciary, the options available to the judiciary are quite
limited. The judiciary does not have the ability to enforce any judgment
against the usurpers, while the usurpers have the power to abolish the
courts or replace "uncooperative" judges.3 78 Following a coup d'etat, a
court
owes its existence to and derives its authority... from the fact that the
present de facto Government which is in full control of the government of
the country, knowing that the Court as such has not joined the revolution,'
has none the less permitted it to continue and exercise its functions as a
court, and has authorized its public officials to enforce the Court's judg-
ments and orders.3 79
The implication is that after a coup d'etat the very power of the courts in
terms of enforceability ofjudgments rests substantially on the support of
the usurpers.
374. ALF Ross, ON LAw ,,mJusrcE 31 (1959). See also THE MILITARY AND THE PROB-
Lm oF LEGrr~mAcY (Gwyn Harries-Jenkins &Jacques van Doom eds., 1976).
375. de Smith, supra note 9, at 104.
376. Dias, supra note 9, at 233.
377. Ojo, supra note 146, at 101.
378. For a long list of cases where the executive successfully interfered with the secur-
ity and independence of the judiciary in many countries, see Claire Palley, Rethinking the
Judicial Role: TheJudiciaUy and Good Government, ZAA LJ., No. 1, 1969, at 2-5.
379. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968) 2 S. Afr. L.R. 284,330 (Rhodesia App.
Div.) (Beadle, C.J.).
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Notwithstanding the insistence ofjudges that their own political opin-
ions are irrelevant,38 0 pronouncements of legal recognition of coups
d'etat are "fundamentally political judgments dressed in legalistic
garb."3 8 1 Because "[t]he decision to accept a revolutionary regime as law-
ful is more obviously a choice between competing values than is the case
with ordinary judicial decisions,"38 2 the personal profiles of judges
become important. This raises some critical questions about the personal
posture of the judges towards coups d'etat. Given the socio-economic con-
text of the societies in question, a number of factors may contribute
towards this posture: the ethnic, provincial, tribal, linguistic, religious, or
class background; the educational and employment record; the security of
tenure; the personal relations with the deposed leaders or the usurpers;
and the identification with declared or real objectives of the coup. Public
information and discussion in the literature about these factors is scant,38 3
precluding any systematic analysis and concrete conclusions. But this
absence of complete and reliable information should not lead us to pre-
tend that this problem does not exist. In discussing the merits of the
options available to a court confronting the issue of validity of usurpation,
one should, to the extent possible, account for the impact of the personal
factor on different options.
B. Option One: Validation/Legitimation of Usurpation
Of the options available to a court when confronted with a coup d'etat,
the one most courts in the post-colonial common-law settings have
adopted is validation/legitimation of coups d'etat and recognition of
unfettered legislative capacity of the usurpers. This option is riddled with
380. See, &g., State v. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. S. Ct. 533, 538 (Munir, CJ.); Uganda v.
Matovu, 1966 E. Afr. L.R. 514, 530, 535 (Uganda) (Udoma, C.J.); Madzimbamuto, [1968]
2 S. Afr. LR. at 326-28 (Beadle, CJ.); id. at 364-65 (QuenetJ.P.); id. at 384-86 (Macdon-
ald, J.A.); R. v. Ndhlovu, [1968] 4 S. Afr. L.R. 515, 520-22, 528-35 (Rhodesia App. Div.)
(Beadle, C.J.); i& at 538-42 (QuenetJ.P.); Mokosto v. King Moshoeshoe II, 1989 L.R.C.
Const. 24, 139 (Lesotho) (Cullinan, CJ.).
381. de Smith, supra note 9, at 94.
382. Dias, supra note 9, at 233.
383. For an example regarding the involvement of Munir, CJ., with the usurpers just
before the Dosso decision, see supra note 161 and accompanying text. Alljudges of the
Rhodesian superior courts belonged to the white settler, minority and thus may have
been sympathetic to the objectives of UDI. See Palley, supra note 9, at 263 (designates
the Madzimbamuto decision as a "pre-eminently a political decision... of loyalist, mod-
erate and 'responsible' members of the European ruling elite."). The personal rela-
tions of two judges with the appellant in the Sallah which led to motions to disqualify.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Yaqub Ali, C.J., who had been given an
extraordinary extension of service by the Constitutional regime, was removed by the
usurpers two days after the application challenging usurpation was accepted for hearing
in Bhutto. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. Nedd, CJ., a beneficiary of the
judicial reorganization by the usurpers, readily accorded them dejure status, while the
Court of Appeals found that the evidence was insufficient to hold so and even accused
Nedd of expressing personal opinions. See supra note 264. One potential source of
information in this context are memoirs ofjudges, but they are often self-serving. See,
e.g., MuHrmmAD Muutn, HIGHWAYS AND Bva-WAYs or LIn (1978) (a spirited defense of
his decision in Dosso).
Cornell International Law Journal
such theoretical, doctrinal, institutional, and moral problems that it is the
least suitable option for a court.
The jurisprudential puzzle inherent in coups d'etat is "how acts of
violence can give rise to 'binding' rules."3 8 4 Confronted with coups d'etat,
judges are "[p] itched into a legal no-man's land, they are expected to make
authoritative pronouncements on the 'right' interpretation of political
facts, and tojustify their interpretation by referring to pre-existing authori-
tative norms."3 85 As the review of case law above demonstrated, when
faced with intermittent coups d'etat, Commonwealth courts "swallowed
Kelsen hook, line and sinker,"3 8 6 or used his theory of revolutionary legal-
ity, in pure or modified forms, as a rule of decision, notwithstanding Kel-
sen's position that "[t]he ideal of an objective science of law and State, free
from all political ideologies, has a better chance for recognition in a
period of social equilibrium .... [and] in the Anglo-American world,
where.., political power is better stabilized than elsewhere ...."387 Sup-
porters of Kelsen have charged that the courts "misrepresented Kelsen's
positivist Pure Theory and its concept of Grundnorm in order to disguise
from observers, and perhaps from themselves, the profoundly political
nature of their actions."3 88 The problem, however, is two-fold: First, Kel-
sen's theory is inherently flawed and, second, it was misinterpreted and
misapplied by the courts. Because Kelsen's theory forms the doctrinal
core of the validation/legitimation option, a critical examination of the
theory is necessary.
1. Kelsen and Coup d'Etat
Kelsen's theory of revolutionary legality grows out of the discontinuity of
law paradigm, which seeks to answer when and under what circumstances
one legal system ceases to exist and a new one is created in its place. 8 9
Kelsen's response is that the "State and its legal order remain the same
only as long as the constitution is intact or changed according to its own
provisions."3 90 Kelsen holds that this "principle of legitimacy... fails to
hold in the case of a revolution,"3 91 because "it is never the constitution
merely but always the entire legal order that is changed by a revolu-
tion,"3 92 with the result that all norms of the old order are "deprived of
384. OLuvcRoNA, supra note 371, at 66.
385. de Smith, supra note 9, at 104.
386. Id. at 103.
387. KE.sEN, GE RAL T-Eoav, supra note 368, at xvii.
388. Hopton, supra note 9, at 73.
389. KELsEN, GENERAL TumoR, supra note 368, at 218-21, 368-69.
390. Id. at 368-69. A corollary being the proposition that legal norms "remain valid
as long as they have not been invalidated in the way which the legal order itself deter-
mines." Id. at 117.
391. Id. at 117. For Kelsen the term revolution, "also covers the so-called coup d'etat.
A revolution . . .occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and
replaced by a new order in an illegitimate way .... From a juristic point of view, the
decisive criterion of a revolution is that the order in force is overthrown and replaced
by a new order in a way which the former had not itself anticipated." Id. at 117-18.
392. Id. at 118.
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their validity by revolution and not according to the principle of legiti-
macy." g33 In the wake of a coup d'etat, "Every jurist will presume that the old
order-to which no political reality any longer corresponds-has ceased to be valid
... , If the revolutionaries "succeed, if the old order ceases, and the
new order begins to be efficacious, because the individuals whose behavior
the new order regulates actually behave, by and large, in conformity with the
new order, then this order is considered as a valid order."3 95 In his
"attempt to make explicit the presupposition on which these juristic considera-
tions rest" Kelsen finds that
the norms of the old order are regarded as devoid of validity because the
old constitution and, therefore, the legal norms based on this constitution,
the old legal order as a whole, has lost its efficacy; because the actual behav-
ior of men does no longer conform to this old legal order.... The principle
of legitimacy is restricted by the principle of effeCtiveness.3 96
Kelsen's theory assumes the identification of the state with the legal
order, with their foundations rooted in the constitution. As his theory
rests upon the "operative premise... that the positive and deliberate destruc-
tion of the foundation of the legal order presumes the intention to found a
new state, a new sovereignty,"3 97 it precludes any distinction between a
revolution and a coup d'etat. While he recognizes that coups d'etat do
not result in actual replacement of the legal system, and "only the constitu-
tion and certain laws of paramount political significance" are suppressed,
while "[a] great part of the old legal order 'remains' valid,"398 he is con-
strained to treat their legal implication as being the same as those of a
revolution. This places his theory out of step with the reality of coups in
post-colonial societies that do not aim at destruction of the entire legal
order, but only at usurpation of political offices.
a. Kelsen's formal juridical conception of the state is fallacious
Kelsen's postulates rest on a narrow, formalistic, and juridical conception
of the state, whereby concepts of "state," "legal order," and "constitution"
become fused. It is this fusion which leads to statements that the state and
its legal order remain the same only as long as the constitution is intact or
changed according to its own provisions.3 9 9 Kelsen's is "a highly restrictive
393. Id.
394. 1& (emphasis added).
395. I. (emphasis added). Leaving no doubt that success is the only criteria of valid-
ity, Kelsen says that "If the revolutionaries fail... their undertaking is interpreted... as
an illegal act, as the crime of treason .... " Id.
396. Id. at 118-19 (emphasis added). See also Hans Kelsen, The Pure The"ry of Law:
Part H, LAW Q. REv., Jan. 1935, at 517, 519.
397. Simeon C. R. McIntosh, Continuity and Discontinuity of Law: A Reply to john Fin-
nis, 21 CoNN. L. Rnv. 1, 5 (1988) (emphasis added).
398. KELSE, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 368, at 117; Ksa.S.E, PuRE THEomR, supra
note 368, at 209-10.
399. KELSEN, GENERmA. THEORY, supra note 368, at 364; KELsEN, PuER THzoRY, supra
note 368, at 209-10. Kelsen views the state as a purely legal phenomenon; not some-
thing apart from its legal or normative order. KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 368,
at 181-82. Rather, it is the centralized legal order-a metaphorical expression, a figura-
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view of the State as the expression of the logical completeness and inner
consistency of the system of legal norms."400 This conception of the state
as a structure of legal norms is a purely juristic and formal one. It fails to
take account of those social factors that condition the nature of particular
states and legal orders in specific settings, and reflects legal positivism's
lack of philosophical concern with moral questions that are at the very
heart of the issue of legitimacy of any legal order or a state.
The nature of a particular state cannot be determined in isolation
from civil society.401 Formal juridical conceptual divisions between the
state and civil society, and the corresponding division between the public
and the private spheres, only mask the mutually conditioning relationship
between the two. The nature of the civil society conditions the forms that
the state assumes within its midst, and the state, in turn, conditions the
civil society by its very existence, structure, and functions. Furthermore,
the function of the state is not exclusively a coercive one. Ideological and
normalizing functions are the primary functions of a modem state,
whereby the state and civil society necessarily overlap. The concept of the
state is open-textured, making it susceptible to a multiplicity of usages. 402
Any purely juristic explanation of the state is, therefore, an unavoidably
abstract postulation of the quintessential form of the state of which actual
states are particular manifestations. Even if one begins with the premise
that a sovereign state exists "where there is an authority [in a defined terri-
tory], which fixes the norms of all law, and beyond which, in the search for
the origin of such norms, we cannot go,"40 3 the concept of a state remains
a theoretical construct; a formal conclusion one may draw about a society
in a defined territory where certain conditions obtain. However, the soci-
ety, loosely defined as a group of human beings living and working
together for the satisfaction of their mutual wants, 40 4 remains indispensa-
tive description of specific relations between the various public organs and offices con-
stituted by a normative order. I& at 189. The state acts only through these public
organs and offices, and it is the legal order that both declares in general terms which
individuals are qualified to perform various functions, and the procedures by which
particular individuals are made organs. Id. at 195. Thus, if the constitution establishes
the organs of the legal order and the norms that regulate their behavior, as Kelsen
posits, then his theory of the constitution is also his theory of the state and the legal
order. The normative order that constitutes the state and the legal order is itself consti-
tuted by the constitution. Id. at 258.
400. KENNETH H. F. DYsoN, THE STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE 9 (1980).
401. My position on the relationship between the state and civil society, which rejects
any rigid compartmentalization between the two, is drawn from ANTONIO GRAMsCi,
SELECIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMscI (Quintin Hoare & Geof-
frey Nowell-Smith eds. & trans., 1971); JURGEN HABERMAs, LEGITIMATION Cmsis
(Thomas McCarty trans., 1975); ANTONIO GRAmsci, SELECIoNs FROM CULTURAL WRIT.
INos (David Forgacs & Geoffrey Nowell-Smith eds., William Boelhower trans., 1985);
MIcHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPuNE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan
trans., 1977).
402. DYSON, supra note 400, at 2. See a/so 1 MIcHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALrI.
AN INTRODUcTION 82-85 (Robert Hurley trans., 1980).
403. HAROLDuJ. .sia, SaunIEs IN LAw AN PoLrcs 238 (1932).
404. See Ssu.oMo AvnERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 134 (1972).
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ble to one's understanding of the nature of the state. Kelsen's theory of
the state and revolution remains blind to this imperative.
While examining Kelsen's identification of law with the state and of
the state with coercion, it is helpful to refer to the critique of Kelsen's
discontinuity thesis advanced byJ. M. Finnis.405 For Finnis, legal systems
are not simply systems of rules, but sequences, or successive sets of rules,
ever changing and cohering in what society accepts as a continuous system
not by virtue of any perennial grundnorm or rule of recognition, but as a
function of the existence of society itself, which is an organic structure
responding to laws of growth, change, and decay analogous to those gov-
erning the individual organism. Consequently, he argues that "a revolu-
tion is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for anything that
should be described as a change in the identity of the state or the legal
system."40 6 Accordingly, both the state and the legal system can be
deemed to survive a revolution without implying the invalidity of all of a
revolution's dispositions in areas conventionally regulated by law.40 7 How-
ever, Finnis argues thatjustice has other demands, so that "sometimes the
character of a revolution is such that allegiance to the revolutionary order
of society is unreasonable," and the reasonableness that forms the basis of
his society-oriented, non-formalistic approach, is "the reasonableness of
justice and philia politike, which demand legal coherence and continuity
and respect for acquired rights."408 In order to appreciate Finnis' con-
tinuity of law thesis, it is important to bear in mind that for him the central
meaning of law is of an authoritative common ordering of a community
that facilitates the realization of the common good.40 9 While he concedes
405. Finnis, supra note 9.
406. Id. at 75. The central question Finnis raises is, "Does every illegal or 'unconsti-
tutional' act, of the sort that would usually be called a coup deta amount to a change in
the constitution and thus in the identity of the legal order? Or is there a class of coups
d'etat that, while illegally supplanting legal officials, nevertheless leave the constitution,
in Kelsen's sense, intact?" Id. at 45. A similar position is that ofJoseph Raz, who states
that:
[N] either the 'constitutional continuity' of the new laws nor their content are
necessary or sufficient conditions for establishing the continuity or lack of con-
tinuity of legal systems. Legal systems are always legal systems of complex forms
of social life, such as religions, states, regimes, tribes, etc .... The identity of
legal systems depends on the identity of the social forms to which they belong.
The criterion of identity of legal systems is therefore determined not only by
jurisprudential or legal considerations but by other considerations as well, con-
siderations belonging to other social sciences.
JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SxSTM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEo aY OF
LEGAL SYsr M 188-89 (1970).
407. Accordingly, "it is usually reasonable to accept the new rules of competence and
of succession of rules proposed by the successful revolutionaries who have made them-
selves masters of society [while] ... adher[ing] to the 'general principle' ... [of] the
validity of the remaining bulk of the legal system." Finnis, supra note 9, at 76.
408. d. at 76.
409. JOHN M. FINNis, NATURAL LAw & NATuRAL RIGHTS 276-77 (1980). He sees these
basic common goods as objective values in the sense that every reasonable person must
assent to their value as objects of human striving. Id. at 205. For the list of Finnis' basic
goods, see id. at 205-09. Finnis' position has been correctly characterized as being a
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that "stipulations of those in authority have presumptive obligatory
force,"410 he argues that if a ruler uses authority to make stipulations
"against the common good, or against any of the basic principles of practi-
cal reasonableness, those stipulations altogether lack the authority they
would otherwise have by virtue of being his."41
While for Kelsen the law is always concerned with coercion, 41 2 for
Finnis it is primarily aimed at facilitating the realization of the common
good.413 The central difference between the two is that, while Kelsen
equates the legal order with the state,4 14 Finnis identifies the legal order
with the society.41 5 Although Finnis correctly points out the Kelsenian fal-
lacy of focusing on the state to the exclusion of society, Finnis' own fallacy
lies in his focus on the society to the exclusion of the state. The position
of this article is that recognition of the essentially interlinked and interde-
pendent nature of the state and civil society is indispensable to the appre-
ciation of the distinction and tension between the concepts of the
legitimacy and the validity of a legal order. As discussed below, this dis-
tinction is critical to formulating an appropriate judicial response to coups
d'etat.
b. Kelsen proffers a theory of law not a rule of decision
It is charged that "Kelsen's theory is betrayed, on its own terms, if it is put to
normative use as a practical principle for guiding judicial decision and
action."416 While "[p]art of the problem lies in Kelsen's own oblique-
ness,"4 17 this is primarily because Kelsen's doctrine is not capable ofjudi-
cial application, the grundnorm being simply a "hypothesis."418 Kelsen has
himself contributed to this confusion. On the one hand, he takes the posi-
tion that jurisprudence is not a source of law,4 19 but on the other, he
asserts that "[w]hat sociological jurisprudence predicts that the courts will
"restatement of natural law." LORD LLOYD OF HAMPsrzAD & M.D.A. FREEmAN, LLOYD'S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 136 (5th ed. 1985).
410. FnNNIs, supra note 409, at 359.
411. Id. at 359-60.
412. KELsEN, GENERAL TmEORY, supra note 368, at 15-29; KEtsEN, PURE THzoy, supra
note 368, at 33-42, 54, 62.
413. FINms, supra note 409, at 276-77.
414. KEIsEN, GENERAL THEORv, supra note 368, at 368-69 ("[T]he state and its legal
order remain the same only as long as the constitution is intact or changed according to
its own provisions.").
415. Finnis, supra note 9, at 69 ("[T]he continuity and identity of a legal system is a
function of the continuity and identity of the society in whose ordered existence in time
the legal system participates.").
416. John M. Finis & B. C. Gould, Constitutional Law, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF COMMON-
wEArH LAw 1972 53-54 (H.M.R. Wade ed., 1973).
417. HAwPrEAD & FREEmAN, supra note 409, at 330.
418. Eekelaar, Rhodesia, supra-note 9, at 22-23.
419. KEI.sEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 368, at xiv, 163. "The science of law has to
know the law-as it were from the outside-and to describe it. The legal organs, as
legal authorities, have to create the law so that afterwards it may be known and
described by the science of law." KEIsEN, PURE THEORY, supra note 368, at 72.
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decide, normative jurisprudence maintains that they ought to decide" 420
The later statement has led to the understanding that Kelsen's theory
"implies that a judge is under a legal duty... to accept successful revolu-
tions ... [and] this duty is not outweighed by any general legal duty of
constitutional loyalty."42 1 The problem is that the adoption of Kelsen's
theory by judges does away with the essential distinction between judges
and legal theorists. 422 It disregards the fact that "accounting for or
explaining such continuity or discontinuity is not an empirical task of
identifying the continuance or discontinuance of individual (positive)
rules of law, but is more appropriately conceptual in nature."
423
John Finch rightly asserts that misconceptions of Kelsen's theory are
attributable, among other things, "to a confusion of the two senses of the
word constitution .... In particular, the constitution in the positive legal
sense has been taken for the basic norm, which it is not."42 4 The courts
that adopted Kelsen's theory to validate coups d'etat generally treated
gnundnorm and the constitution synonymously. This facilitated treatment
of Kelsen's position about the theoretical concept of grundnorm as directly
applicable to the status of the constitution.
In Kelsen's theory, however, there is a sharp distinction between the
two. The grundnorm is the reason for the validity of the constitution as
seen by legal science; it is not the constitution itself. The grundnorm lies
outside positive laws and their norms; it is a presupposition of them made
in the interest of legal science. And even though presupposed, the
grundnorm has no independent status; it always refers to a specific constitu-
tion. Furthermore, the grundnorm is not prescribed by Kelsen's "pure the-
ory." To prescribe it would be to make laws, and "pure theory" cannot
create a law on its own account; only those authorized to do so by the legal
system can do that. Kelsen's "pure theory" is concerned only with intellec-
tual coherence in legal analysis. It is a descriptive theory, not a prescrip-
tive principle of law.425 Kelsen refers to the grundnorm as the "constitution
420. KELsEN, GE ERAmL THEoRY, supra note 368, at 172 (emphasis added). At other
times Kelsen is emphatic: "Never, not even in the earliest formulations of the Pure
Theory of Law did I express the foolish opinion that the propositions of the Pure The-
ory of Law 'bind' the Judge in the way in which legal norms bind him." Hans Kelsen,
Professor Stone and the Pure Theoy of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1128, 1134 (1965).
421. Harris, supra note 9, at 132.
422. For example, Harris, a proponent of Kelsen's, defends the revolutionary legality
cases by saying- "The judges in Pakistan, Uganda and Rhodesia were actingproerly in the
role of legal scientists when they found that the revolutionary regimes were legal, because
they were confronted with very strong evidence that, whatever decision they reached,
the revolutions would be successful." Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
423. McIntosh, supra note 397, at 6.
424. JoHN D. FINCH, INTRODUCrION TO LEGAL THEORY 112 (3d ed. 1979).
425. Failure to recognize this distinction leads judges (for example, those deciding
Madzimbamuto) to see
[t]he Grundnorm itselfas granting validity rather than as being a reflection of the
Courts' granting validity. They equated the validity presupposed of a constitution
because of the Grundnorm with the validity bestowed on a constitution by its
acceptance by the Court, never realizing that, whichever constitution is
accepted, legal science automatically assumes there is a Grundnora. In this way,
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in the legal-logical sense" as opposed to the "constitution in the positive
legal sense,"42 6 and insists that these are distinct concepts, and any inter-
pretation that would collapse the two "is without any foundation in my
writings."4 2
7
The confusion of grundnorm and constitution permitted judges in the
cases reviewed above to present themselves as impartial, even scientific,
fact-finders, objectively discovering and predicting efficacy. Such activity,
however, is alien to the enterprise of "pure theory," which aims to describe
the post-decision situation and thus cannot take part in making that deci-
sion. A decision finding efficacy as a basis of validity is an act of norm-
creation, not a presupposition of legal science. Acts of norm-creation, as
Kelsen notes, may quite legitimately be politically inspired, constrained
only by the need to rest the validity of the norm thus created on a higher
norm.428 However, when the norm to be created is the constitution itself,
the highest positive norm, it follows logically that the requirement of a
higher norm is absent. At this point, the decision is entirely political,
4 29
and therefore outside the province of adjudication.
Grundnorm is a hypothesis, presupposed in juristic thinking to serve
certain logical purposes. It must not be identified with any real norm or
socio-political phenomenon. The grundnorm is only a postulate of rea-
son-a Kantian transcendental-and accords no ontological status to the
legal order it supposedly validates. 430 Even if the basic norm is a necessary
condition of our knowledge that valid norms exist, it is not itself a "real"
norm. The basic norm, lacking specific content, is nothing but a presup-
position of any legal order, subject only to the condition that the order is
an effective, actual legal order.43 1 Being a hypothetical postulate of rea-
son, the grundnorm cannot establish the legal order's validity, for it is only
after we have identified an actual legal order as valid that we presuppose a
basic norm.43 2 But in his formal hierarchy of norms, Kelsen places the
grundnorm above the constitution. Though the constitution, written or
unwritten, is recognized as the "highest level of positive law," it is itself
validated by the presupposed grundnorm43 3 The troubling implication is
that if the constitution, though the "highest level of positive law," is not in
fact the highest norm, then the constitution's validity may be questioned
they disguised the overtly political nature of their actions. Their political deci-
sion to bestow validity was seen as inevitable as a result of being presented in
the guise of jurisprudential interpretation. The logical necessity of the Pure
Theory was enlisted in support of political necessity.
Hopton, supra note 9, at 83-84.
426. Kelsen, supra note 420, at 1141.
427. Id.
428. See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Science and Politics, 45 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 641, 654 (1951).
429. Id.
430. For Kant's influence on Kelsen, see Alida Wilson, Is Kelsen Really a Kantian?, in
EssAys oN K zsEN (Richard Tur & William Twining eds., 1986).
431. Lloyd L Weinreb, Law as Order, 91 H v. L. REv. 909, 934 (1978).
432. See id. at 932-33. According to Weinreb, the presupposition of a basic norm is
an ontological inference from an observed fact to an unobserved fact.
433. KFLsEN, PuRE TnEoRY, supra note 368, at 118.
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like that of any subordinate law within the legal system.434 Resolution of
this dilemma lies in the province of legal theory, not in adjudication. Con-
sequently, Kelsen's theory cannot rightfully be used as a rule of decision in
a court of law.
c. The relationship between efficacy and validity is problematic
The relationship between efficacy and validity posited by Kelsen remains
elusive and problematic. The courts, in line with commentators, have
understood Kelsen to ground the validity of a norm or legal order in its
efficacy.435 Kelsen, however, insists that there is no direct cause and effect
relationship between the two, and that "the efficacy of the legal order is
only the condition of validity, not the validity itself."43 6 Contrary to Kel-
sen's formulation that "validity is conditioned by the efficacy in the sense
that a legal order as a whole just as a single norm loses its validity if it does
not become by and large effective," 437 and his "call [ing] attention to the
fact that a legal norm becomes valid before it can be effective,"438 the post-'
colonial judicial practice first makes a factual finding of efficacy and then
bases validity upon such a finding. Furthermore, the criteria of efficacy
forwarded by Kelsen is profoundly imprecise: "A legal order is regarded as
valid, if its norms are by and large effective (that is, actually applied and
obeyed). d39 The imprecision leaves open a wide area forjudicial politics.
As the survey of the case law demonstrates, the courts used different tests
based on different evidentiary materials to decide the question. This sin-
gular lack of consistency lends credence to Dias' position that "[t]he truth
of the matter is that effectiveness is only what the judges choose to regard
as such; which places considerable power in their hands."440
When Kelsen observes: "The validity is a quality of law; the so-called
efficacy is a quality of the actual behavior of men and not, as linguistic
usage seems to suggest, of law itself. The statement that law is effective
means only that the actual behavior of men conforms with the legal
norms,"44 1 he admits that efficacy depends on "those very sociological fac-
434. This conclusion accords with Kelsen's position that only the grundnorm;validity
is not open to question. Id. at 201-05.
435. SeeJuuus STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND IAs,.v ' REASONINGS 103-04 (1964).
436. Kelsen, supra note 420, at 1139 (citation omitted). Kelsen explains that
[p]ositing (Seizung) of the norms and efficacy (Witrsamkeit) of the norms are
"conditions of validity"; efficacy in the sense that the established legal norms
must be by and large obeyed and, if not obeyed, applied; otherwise the legal
order as a whole, just as a single norm, would lose it[s] validity. A condition is
not identical with that which is conditioned.
Id. at 1139-40.
437. Id. at 1140.
438. Id.
439. KELSEN, PuRE THEORY, supra note 368, at 212.
440. Dias, supra note 9, at 254. In this regard judges do not so much "find" efficacy as
they contribute towards it. For example, the judges in the UDI cases "kept cementing
effectiveness [of the coup] layer by layer until it reached a point at which they could
look back on their own handiwork and treat it as an objective fact." Id. at 253.
441. KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 368, at 39-40. Kelsen adds, "thus validity
and efficacy refer to quite different phenomena." Id. at 40.
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tors which he so vehemently excluded from his theory of law."442 This in
turn raises methodological and evidentiary issues about any judicial deter-
mination of "actual behavior" of people. As the survey of case law demon-
strates, courts have primarily relied upon judicial notice of so-called
notorious facts and self-serving affidavits from agents of the usurpers to
reach conclusions of the efficacy of coups. Evidentiary problems are com-
pounded where courts undertake determination of the efficacy of the new
legal order shortly after a coup d'etat because it invariably involves ventur-
ing predictions of future behavior," 3 a task well beyond judicial
competence.
There is also the problem of exclusion of reasons and quality of sub-
mission and conformity. Kelsen portrayed this as a methodological prob-
lem: "We are not in a position to say anything with exactitude about the
motivating power which men's idea of law may possess. Objectively, we
can ascertain only that the behavior of men conforms or does not conform
with the legal norms."444 This raises serious ethical and moral questions
because "not only effectiveness but also conformity to morality and justice
is among the very springs of [grundnorm's] being and continued life." 445
Even ifjudges had no legal obligation to take into account the ethical and
moral dimensions of the problem, "they are no more exempt from moral
obligations than other officers of state in revolutionary situations. Indeed,
442. P-W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 413 (3d ed. 1970).
443. For example, Harris believes that judges can "discover" which legal norms are,
by and large, effective at any given time:
[F] irst, by recording what commands, permissions and authorizations (stipulat-
ing sanctions) have been issued (and not repealed) by a person or body pur-
porting to act as legislator;, secondly, by recording (or predicting) occasions on
which the stipulated sanctions have been (or are likely to be) applied by persons
purporting to act as state officials; thirdly, by recording (or predicting) acts of
disobedience, that is, acts specified as conditions for the application of stipu-
lated sanctions to the actor. If there is a socially significant ratio between the
official acts and the acts of disobedience, and it can be predicted that this ratio will
continue to obtain for a reasonable length of time, the meaning-contents of the com-
mands, permissions and authorizations are by and large effective norms.
Harris, supra note 9, at 124 (emphasis added).
444. KELSEN, GENFERAL THEORY, supra note 368, at 40. Belonging to the traditional
paradigm of science, the Kelsenian search for efficacy in the "actual behavior of men"
ignores the epistemological limitations of observed behavior as a key to understanding
human action. For critiques of traditional understanding of the philosophy and episte-
mology of science and social science and of behavioralism in particular, see RICHARDJ.
BERNSTmN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL & PoLnCAL THEoRY (1976); ANTHONY GM-
DENS, NEW RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (1976); THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970);JuRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE & HuMAN INTER-
ESTS (JeremyJ. Shapiro trans., 1971). Human "action is intrinsically meaningful; it is
endowed with meaning by human intentionality .... [I]n focusing on action, we can
and we must speak of its subjective meaning, the meaning it has by virtue of the mean-
ing-endowing intentional act of a human consciousness, as well as its objective mean-
ing." BERNSrEIN, supra, at 65. Accounting for the motivations of behavior is critical
when conclusions about the behavior determine rights and obligations of the rulers
and the ruled. See generally ANTHONY GmDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY.
ACTION, STRUCTURES & CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1979); RICHARD BERNSTEIN,
BEYOND OBjECTrivISM AND RELATIVISM (1983).
445. Dias, supra note 9, at 255.
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moral obligation may weigh more heavily on them than on any other
group of officers." 446 Kelsen is rightly criticized for making law and the
state a composite of definitional fiats.4 47 Law, to be worthy of fidelity,
must be something more than mere force.4 48 Law is not simply order; it
must correspond to the demands ofjustice, morality, and agreed notions
of what ought to be. To achieve this end, the teleology of state and law
must be linked up with the fundamental project of philosophy: the
human good and happiness.449
Similarly, the Kelsenian teleology of efficacy and validity must be
linked up with motivations and compulsions of general compliance with
successful usurpations. It is "not so much whether morality or justice
should count, but what counts as morality and justice."450 Ignoring this
question lends credence to the charge that "political quitism is the core of
Kelsen's attitude."451 After all:
[E]ven if one admits that ajudge qua judge ought to accept the laws of a
successful revolutionary regime, this legal duty may, in particular cases, be
outweighed by other extra-legal duties. It may be outweighed by a political
duty not to give support to an immoral regime or by a personal moral duty
to observe ajudicial oath. A revolutionary upheaval is just the sort of situa-
tion where being a good judge may have to give way to being a good citizen
or a good man.452
Following the lead offilan4 some courts rejected Kelsen's equation of
efficacy with validity on the ground that it excludes from consideration
"sociological factors of morality and justice which contribute to the accept-
ance or effectiveness of the new Legal Order."453 Other courts modified
Kelsen's efficacy test to ensure that submission of the people was the result
of "popular acceptance" 454 and the coup d'etat's "moral content,"455 "not
446. de Smith, supra note 9, at 104-05.
447. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fhdelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 630, 631 (1958).
448. In Fuller's words:
Law, as something deserving loyalty, must represent a human achievement; it
cannot be simple fiat of power or a repetitive pattern discernible in the behav-
ior of state officials. The respect we owe to human laws must surely be some-
thing different from the respect we accord to the law of gravitation. If laws,
even bad laws, have a claim to our respect, then law must represent some gen-
eral direction of human effort that we can understand and describe, and that
we can approve in principle even at the moment when it seems to us to miss its
mark.
Id- at 632.
449. Paul Ricoeur, The Political Paradox, in LEGrrimAcy AN THE STATE 251 (William
Connoly ed., 1984).
450. Dias, supra note 9, at 255, citing Ronald M. Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforce-
ment of Morals, 75 YALE LJ. 986, 1001 (1965-66).
451. Honore, supra note 9, at 272.
452. Harris, supra note 9, at 127.
453. Mitchell v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1986 LRC. Const. 35, 67 (Grenada)
(quoting Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. S. Ct. 657, 692 (Pakistan)).
454. Liasi v. Attorney-General, 1975 C.L.R. 558, 573 (Cyprus).
455. Bhutto, 1977 P.L.D. S. Ct. at 704.
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mere tacit submission to coercion or fear of force."456 Tests of validation
were modified to require that "it must not appear that the [usurper]
regime was oppressive and undemocratic."457 While the early cases, fol-
lowing Kelsen, had considered motivation of usurpation irrelevant, later
cases took the position that "[t]he legal consequences of such a change
must... be determined by a consideration of the total milieu in which the
change is brought about, including the motivation of those responsible for
the change,"458 and "the reason why the old constitutional government
was overthrown and the nature and character of the new legal order."
4 59
It was further opined that each one of these considerations "raises a ques-
tion of fact."4 60 But these modifications do not place the theory of revolu-
tionary validity on a more sound footing. The evidentiary problems
remain, as the Mitchell Court was prepared to admit.
More importantly, these consideration go towards the moral content
of the right of a regime to govern and the obligation of fidelity of the
governed. As such, these issues are political/moral in nature and go to
the question of legitimacy, which remains beyond the purview ofjudiciar-
ies and belongs in the political processes of the society at large. Since
legitimacy of a revolutionary regime is not a legal issue susceptible to adju-
dication, 46 ' the modified conditions of efficacy cannot be considered
questions of fact to be pleaded and proven by the parties to the case. The
error is to see the issue of legitimacy as a legal issue, hence the search for a
rule of law to resolve the question. The modified conditions are not legal
standards; rather, they are standards of political discourse for evaluating
the legitimacy of an extra-constitutional order.
2. The Doctrine of State Necessity Is Not Applicable to a Coup d'Etat
Some cases relied upon the doctrine of state necessity to validate and legit-
imize coups d'etat, but such reliance is doctrinally inappropriate. While
common law has long recognized the doctrine, given its extra-constitu-
tional nature, its application has been traditionally circumscribed by care-
fully demarcated preconditions.4 62 The preconditions to the application
of the doctrine are: "(a) An imperative and inevitable necessity or excep-
tional circumstances; (b) no other remedy to apply; (c) the measure taken
must be proportionate to the necessity; and (d) it must be of a temporary
character limited to the duration of the exceptional circumstances." 4 63 In
456. Mitchel; 1986 L.R.C. Const. at 72 (Haynes, P.).
457. Id.
458. Bhutto, 1977 P.L.D. S. Ct. at 721.
459. Mitchell, 1986 LR.C. Const. at 67 ("Was the motivation mere power grabbing or
was it a rebellion for example against oppression or corruption or ineptitude? And is
the new legal order a just one?").
460. Id. at 42.
461. See infra part III.E.2.
462. For the evolution of the doctrine in common law, see Williams, supra note 27;
Stavsky, supra note 9, at 342-63. See also Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of
Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989).
463. Attorney-General v. Ibrahim, 1964 C.L.R. 195, 265 (Cyprus).
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its classic formulation, the doctrine may be invoked only by the lawful sov-
ereign, 464 and validated acts must be "directed to and reasonably required
for ordinary orderly running of the State;... [and] not impair the rights of
citizens under the lawful... Constitution."46 5 As such, the doctrine of
state cannot be used to validate a coup d'etat. It was only by stretching the
doctrine out of shape that it was turned into an instrument that validated
usurpation.
The courts in Madzimbamuto and infilani saw fit to combine the doc-
trine of necessity with the so-called doctrine of implied mandate. This
doctrine, borrowed from Hugo Grotius, allows courts to validate necessary
acts of an usurper because the lawful sovereign would have wanted these
acts to be done in the interest of preserving the state.4 66 The doctrine of
implied mandate was proffered at a time of absolute monarchies, before
the era of constitutional governance, separation of powers, and independ-
ent courts,4 6 7 and as such is not worthy ofjudicial recognition by any self-
respecting modern court. Traveling further along this road, Bhutto ren-
dered meaningless any distinction between the doctrine of necessity and
the theory of revolutionary legality when it used the doctrine to validate
unfettered legislative capacity of the usurper regime, including the power
to amend the Constitution.4 68 Another device used by the courts to do
away with the traditional limitations on the application of the doctrine is
to focus not on the necessity which prompted the extra-constitutional
action, but on the necessity that faces the court after the fact to "validate
such action in the public interest, indeed as a matter of public policy."4 6 9
Sir Jocelyn Simon's observation that "public policy is the very essence of
the doctrine, whether one calls it 'necessity' or 'implied mandate' or any-
thing else,"4 70 is closer to the actual practice. This in turn raises two criti-
cal problems. One, such dilution of the doctrine makes judicial practice
vulnerable to the charge that imprecision of the doctrine leads to judicial
usurpation of legislative functions.47 1 Two, this permits the judges to
bring into play, without acknowledging it, their personal biases and
464. Governor-General's Case, 1955 P.L.D. F. Ct. 435, 486 (Pakistan).
465. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 3 All E.R. 561, 579 (P.C.) (Lord
Pierce).
466. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Aft. L.R. 284,348 (Rhodesia App.
Div.). The court also consulted works of Victoria, Suarez, Lessius, Pufendorf, and Coc-
cejus. Id. at 349-50;Jilani v. Gov't of Punjab, 1972 P.L.D. S. Ct. 139, 205 (Pakistan).
467. See, e.g., Palley, supra note 9, at 276, n.72 ("It is clear from the context of their
remarks that they were proffering lessons in the art of survival.").
468. Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. S. Ct. 657, 712 (Pakistan).
469. Mokotso v. King Moshoeshoe II, 1989 L.R.C. Const. 24, 120 (Lesotho). See also
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, 1966 R.L.R. 756 (Rhodesia Gen. Div.). "I base my
conclusion on the doctrine of public policy, the application of which is required, justi-
fied and rendered unavoidable in these circumstances, by necessity." Id. at 867
(Gordon,J.) In line is Hamoodur Rahman, C.J.'s position infilan4 that "recourse has to
be taken to the doctrine of necessity where the ignoring of it would result in disastrous
consequences to the body politic and upset the social order itself." Jilan4 1972 P.L.D. S.
Ct. at 206.
470. Adams v. Adams, [1970] 3 All E.R. 572, 587.
471. For example, Beadle, C.J., took the position that the doctrine of necessity
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preferences.472
Perceptive critics have long held that application of the doctrine of
necessity "requires ajudgment of value, an adjudication between compet-
ing 'goods' and a sacrifice of one to the other. The language of necessity
disguises the selection of values that is really involved."473 Even where a
judge personally finds the motivations of usurpation laudable, his legal
obligation to enforce the constitution remains.474 To permit judges to
decide such basic questions as the rightful rulers on the basis of personal
preference does away with even a pretense of rule of law. In view of the
admonition that necessity is "[tihe tyrant's plea, [to] excus[e] his devilish
deed,"475 and the fundamental principle of the doctrine of necessity that
"nobody may take advantage of a necessity of his own making,"476 its use is
best limited to extra-constitutional actions by a lawful government taken in
response to emergencies and designed to protect rather than subvert the
constitutional order.
3. International Law Does Not Validate Coups d'Etat
One line of reasoning adopted by some of the courts to validate usurpa-
tion through coup d'etat is to refer to the principles of state recognition in
international law and find municipal courts obligated to follow dictates of
international law.477 This line of reasoning implies an uncritical adoption
is so imprecise in its application that if the Court had to judge the validity of
"all" the present government's legislation by this yardstick it would in effect be
usurping the function of the legislature, because it would then be charged with
the authority of determining not merely whether one particular controversial
measure was valid, but with the general authority to review the whole field of
governmental legislation and to decide in its discretion which individual mea-
sure was necessary in the public interest and which was not. This is a legislative,
not a judicial function.
Madzimbamuto, [1968] 2 S. Aft. L.R. at 330.
472. See, e.g., Claire Palley's criticism that in the UDI cases the use of necessity and
public policy permitted the Rhodesianjudges, all belonging to the minority white estab-
lishment, without consciously evaluating their choice, to prefer social order over indi-
vidual liberty and validate the unlawful and morally repugnant white minority regime.
Palley, supra note 9, at 281-83.
473. Williams, supra note 27, at 224.
474. As Fieldsend, J., put it:
There may be pressing and convincing reasons for Judges as individuals to
accept what an executive has done to overthrow an established order in the
name of the public good, but, in my view, a court constituted on one constitu-
tional basis cannot legally support the unconstitutional overthrow of the foun-
dation upon which it is founded.
Madzimbamuto, [1968] 2 S. AfT. L.R. at 430.
475. JOHN MELTON, PARADISE LosT, bk. 4, lines 393-94 (photo. reprint 1973) (1667).
476. Madzimbamuto, [1968] 2 S.AL.R, at 330.
477. Most notably in Dosso, Munir, CJ., said that "a victorious revolution or a success-
ful coup d'etat is an internationally recognized legal method of changing a Constitution."
State v. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. S. Ct. 533, 539 (Pakistan). In Madzimbamuto, Beadle, C.J.,
could see "no reason why an international law definition should not be used by a
municipal court, because it would seem that if a government conformed to an accepted
international law definition of either a dejure or a de facto government, then afortiori
it should be recognized as such by a municipal court." Madzimbamuto, [1968] 2 S. Ar.
L.R. at 314. In Matovu, Sir Udo Udoma, C.J., said: "Although the product of a revolu-
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of the extreme monistic view of the primacy of international law
expounded by Kelsen. 478 This view of Kelsen is logically independent
from his analysis of domestic legal systems,479 and involves the proposition
that all norms of a domestic legal system are subordinate to those of inter-
national law. The validity of the grundnorm itself is therefore no longer
presupposed, but is determined by a positive norm of international law
which
[a]uthorizes an individual or group of individuals, on the basis of an effec-
tive constitution, to create and apply as a legitimate government a norma-
tive coercive order. That norm, thus, legitimizes this coercive order.., as a
valid legal order... regardless of whether the government came to power
in a 'legitimate' way... or by revolution.4 80
There are numerous problems with using this proposition as a rule of
decision. Irrespective of its merits, it is a theory of law and the interrela-
tionship between systems of law, and not a principle of law that could serve
as a ratio decidendi The theory is extreme because it is possible to uphold
the primacy of international law in a general sense48 1 without obligating
domestic courts to validate usurpation of state power. The theory is mor-
ally repugnant because it equates might with right. It is contrary to the
traditional practice of British courts of following customary international
law only if not in conflict with domestic statutory law or prior decisions of
final authority.48 2 The British practice, in turn, is in line with the general
practice that "as between the international legal order and a particular
national order, primacy may simply be determined by the legal order
which has the question before it."483 Finally, even if it were conceded that
international law binds a municipal court in the matter, there is no logical
reason why international legal principles other than rules of recognition
should not be taken into account. The right of self-determination 48 4 and
tion, the Constitution is none-the-less valid in law because in international law revolu-
tions and coups detat are recognised methods of changing government and
constitutions of sovereign states." Uganda v. Matovu, 1966 E. Aft. L.R. 514, 537
(Uganda).
478. KELSEN, GENER. THEoRY, supra note 368, at 367-68; KEtsEN, PURE TntoR, supra
note 368, at 214-15, 333-44.
479. KtEsEN, GENERAL TuEORy, supra note 368, at 388; KELsEN, PURE THEoRY, supra
note 368, at 214-15; Kelsen, supra note 420, at 1151-52; Joseph G. Starke, The Primary of
International Law, in LAw, STATE ArD INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: EssAys IN HONOR OF
HANs KmEN 312-13 (Salo Engel ed., 1964).
480. KELsEN., PUE THEORY, supra note 368, at 215.
481. For example, Starke suggests two spheres of primacy distinguished from Kel-
sen's position: First, that municipal tribunals in general give preference to interna-
tional law when in conflict with municipal law, and, second, that states should respect
international law above national interest. Starke, supra note 479, at 308.
482. LAssA OPPENHEM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952);
IAN BROWNLE, PRINCIPLEs OF PuBuc INTERNrAIoNAL LAw 43 (4th ed. 1990).
483. STONE, supra note 435, at 119.
484. See generally Daniel Thurer, Self Determination, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTRNATONAL LAw 470, 470-75 (1985); W. OFuATEY-KoDJOE, THE PINCIP'LE OF SEF=-
DETEMINA-TnON IN INTRNATIONA. LAw (1977); MhcmA PoERza.mcE, SE.r-DE-RsueA-
TioN IN LAw AND PRACTICE (1982).
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other principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights48 5 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights486
would certainly come into play in a situation where normal constitutional
process is undermined and the submission and fidelity of a people is
sought on the basis of monopoly of coercive force.
The cases surveyed are remarkable for the complete lack of consis-
tency in the application of international legal norms and practice of states
in adjudication of validity of coups d'etat. First, there is a division between
those who find international law relevant to the issue and those who do
not. Second, among those who think international law is relevant, some
find the theory and principles of international law applicable while others
find the practice of recognition of the state and/or government by other
states relevant. Among those who consider the practice of recognition rel-
evant, some find recognition or lack thereof determinative of the issue;
others find that it is not.
To conclude, the validation/legitimation option does not have firm
doctrinal legs to stand on. By furnishing judicially pronounced legitimacy
to extra-constitutional orders, the courts augment the effectiveness of
usurpation and thus contribute to the fragility of constitutional govern-
ance. By failing to distinguish force from law, this option erodes the ideal
of the rule of law and diminishes the prestige of the courts.
C. Option Two: Strict Constitutionalism
Confronted with a coup d'etat, one option available to a court is to take
the road of strict constitutionalism, i.e., follow the principle that "a court
which derives its existence from a written constitution cannot give effect to
anything which is not law when judged by that constitution." 487 The
advantages of this choice are numerous. Besides being doctrinally safe,
strict fidelity to the constitution will furnish consistency to judicial
responses to the question of validity of usurper regimes. By denying any
judicially pronounced stamp of approval, the courts would impede attain-
ment of effectiveness and legitimacy by extra-constitutional regimes. Such
a determination will implicitly legitimize resistance to the usurper
regimes, which in turn may induce the body politic to strive for restoration
of the constitutional order. Finally, fear of judicial rebuke may deter
would-be adventurers from subverting the constitutional order, and thus
485. GA. Res. 217 A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Article 21 (3) of the Declara-
tion states: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting proce-
dures." I&/ at 75.
486. Entered into force, March 23, 1976. GA. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). Article 1(1) of the Covenant reads: "All
people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely deter-
mine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural devel-
opment." Id. at 53.
487. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Air. L.R. 284,432 (Rhodesia App.
Div.) (Fieldsend, J.).
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promote stability.488
The option of strict constitutionalism, however, is not without serious
shortcomings. First, there is the issue of doctrinal validity of fidelity to a
constitutional order that has been destroyed and replaced as a matter of
fact. Doctrinal consistency is of little value if the resulting judicial pro-
nouncement is completely out of step with the political reality. This is why
common law has long recognized the imperative to give at least limited
recognition to a de facto, though extra-constitutional, regime. This is
clearly evident in the English law of treason, 48 9 the American War of Inde-
pendence cases,4 90 and the American Civil War cases.4 91
488. As Fieldsend, J., stated: "Nothing can encourage instability more than for any
revolutionary movement to know that, if it succeeds in snatching power, it will be enti-
tled ipso facto to the complete support of the pre-existing judiciary in their judicial
capacity." Id. at 430.
489. The earliest example of this recognition is the Statute of Treason 1351, of which
Coke said that "this Act is to be understood of a king in possession of the crown and
kingdom," and "the other [king] that hath right and is out of possession is not within
this Act." 3 EnwARD COKE, INsTrrums OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 7 (photo. reprint 1985)
(1817). See also 4 WruIAM BLAcz roNE, COMMENTARiES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 77-78
(photo. reprint 1979) (1769). Of course, a qualification was that the "king in posses-
sion" must be securely, not merely temporarily, in possession, and must enjoy the sup-
port or acquiescence of the bulk of the people. FoslR, CROWN CASES 403 (3d ed.
1809). Hawkins adds a corollary that the Act obligates the citizen to fight for the de
facto king against the dejure oustee. 1 WLAM HAWKmNS, PLEAS OF T-m CROWN, ch. 17,
§ 16 (P. R. Glagerbrook ed., 1973). See generally Anthony M. Honore, A//egiance and the
Usurper, CAMBRIDGE LJ. 214 (1967); Alan Wharam, Treason in Rhodesia, CAMBRMGE LJ.
189 (1967).
490. See Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. 1, 53 (1781) (in this case, heard while the war
of independence was in progress, the court recognized the regime born of rebellion as
the dejure government); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796); M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessess,
8 U.S. 209 (1808); Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99 (1830) (these
cases, heard after the peace treaty of 1783, held that in the case of a successful revolu-
tion the validity of the new government's laws dates back to the day the revolution first
broke out).
491. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868).
([T]he new government, having displaced the regular authority, and having
established itself in the customary seats of power, and in the exercise of the
ordinary functions of administration, would have constituted, in the strictest
sense of the words, a de facto government, and its acts, during the period of its
existence as such, would be effectual, and, in almost all respects, valid ....
[T]his is true of the actual government of Texas, though unlawful and revolu-
tionary, as to the United States.
Id. at 733 (Chase, C.J.). See also Thorington v. Smith 75 U.S. 1 (1869) (holding that a
contract for the payment of Confederate notes, made during the Civil War, should be
enforced. "[T]his currency must be considered in courts of law in the same light as if it
had been issued by a foreign government, temporarily occupying a part of the territory
of the United States. . . ."); Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. 570 (1873) (holding that acts of
Confederate states are valid so far as they did not impair or tend to impair the
supremacy of the Union); First Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Texas, 87 U.S. 72 (1874) (concur-
ring judge stating that legislative act of a Confederate state is valid if passed for the
ordinary administration of its powers and duties as a State); Sprott v. United States, 87
U.S. 459 (1874) (recognizing that acts of the States in rebellion must be upheld in the
interest of civil society where such government is a necessity); Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S.
388 (1897) (holding that Georgia statute which authorized guardians to invest their
trust funds in Confederate bonds was valid); United States v. Home Insurance Co., 89
U.S. 99 (1875) (holding that corporations created under Confederate state have power
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There is also increasing judicial recognition that, in a proper context,
to make the letter of the law yield to political realities does not necessarily
mean a diminution of the rule of law. The most cogent example of this
phenomenon in the context of post-colonial common law settings, i.e., all
ex-colonies of Britain, is the status of the Statute of Westminster of
1931.492 The Statute, enacted to confer full legislative capacity upon legis-
latures of self-governing dominions, provides:
No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commence-
ment of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as
part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act
that Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof. 493
This statute, which furnished the basis of decolonization of the British
Empire, gives rise to an acute divergence between legal logic and political
reality. The English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty implies unfet-
tered legislative power.49 4 Consequently, an act of the Parliament cannot
bind future parliaments, 495 and therefore, any statute is by definition revo-
cable. 496 Logically then, the correct legal position is that the Statute of
Westminster can be revoked by the British Parliament, restoring the Parlia-
ment's legislative capacity over the ex-colonies, and thus nullifying their
independent sovereign status.4 97 Does recourse to logic and formal legal
to sue in the Federal courts where the acts of incorporation had no relation to the
rebellion); Johnson v. Atlantic Gulf & W. Indian Transit Co., 156 U.S. 618 (1894)
(upholding the validity of a Confederate law passed during the Civil War under the
"settled Doctrine that the acts of the rebellious states in their individual capacities ... so
far as they did not tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority or the consti-
tutional rights of citizens are treated as valid.").
492. Statute of Westminister, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, Ch. 4 (Eng.).
493. Id. § 4.
494. "Parliament .. . has, under the English Constitution, the right to make or
unmake any law whatever." A.V. DicEy, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAw OF
THE CONsTrrUrON 39 (10th ed. 1959). "This doctrine of the legislative supremacy of
Parliament is the very keystone of the law of the constitution." Id. at 70.
495. "Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind
not." BLAcxsroN, supra note 489, at 106. See alsoJ.D. van der Vyer, Parliamentary Sover-
eignty, Fundamental Freedoms and a Bill of Rights, 99 S. Am. LJ. 557, 561 (1982).
496. "Acts which are in their nature revocable cannot by strength of words be fixed
and perpetuated.... For a supreme and absolute power cannot conclude itself, neither
can that which is in nature revocable be made fixed." Sir Francis Bacon, Maxims in the
Law, reprinted in 7 THE WoRKs OF FRAqcis BACON 369 (J. Spedding ed., 1870-75); Sir
Francis Bacon, The Historie of the Raigne of King Henry the Seventh, reprinted in 6 THE
WoRKS oF FRANcIs BACON 160 (J. Spedding ed., 1870-75) quoted in van der Vyer, supra
note 495, at 561; "[N]o Act of Parliament can effectively provide that no future Act shall
interfere with its provisions." Vauxhall Estates Ltd. v. Liverpool Corp., [1932] 1 K.B.
733, 743; "[Tlhe legislature is unable, according to our constitution, to bind itself as to
the form of subsequent legislation; it is impossible for Parliament to say that in a subse-
quentAct of Parliament dealing with this subject matter shall there never be an implied
repeal." Ellen St. Estates Ltd. v. Minister of Health, [1934] All E.R 385, 390 (Eng. CA).
497. Another logical route culminating in the same legal position is that because
legislative powers of ex-colonies derive ultimately from a British statute of Order in
Council, there was never a complete transfer of power but only a delegation of author-
ity. So even a constitution adopted by a member of the Commonwealth may be
regarded as owing "its force of law, in the last resort, to the Parliament of the United
Kingdom." KzuErm C. WHEAPE, CONSrrOTIONAL STRUCTURx OF THE COMMONWEALTH
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doctrine end the inquiry? Can an act of the British Parliament nullify the
independent sovereign status of, say, India or Nigeria? As this "would be
politically impossible, even if legally valid,"49 8 English case law has
acknowledged that repeal of this statute "is theory and has no relation to
realities," 499 and hence "[1]egal theory must give way to practical poli-
tics." 50 0 The imperative of a successful coup d'etat may be similar.
Any court inclined to adopt strict constitutionalism must address the
question of whether a court, when it chooses to continue to sit after the
usurpation, remains the "old" court under the "old" constitution. The
issue was directly and exhaustively addressed in Madzimbamuto, where the
contending arguments were forwarded. Fieldsend, J., took the position
that, "[a ] court created by a written Constitution can have no independent
existence apart from that Constitution; it does not receive its powers from
the common law and declare what its own powers are; it is not a creature
of Frankenstein which once created can turn and destroy its maker."501
Beadle, CJ., rejected the view that the court continued to be a 1961 Con-
stitution court resting on the simple fact that its orders were not enforced
by "any remnant of a government governing under the 1961 Constitu-
tion," but by "the officials of the present de facto Government."50 2 The
proposition is very strong that the authority of a court, even in normal
times, is a de facto authority flowing from the effective power in the state
for the time being. When judges continue to sit
after they had found as a fact that as a result of successful revolutions the
old constitutions had been effectively overthrown and replaced by new con-
stitutions, they, by continuing to sit, accepted the new constitutions, and
when they held that the new constitutions were de jure constitutions they
gave these decisions sitting under the new constitutions.5
0 3
100 (1960). A new Act of Parliament can reverse the whole process. In fact, as an
assertion of legal nationalism designed to demonstrate that the constitution is rooted in
native soil, some ex-colonies adopted new constitutions in a manner unauthorized by
the pre-existing constitution. STANLEY DE SMITH, CONsTITIrONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE
Lw 75 (4th ed. 1981).
498. Sm JusEs FAwcETT, THE BRmSH COMMONwEAALTH rN INTrNUTONAL LAw 106
(1963).
499. British Coal Corp. v. Rex, [1953] All E.R. 139, 146.
500. Blackburn v. Attorney-General, [1971] 2 All E.R. 1380, 1382 ("Freedom once
given cannot be taken away.").
501. Madzimbamuto v. Larder-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Afr. LR. 284, 430 (Rhodesia App.
Div.).
502. Id. at 330.
503. Regina v. Ndhlovu, [1968] 4 S. Mr. L.R. 515, 522 (Rhodesia App. Div.). See also
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). Taney, C.J., said:
Judicial power presupposes an established government capable of enacting laws
and enforcing their execution and of appointing judges to expound and
administer them. The acceptance of the judicial office is a recognition of the
authority of the government from which it is derived. And if the authority of
that government is annulled and overthrown, the power of its courts and other
officers is annulled. And if a State court should enter upon the inquiry pro-
posed in this case, and should come to the conclusion that the government
under which it acted had been put aside and displaced by an opposing govern-
ment, it would cease to be a court and be incapable of pronouncing ajudicial
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Judges who continue to serve under the new regime do so at the suf-
ferance of the new rulers, and as such, can do no less than acknowledge
the de facto status of the order they serve. The determination of de facto
status in this context may be based on the question of whether the regime
is maintaining the courts and enforcing their orders and judgments. For
the courts to assume the power to decide whether an extra-constitutional
order is legitimate and valid, is to regard the issue as merely legal. This
creates a fundamental contradiction. Under the new order, the courts are
the agents of the new order. Since the latter cannot derive its validity from
its own agent, they therefore lack the power to determine the validity of
that order. Courts lack the power to determine their own existence since
they come into being not on their own, but rather, upon the legal order
willing them so. It is beyond question that the new regime, being success-
ful, would have the power to disband the old system of courts and institute
its own system.50 4 So, when the old courts continue to sit under the new
regime, we must indulge in the presumption that they do so at the suffer-
ance of the new regime. In this respect, they might be viewed as courts of
the new order deriving their validity from the new order, and not the
other way around.
The proposition that a court which derives its existence from a consti-
tution cannot give effect to anything that is not law when judged by that
constitution 50 5 is of little utility in the post-usurption situation because the
question about the legal bedrock of a court sitting after a successful coup
d'etat is not susceptible to any logical answer. Does it remain a court
under the violated constitution or is it a court under the new order?
Instead of becoming entangled in this chicken-egg question, the merits of
strict constitutionalism should be judged on the basis of practical consider-
ations. One must start with an acknowledgment that historically all consti-
tutions have an extra-constitutional origin, and that periodic demise of
constitutional orders remains a political fact.50 6 However, "law is the law[;]
decision upon the question it undertook to try. If it decides at all as a court, it
necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the government under which
it is exercising judicial power.
Id. at 39.
504. This fact led Eekalaar to the following position:
It is sheer folly for a court, in the face of success and effectiveness of a new
regime, to declare the old constitution and the laws based upon it still in force
on the ground that they have not been nullified in a manner anticipated by the
old order itself, for it remains a simple matter for the revolutionary regime to
dismiss the judges, or disband the courts and institute its own judicial system
and install new judges.
Eekelaar, Thindples, supra note 9, at 41.
505. Madzimbamuto, [1968] 2 S. Aft. L.L at 432 (Fieldsend,J.).
506. Courts cannot but recognize the lesson of history:
The Constitution as a matter of fact is logically prior to the constitution as a
matter of law .... No constitution, therefore, can have its source and basis in
the law. It has of necessity an extra-legal origin, for there can be no talk of law
until some form of constitution has already obtained de facto establishment by
way of actual usage and operation. When it is once established, but not before,
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[b]ut politics are politics." 50 7 In the aftermath of a coup d'etat, it is impor-
tant to remember that "[i] t is a fundamental principle that ajudge cannot
make an order, either in a civil case or in a criminal case, which he knows
will be a mere brutumfulmen because it cannot be put into effect."50 8 In
the final analysis, a court "derives its real authority from the fact that the
governmental power recognizes it as a court and enforces its judgments
and orders."50 9 Strict constitutionalism in the face of successful usurpa-
tion is unlikely to induce the usurpers to relinquish power. A more likely
result is a rebuke of the court's pronouncement by the usurpers. They
may choose to abolish the existing court or simply ignore its directives, in
which case the judges may feel obliged to resign. In either scenario, the
usurpers would get the opportunity to pack the court with subservient and
sympathetic judges. The fact that most coups d'etat were validated by the
courts, as the above survey demonstrated, may be evidence thatjudges are
guided by these practical considerations. The few instances where the
courts refused to validate the usurpation, the courts were either beyond
the reach of the usurpers or were rebuked by the regime.
In refusing to validate the UDI regime in Rhodesia, the Privy Council
had nothing to lose and everything to gain. Being a British court, it was
the law can, and will, take notice of it. Constitutional facts will be reflected with
more or less accuracy in courts ofjustice as constitutional law.
GLvtvn.LE WIMxius, SALMOND ONJURISPRIDENCE 101 (11th ed. 1957). According to de'
Smith, "[Il]egal theorist have no option but to accommodate their concepts to the facts
of political life. Successful revolution sooner or later begets its own legality .... Thus,
might becomes right in the eye of the law." DE SMrrH, supra note 497, at 76-77. After
noting that this is the lesson of the English Revolution of 1688 and the rebellion of
American colonies, de Smith quickly added: "It offers a description, not a prescription.
It does not dictate what attitude judges and officials ought to adopt when the purported
breach of legal continuity takes place." Id. at 77.
507. de Smith, supra note 9, at 110.
508. Ndhlamini v. Carter, [1967] 4 S. AfT. L.R. 378,383 (Rhodesia App. Div.) (Lewis,
J.). See also Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. AfT. L.R. 284, 457, 462 (Rho-
desia App. Div.) (Beadle, C.J., opined that because of the attitude of the UDI regime,
an adverse decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council "would be a mere
brumufuhaen... merely an academic exercise... [Mrs. Madzimbamuto had] no statu-
tory right to compel the Board to embark upon an inquiry the outcome of which was
bound to be a mere brutumfnulen."). Munir, C.J., discussing the decision of the Federal
Court of Pakistan in the Governor-General's Case said:
The mental anguish caused to the judges by these cases [was] beyond descrip-
tion .... [N] ojudiciary elsewhere in the world had to pass through what may be
described as a judicial torture. [If the court had found against the Governor-
General] there would have been chaos in the country.... [Who could say that]
the coercive power of the State was with the court and not with the Governor-
General .... At moments like these public law is not to be found in the books;
it lies elsewhere, viz, in the events that have happened.
de Smith, supra note 9, at 98. See also Prentis v. Atlanta Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210,
226 (1908) ("A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist." (Holmes,J.));
Rola Co. (Austl.) Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 69 C.L.R. 185, 199 (1944) ("If a body which
has power to give a binding and authoritative decision is able to take action so as to
enforce that decision, then, but only then .... all attributes ofjudicial power are plainly'
present." (Latham, C.J.)).
509. Regina v. Ndhlovu, [1968] 4 S. Aft. LR. 515, 526 (Rhodesia App. Div.).
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safely outside the purview of the UDI regime. Furthermore, its decision
was guided not by legal doctrines of continuity of law, but by unquestion-
ing fidelity to the British government's position about the issue, as
reflected by the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 and the Southern Rhodesia
(Constitution) Order in Council 1965.510
More significant, however, is the response of the Rhodesian Court to
the Privy Council's position. In Regina v. Ndhlovu,5 1' the Court declared
that the decision of the Judicial Committee was not binding on the courts
of Southern Rhodesia; that the 1965 Constitution had become the dejure
Constitution; and that the UDI government had become the lawful gov-
ernment. 512 Infilan4 by the time the successful coup d'etat was declared
an unlawful usurpation on April 20, 1972, the usurper regime had already
fallen four months earlier.5 13 Nevertheless, the Court, combining the
doctrine of implied mandate with the doctrine of state necessity, and call-
ing it "a principle of condonation and not legitimation," validated many
acts of the usurper regime "notwithstanding their illegality in the wider
public interest."514 In Liasi, the Cypriot court declined to validate the
1974 coup d'etat, but only after the short-lived coup had been sup-
pressed. 51 5 Moreover, the restored constitutional government, which had
by legislation characterized the coup as being without legal basis, joined
the petitioner in seeking a judicial declaration of invalidity of the coup.
Similarly, the Mitchell Court refused to validate a usurper regime that had
already fallen.51 6 Still the court, itself a product of the usurper regime,
invoked the doctrine of necessity to validate both its own existence and its
jurisdiction.
The only case where an incumbent usurper regime was refused valida-
tion by the courts was the Lakanmi case of Nigeria.5 7 The response of the
regime was swift and unequivocal. Within two weeks of the Lakanmi deci-
sion, the new order by decree declared itself a revolution that had effec-
tively abrogated the entire pre-existing legal order and expressly voided
the Lakanmi decision. 5 18 In the face of this express rebuke, the Nigerian
court saw it fit to capitulate, as evidenced by its holdings in Adejumo,5 19
510. The later provided that, among other things, "any instrument made or other act
done in purported promulgation of any Constitution for Southern Rhodesia except as
authorized by Act of Parliament is void and of no effect." Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-
Burke, [1968] 3 All E.R. 561, 562 (P.C.).
511. [1968] 4 S. AfT. L.R. 515 (Rhodesia App. Div.).
512. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
513. This fact prompted the remark that "it cannot be forgotten that the court
declared Yahya Khan an usurper only after he was no longer in the saddle. The courts
have yet to dismount a leader on horseback." Kamal Azfar, Constitutional Dilemmas in
Pakistan, in PAKISTAN UNDER THE MiAmn. ELEVEN YEaRS oF ZIA-UL-HAQ 64 (Shahid
Javed Burki & Craig Baxter eds., 1991).
514. Jilani v. Gov't of Punjab, 1972 P.LD. S. Ct. 139, 154 (Pakistan). See also supra
notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
515. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
516. See supra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
517. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
518. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
519. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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notwithstanding its passionate espousal of the principles of separation of
powers and inherent autonomy and power of the judiciary in Lakanmi.
The other example of a decisive rebuke by usurper regimes of an
assertive judiciary is the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) of Paki-
stan in 1981. 5 20 This Order expressly reproved assertions of indepen-
dence by the superior courts, immunized the actions of the usurpers from
judicial review, and required judges of the superior courts to take a new
oath pledging fidelity to the new regime.5 2 1 Judges who refused to take
the new oath, and those "not invited" to do so, lost their offices. 52 2 In all,
nineteen judges, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, lost
their offices.5 23 Strict constitutionalism in the face of a successful coup
d'etat, therefore, only heightens "the gap between omnipotence in theory
and impotence in fact."524
D. Option Three: Resignation of Office
Another option available to judges, when asked to adjudicate the legality
of a coup d'etat, is to resign.52 5 Characterizing the decision to stay in
office as "a political decision,"52 6 advocates of resignation argue that "if
they continue in office their real or apparent acknowledgment of the
authority of the new regime will clothe it with the valued prize of legiti-
macy."5 27 When faced with usurpation of power, whether ajudge should
stay or resign "is a matter of personal choice.., a matter ofjudicial con-
science." 528 Justices Fieldsend and Young in Rhodesia, 52 9 Justices
520. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
521. See supra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
522. Denmon, supra note 213, at 14.
523. Id. See also Conrad, supra note 9, at 166.
524. Regina v. Ndhlovu, [1968] 4 S. AfT. LR. 515,521 (Rhodesia App. Div.) (Beadle,
C..). The limits of judicial power were recognized by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh in India, when it observed:
Preservation of democratic values, or for that matter, the ideal of good govern-
ment, is not the function or prerogative of the judiciary alone. It is, and ought
to be the concern of all the three wings-nay of all concerned. The entire
burden cannot be shifted to the shoulders of the judiciary. Its shoulders are
not strong or broad enough to bear all that burden.
Harinadhababu v. Ramarao, 1991 L.R.C. Const. 69, 99 (India).
525. See, eg., de Smith, supra note 9, at 108; R. S. Welsh, The Constitutional Case in
Southern Rhodesia, 83 L-w Q. REv. 64 (1967).
526. de Smith, supra note 9, at 108.
527. Id. at 105.
528. Ndhlovu, [1968] 4 S. AfT. LR. at 532.
529. Fieldsend gave the following reason for resigning on March 4, 1968:
It is my view that to continue in office under the present circumstances, particu-
larly in the light of the Government's declared intention not to recognize any
right of appeal to the Privy Council, amounts to accepting the abandonment of
the 1961 Constitution, both as an enforceable standard by which to judge and
as the source of authority of this Court. For the reasons advanced in myjudg-
ment in the Constitutional Case, I cannot accept this abandonment, with all it
entails, and accordingly I am not able to continue as a member of the Court.
Welsh, supra note 9, at 179. Fieldsend,J., had earlier taken the position that"[i]t maybe
a vain hope that the judgment of a court will deter a usurper, or have the effect of
restoring legality, but for a court to be deterred by fear of failure is merely to acquiesce
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Anwarul Haq and Marri in Pakistan, 530 and the entire Supreme Court of
Fiji in 1987531 exercised this option.
In light of the futility of a ruling adverse to the usurpers, the option of
resigning has some advantages. First, it signals the fidelity of the judges to
the constitution under which they held office and reinforces the techni-
cally unassailable principle that "a court which derives its existence from a
written constitution cannot give effect to anything that is not law when
judged by that constitution."5 3 2 Second, resignations would deny the
usurpers judicially pronounced validity and legitimacy. Finally, resigna-
tions can serve as an unmistakable signal to the body politic that the
usurpers have gone beyond the law and that the pretense of preserving the
legal order is just that, and one to which the judiciary will not be a
party.533
These advantages, however, are tempered by some contrary consider-
ations. First, resignation of office is a heavy personal burden to be placed
on the judges simply because the usurpers have indulged in extra-constitu-
tional conduct. Second, it is doubtful that the body politic needs a drastic
act like resignation ofjudges to alert them to the fact that the coup d'etat
is extra-constitutional. The resignations may well encourage others to defy
the usurper regime, but this fact should not obligate judges to resign,
in illegality." Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 2 S. Afr. L.R. 284,430 (Rhodesia
App. Div.). Young, J., made the following statement in open court on August 12, 1968:
If ... the authority of the Privy Council is not acknowledged in this country,
then it is equivalent to a rejection of the authority of the High Court and in my
view the only course open to ajudge of the High Court is to withdraw from the
bench. It is a matter ofjudicial conscience .... There can be no suggestion
that my resignation or that of any other judge must lead to a breakdown of law
and order. On the contrary, for a judge appointed under the 1961 Constitu-
tion to enforce a law that subverts that Constitution is, in my judgment, to over-
throw the law of the country. If order is to be maintained under some new
system of law then it must be done by judges appointed by those responsible for
the creation of the new system.
Welsh, supra note 9, at 182.
530. Both declined to take the new oath required by the military regime in 1981 and,
as a consequence, lost their positions. See Denmon, supra note 213, at 14.
531. On May 14, 1987, the armed forces of Fiji overthrew the newly elected govern-
ment in a coup d'etat and suspended the 1970 constitution. Richard N. Kiwanuka, On
Revolution and Legality in Flji 37 IrN'L & Comp. L.Q. 961, 961-62 (1988). The governor-
general refused to recognize the usurpers, assumed executive control, and dissolved the
Parliament. Id. at 963. The supreme Court denounced the coup as illegal and admit-
ted a petition by the overthrown government seeking restoration of the constitutional
government. Bavadra v. Attorney-General, [1988] L.R.C. Const. 13 (Fiji). The gover-
nor-general's attempts to restore parliamentary democracy were thwarted by a second
coup on September 26, 1987. The usurpers declared Fiji a republic and the governor-
general was obliged to resign his commission. Kiwanuka, supra, at 964. The Supreme
Court judges "who had sworn allegiance to the Queen and the 1970 Constitution,
refused to transfer it to the [usurper] regime .... [But eventually they] ... vacate[d]
their chambers, thus making room for a new judiciary which was subsequently
appointed." Id
532. Madzimbamuto, [1968] 2 S. AfT. L.L at 432 (Fieldsend, J.).
533. For example, Eekelaar believes that the Rhodesian judiciary "underestimated
the impact" resistance by resignation "on their part might have had on the political
strength of the usurpers." Eekelaar, Rhodesia, supra note 9, at 32.
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since encouraging political action is not a part of the judicial function.
Third, resignation by judges may add to instability, increase "the likeli-
hood of developing anarchical chaos,"5 4 and prejudice "their peaceful
tasks of protecting the fabric of society in maintaining law and order."53 5
Fourth, remaining in office will prevent the usurpers from packing the
courts with sympathetic and/or incompetent judges. 53 6 To allow the
usurpers an opportunity to appoint judges subservient to them would have
two negative results: (1) any continuing check on the conduct of the
regime will be eliminated; and (2) confidence of the citizens in the judi-
cial system will erode, and orderly administration of justice will be
jeopardized.
While the legitimacy and validity of a regime born of a successful
coup d'etat is outside the purview ofjudicial determination, the judiciary
retains the important role of reviewing the functioning of a usurper
regime. A constitutional rupture does not mean, ipso facto, unfettered
legislative capacity for the extra-constitutional regime. Here, it is essential
to distinguish a constitutional rupture from discontinuity of law.5 37
A coup d'etat typically suppresses only that part of a constitution that
deals with political organs of the state; the rest of the constitution and the
larger legal system is expressly left in place. Where coups d'etat do not
directly affect the jurisdiction of the courts, or when the continuation of
534. Hasan, supra note 9, at 236. Macdonald, A.J., used this as a rationale for recog-
nizing the UDI regime as the legitimate regime: "Cooperation between these three
departments is essential if orderly government is to be established and maintained. The
refusal by any one of these departments to co-operate with the other two can, at best,
lead to grave uncertainty and at worst to anarchy." Madzimbamuto, [1968] 2 S. Aft. L.R.
at 410.
535. Regina v. Ndhlovu [1968] 4 S. Aft. L.R. 515, 533 (Rhodesia App. Div.) (Beadle,
CJ.). According to Beadle, the first duty of the judges was, "whatever the political bat-
tie," to "keep out of the main area of dispute" and to "carry on their peaceful tasks of
protecting the fabric of society in maintaining law and order," provided, of course, their
independence is not tampered with. Id. With obvious, though not explicit, reference
to the statement ofYoungJ., on his resignation, Beadle, C.J., remarked that "[a] soldier
may desert from the battlefield, secure in the knowledge that there are others who will
remain and who will see that the battle is won, but this does not justify his desertion."
Id. at 534.
536. See Palley, supra note 9, at 269, for a discussion that the Rhodesian judges, par-
ticularly Beadle, C.J., considered this factor determinative in deciding to remain in
office. See also de Smith, supra note 9, at 105.
537. Such a distinction was expressly made in Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, 1977
P.L.D. S. Ct. 657 (Pakistan), though the Court made limited use of the distinction in its
substantive holding. The Court said:
[I]f it is assumed that the old Constitution has been completely suppressed or
destroyed, it does not follow that all thejudicial concepts and notions of moral-
ity and justice have also been destroyed, simply for the reason that the new
Legal Order does not mention anything about them. On the contrary, I find
that the Laws (Continuation in Force) Order makes it clear that, subject to
certain limitations, Pakistan is to be governed as nearly as may be in accordance
with the 1973 Constitution, and all laws for the time being in force shall con-
tinue. These provisions clearly indicate that there is no intention to destroy the
legal continuity of the country, as distinguished strictly from the Constitutional
continuity.
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the nature and scope ofjurisdiction is confirmed, the courts then remain
creatures of the pre-rupture legal order, and any formal "continuation in
force" provision, being merely declaratory in character, does not change
the identity or the jurisdiction of the courts.53 8 Thus, since the judiciary
maintains some power to control the new regime, it is important that the
judges remain in office.
Even where the usurpers reconstitute the courts, require new oaths,
and alter the courts' composition and jurisdiction, the courts are not nec-
essarily rendered impotent to review the conduct of a usurper regime.5 3 9
In these situations, the important distinction between judicial power and
jurisdiction becomes relevant.5 40 The very fact that the courts exist
bestows upon them an inherent power to determine the law and inquire
into their own jurisdiction. Even where a court confronts a legal impasse,
in that the constitutional order that brought it into existence has been
successfully and completely subverted, it may rightfully invoke the doc-
trine of state necessity as a source of its power and continuing jurisdiction
to review the exercise of legislative power by a usurper regime.54 ' Even
where a usurper regime requires a new oath of office, the position remains
unchanged. If the nature and function of the courts are understood in
terms of the aggregate legal system rather than in terms of a particular
political constitution, a new oath does not preclude judicial review of legis-
lative powers of an extra-constitutional regime. Typically, the new oaths
administered by usurper regimes include the duty to uphold the law(s).542
Id. at 706.
538. See, ag., Khan v. Anwar, 1976 P.L.D. S. Ct. 354, 373-75 (Pakistan) (standing for
the proposition that the identity of the high courts remained the same though the
constitution under which they were established was abrogated and a new constitution
came in force).
539. "It may be that the court's mere presence exercises some check on a usurper
who prefers to avoid a confrontation with it." Madzimbamuto, [1968] 2 S. Afr. L.R. at 430
(Fieldsend, J.).
540. According to the Supreme Court of Pakistan:
UWudicial power is inherent in the Court itself. It flows from the fact that it is a
Constitutional Court and it can only be taken away by abolishing the Court
itself.... This power, it is said, is inherent in the judiciary by reason of the
system of division of powers itself under which ... the Legislature makes, the
executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the law.
State v. Zia-ur-Rehman, 1973 P.L.D. S. Ct. 49, 69-70 (Pakistan).
541. There is no logical reason why the judiciary is any less entitled than the execu-
tive to assume extra-constitutional powers under the doctrine of state necessity in order
to bridge legal chasms and effect a transition to legality. The superior courts of Cyprus,
Malta, and Grenada adopted this route when confronted with constitutional break-
downs. See Attomey-General v. Ibrahim, 1964 C.LR. 195 (Cyprus); Mitchell v. Director
of Public Prosecutions, 1986 L.R.C. Const. 35 (Grenada); Archbishop Joseph v. Prime
Minister, (Constitutional Court of Malta 1985) (unreported), summarized in 11 COM-
MONWEALTH L. BuLt. 44 (1985).
542. For example, in Pakistan the new oath prescribed by the usurper regime under
Supreme CourtJudges (Oath of Office) Order, 1977 (Presidential Order No. 9 1977 of
September 22, 1977) simply adopted the wording of the oath in the 1973 Constitution
and deleted references to the Constitution: "I will discharge my duties, and perform my
functions, honestly, to the best of my ability and faithfully in accordance with the Consti-
tution of the Islamic Republic of Pahistan and the law...." (Italicized words were deleted).
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Even otherwise, the general duty to uphold the law must be viewed as a
legal reservation implicit in any oath sworn by a member of the judiciary.
This express or implied duty to uphold the law opens the door for the
courts to adopt continuity-of-law approaches. This, in turn, facilitates the
search for legal principles of appropriate conduct by public officials devel-
oped over time in the legal culture of the society relevant to test the scope
of legislative powers of an extra-constitutional regime.543 Such active judi-
cial oversight is essential to protect the minimal basic rights of citizens
against the arbitrary and repressive exercise of power by usurper regimes
during the period when the larger questions of legitimacy of the new
order are determined by the political process. Any meaningful judicial
oversight, however, presupposes that judges eschew incentives to resign
and remain in office.
E. Option Four: Declare the Legitimacy and Validity of a Coup d'Etat
a Nonjusticiable Political Question
The political question doctrine of nonjusticiability stems from the very
opinion of ChiefJustice Marshall which gave birth to the practice ofjudi-
cial review.5 " Even as he claimed for the courts the power to review the
acts of other branches of government, Marshall acknowledged some limi-
tations on that power:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this courL54
In Luther v. Borden,546 the Court further developed the doctrine in a
context relevant to this study. In that case, which arose in the wake of the
Dorr Rebellion of 1842, the legitimacy of the charter government of
Rhode Island was disputed and the Court was asked to decide whether the
rebellion had been justified.547 The Court declined to make such a deci-
sion. While the Court recognized that the Constitution mandates a partic-
ular form of government for the states, it insisted that only the political
branches of government could enforce the constitutional mandate in
question.5 48 Because the President had accepted the charter government
at the time of the Dorr Rebellion, the Court would not reach an inconsis-
543. In this inquiry a court may find useful the distinction drawn between "rules"
and "principles" by Dworkin and Eekelaar. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Law a System of
Rules?, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967); Eekelaar, Principles, supra note 9, at 30-37. Princi-
ples to be identified may be ones whose "authority lies outside the four comers of the
positivist legal system." Id. at 34. The origin of these principles may be found "not in a
particular decision of some legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness devel-
oped in the profession and the public over a time." Dworkin, supra, at 41.
544. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
545. Id. at 170.
546. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
547. See id. at 2-38.
548. Id. at 42.
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tent result 5 49
A succinct enunciation of the doctrine was proffered by the Court in
Baker v. Carr.550 The common law courts in otherjurisdictions are familiar
with the doctrine, and in some of the cases reviewed above the courts con-
sidered the doctrine, although they declined to follow it.5 5 1 The judicial
abdication envisaged by this doctrine has two conceptual components:
constitutionally mandated limits and self-imposed prudential limits.
55 2
Critics of the political question doctrine primarily caution against
accepting lightly the idea that under a written constitution, any part or
provision thereof is notjusticiable.55 3 Since the focus of the present study
is on the justiciability of a coup d'etat after the constitutional order has
been successfully subverted, this article explores the realism, functionality
and prudence ofjudicial abdication in the face of a coup d'etat5 54
1. Realism and Prudence Warrant Judicial Restraint
In ascertaining the suitability of the political question doctrine to the con-
stitutional crises engendered by a coup d'etat, the test forwarded by the
549. After noting that the President had expressed his willingness to support the
charter government with military force, Taney, C.J., concluded: "[C] ertainly no court of
the United States, with a knowledge of this decision, would have been justified in recog-
nizing the opposing party as the lawful government." I& at 44. Concerns about
problems of proof associated with any determination of legitimacy of a government
played an important part in the decision. A court's capacity to find the requisite facts
and problems of consistency if the outcome of such cases depended on jury findings of
fact particularly concerned the ChiefJustice. Id. at 40-43.
550. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The court said:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expres-
sing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
551. In other common lawjurisdictions, "[t]here are simply categories of questions,
some but not all of which have a strongly political flavor, which they [the courts] have
decided, for historical or policy reasons, to treat as nonjusticiable." STANLEY DE SMIH,
JUDIcIAL REvtEw OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 273 (2d ed. 1968).
552. See AL.x.xAnz M. BIGEE., THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANc- 111-98 (1962).
553. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ. 597
(1976); LAuIrEcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrITIfONAL LAw 72 (1978). For other criti-
cisms, see Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS
CONST. LQ. 595 (1987); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question,"79
Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1985); Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Question": A
Response, 101 HARv. L. REv. 524 (1987).
554. For arguments about realism and functionality of the doctrine, see Fritz W.
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE LJ. 517
(1966);J. Peter Hulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 97
(1988); B. 0. NwASuEzE, JUDicrAxsM IN CowomwE. AL AmRcA THE RoLE OF THE
COURTS IN GovERNmENT 37-43 (1977).
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Supreme Court in Baker v. Cart, combined with Alexander Bickel's articu-
lation of the rationale for the doctrine, is very helpful. According to
Bickel:
Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the political-ques-
tion doctrine: The Court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded in equal
parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled
resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, which tends to unbalance
judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so much that the judicial judgment
will be ignored, as that perhaps it should but will not be; (d) finally... the
inner vulnerability, self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irrespon-
sible and has no earth to draw strength from.555
In the aftermath of a successful coup, all these considerations come
into play. First, there is the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to
principled resolution. A coup d'etat, by definition, is a political event not
contemplated by the constitution which destroys the pre-existing constitu-
tional order. If a court decides to proceed with adjudication of the legality
of a coup d'etat, it may either apply the law of the pre-existing constitution
or seek extra-constitutional rules of decision. Any attempt to judge the
coup by the dictates of the destroyed constitution raises institutional, theo-
retical, doctrinal, and practical problems as discussed in part II.C. Institu-
tionally, the court is faced with a dilemma whether it is a court under the
"old" constitution or one under the "new" de facto legal order. Theoreti-
cally, the court is faced with the meta-legal question of the relationship
between constitutional facts and constitutional law. The doctrinal impasse
and the futility of strict constitutionalism was discussed above.556 The
alternative of adopting extra-constitutional doctrines and principles has its
own problems, as demonstrated by the survey of the case-law in part I.
While most courts validated coups d'etat, there was a singular lack of
doctrinal consistency. The courts vacillated between the pure theory of
revolutionary legality; the modified theory of revolutionary legality; the
restricted doctrine of necessity;, the unrestricted doctrine of necessity; the
doctrine of implied mandate; the public policy doctrine; and various com-
binations thereof. Utterly lacking any measure of continuity, the contra-
dictory pronouncements render the courts vulnerable to the charge that
they were politically timid, personally expedient, intellectually dishonest,
and that they were making policy determinations clearly not within judi-
cial discretion. Such a dismal judicial record warrants judicial abdication
on grounds of nonjusticiability, rather than additions to the doctrinal
maze. If one appropriately recognizes that there is "no neat rule of thumb
available to Judges during or immediately after the 'revolution' for the
purposes of determining whether the old order survives," 5 57 it becomes
"clearly desirable to keep the courts out of the main area of dispute, so
that, whatever be the political battle, .. . the courts can carry on their
peaceful tasks of protecting the fabric of society and maintaining law and
555. BxcxEL, supra note 552, at 184.
556. See supra part II.C.
557. DE SMrrH, supra note 497, at 77.
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order."558
Second, there is the problem of ascertaining facts which is com-
pounded by the lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards.
This is most apparent in the findings of efficacy of extra-constitutional
regimes. Some courts pronounced the usurpation efficacious without
even taking the trouble of pointing out any facts warranting such a deter-
mination. Others based this determination on self-serving affidavits fur-
nished by the usurpers or other public officials under the control of the
usurpers. The evidentiary method of choice remains judicial notice of
notorious facts. Determining facts in the midst of political upheavals and
characterizing socio-political situations and human behavior patterns
unassisted by opinions of disinterested and trained analysts is a hazardous
task in any context. This becomes inexcusable when courts venture along
this path, knowing quite well that their "factual" pronouncements are
pregnant with far-reaching political implications. Furthermore, sudden
changes of facts in the course of political upheaval can lead to embarrass-
ment of the court. For example, the regime that won the stamp of validity
based on efficacy in Dosso was itself overthrown within a day of the court's
pronouncement.55 9 The sharp difference between the High Court and
the Court of Appeals in Mitchell regarding "notorious facts" suggests that,
in the guise ofjudicial notice, personal preferences and value choices of
the judges were in play.
Third, there is the problem of the sheer enormity and momentous-
ness of the issue which may tend to unbalance judicial judgment. Coups
d'etat are typically highly charged and volatile socio-political events, often
accompanied by violence and civil strife. Such contexts are ill-suited for
considered and coolheaded judicial inquiry and pronouncements.
Lastly, there is the potential embarrassment for the courts of the
usurpers' disregard of any adverse pronouncements. As the aftermath of
the Lakanmi opinion in Nigeria and the PCO in Pakistan demonstrate,
usurper regimes having a monopoly of coercive power will not tolerate any
rebuke or hindrance by the judiciaries. Nullifying judicial decisions by
decree, removal of judges, restructuring of the courts, appointment of
sympathetic judges, and requiring new oaths pledging fidelity to usurpers
are all options available to, and availed by, the usurpers when confronted
with judicial challenges. In view of all these factors, the political question
doctrine of nonjusticiability provides the courts with the most prudent and
realistic option when confronted with the question of the validity of a
coup d'etat.
558. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1968] 3 All E.R. 561,582 (P.C.) (Lord Ried).
559. President Mirza abrogated the Constitution and proclaimed martial law on
October 7, 1958. Dosso, which validated the new order, was announced on October 27,
1958. That very evening, three senior generals informed the president of the army's
decision that he relinquish his office and leave the country. The president complied.
See MoHAmmAD Avur KHAN, FwmNns NOT MAsmm: A PoLITICAL AUTOBIOcRAPIIY 75
(1967).
VoL 27
1994 Jurisprudence of Successful Treason
2. The Legitimacy of a Coup dEtat Is a Political/Moral Question and Its
Validity a Meta-Legal One
The proposition of nonjusticiability of coups d'etat also rests on a funda-
mental conceptual distinction between legitimacy and validity of a legal
order. Nearly all the cases in this survey treated legitimacy and validity as
conceptually identical, often using the expressions interchangeably.
While there is an overlap of lexical definitions,56° the two concepts are
fundamentally distinct-a distinction crucial to an appropriate judicial
response to coups d'etat. The pervasive judicial practice to collapse legiti-
macy and validity into one is rooted in an uncritical adoption of Kelsen.
Besides calling his hypothesis of validity "the principle of legitimacy,"5 6 '
Kelsen argues:
The bare fact that an individual (or a group of individuals) is in a position
to enforce a certain pattern of behavior is not a sufficient ground for speak-
ing of a relation of domination such as constitutes a state .... The domina-
tion that characterizes the state claims to be legitimate and must actually be
regarded as such by rulers and [the] ruled. The domination is legitimate
only if it takes place in accordance with a legal order whose validity is pre-
supposed by the acting individual.5 62
"Legitimacy is the foundation of [state] power exercised.., both with
a consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern and
[a corresponding] recognition by the governed of that right" resulting in
an obligation of fidelity.56 3 As such, legitimacy invokes questions of poli-
tics and morality that must be resolved through the political processes of
the society. These questions are not legal in nature and must not be sub-
jected to adjudication.
Validity, on the other hand, refers to the binding nature of a norm,
which is derived from its conformity to a higher order norm, like a consti-
tution. As such, validity is a legal question subject to adjudication. A clear
distinction between legitimacy (right/obligation) and validity (legality) is
critical to fashion an appropriate response to successful usurpation. The
problem of legitimacy concerns the justness of the state or the legal order
as a whole and is not primarily about establishing criteria for identifying or
validating particular laws. No court has the authority to determine
whether the state and the legal order that it serves is legitimate. That
would be tantamount to the court creating itself. The courts, as agencies
560. Legitimacy means lawfully begotten; the condition of being in accordance with
and sanctioned by the law. Validity means having legal force, binding under the law.
See Wkn sru's NEW TWETIEH CEaNruR UNABRmDGED DIaToNARY 1035, 2017 (2d ed.
1979).
561. KELsEN, GENERAL THEORy, supra note 368, at 117.
562. Id. at 187-88.
563. See Dolf Sternberger, Legitimacy, in 9 NTRIoNAs. ENCYCLOPEDIA oF SOCIAL
SCIENCE 244 (David L. Sills ed., 1968). See also PATRICK Ru", WrLL AND PoLmrcAL LEGrr-
nmcy (1982); TOM R. "TYLER, WHY PEoPLE OBEY Trm LAw (1990). Tyler traces compli-
ance with the law to such normative considerations as legitimacy, id at 64; procedural
fairness, i& at 102; and the citizenry's right to a voice in decisions that affect them, id. at
178.
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of the state, sit more asjustificatory, rather than adjudicatory, organs when
confronted with questions bearing upon the very legitimacy of the state s 64
But a court can examine the validity of a norm by testing it against the
dictates of the constitution, whether written or otherwise.
While Kelsen, for whom "Uj]ustice is an irrational ideal,"565 associates
the phenomena of obligation and right with processes of law and legality,
he fails to root the link between standards of legality and principles of
obligation in critical morality. Kelsen's theory is a source-based, formal
theory of validity that would qualify any effective regime as a valid legal
order and, by definition, a legitimate one. Because for Kelsen the norma-
tive response to law is linked primarily to effectiveness, his theory leaves
open not only the question of justification but every other conceivable
problem concerning the difference between law and naked force. Kel-
sen's theory remains inadequate and incomplete as a theory of legitimacy
in that it does not concern itself with a definition of law and the state
which would make meaningful the obligation of fidelity to law.5 66 The
validity of a norm or legal order depends, for Kelsen, on its pedigree
(driven from the grundnorm) or power/efficacy ("by and large effec-
tive"). 567 It is beyond question that the existence of an effective order is a
prerequisite to any critical value judgment on which the case for obliga-
tion of fidelity depends. Where the very existence of a legal order is in
question, or conversely, where the issue is which of the two or more com-
peting legal orders should be given effect by the courts, the key empirical
issue is the measure of effective control of a legal order. But any answer to
this question does not necessarily bear on the question of whether that
legal order is a legitimate one.
Legitimacy is a two-faceted problem: how can the state justifiably
make demands of obedience on its citizens, and what is the rationale
underlying the individual's obligation to obey the state. Any discussion of
legitimacy invokes the principal questions of modem political philoso-
phy-problems concerning political obligations, rights of subjects against
564. See PmLIP SoPER, A THEor OF LAw 112-25 (1984).
565. KELsEN, GENRA. THsoaRy, supra note 368, at 13. According to Kelsen, "[w]hatit
all comes to, essentially, is the insight that there is not just one single morality, 'the'
morality, but rather that there are many moral systems .... The thesis rejected by the
pure theory of law... [is that there is] an absolute morality, i.e., one which holds good
at all times and places." Hans Kelsen, Law and Morality, in EssAYs IN LEGAL AND MoRAL
PHILosopHy 92 (Peter Heath trans., 1973).
566. On the problem of the obligation to obey, see generally ANTHONY D. WooZLEY,
LAW ANE OBED ENCE (1979);JoHu A. SIMMONs, MoRAL PUNcIPLEs AN PoLrriCAL OBLa-
GA-TONS (1979); JOsEPH RAZ, THE AuTHor OF LAW (1979); M.B.E. Smith, Is There a
Prima Fade Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973); Rolf Sartorius, Political
Authwrity and Political Obligation, 67 VA. L. REv. 3 (1981);J.L. Mackie, Obligations to Obey
the Law, 67VA. L. REv. 143 (1981); Thomas R. Flynn, CollectiveResponsibility and Obedience
to the Law, 18 GA. L. REv. 845 (1984); Kent Greenawalt, Prvmise, Benefit and Need: Ties
That Bind Us to the Law, 18 GA. L. REv. 727 (1984); Wdliam McBride, The Fetishism of
Illegality and the Mystification of "Authority" and "Legitimazyc, 18 GA. L. REv. 863 (1984);
Frances Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory and Civil Disobedien 18
GA L. REv. 929 (1984).
567. Kelsen, supra note 420, at 1144.
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the government, citizens' rights to political participation, and the proper
scope of governmental action. Legal systems, in order to impose obliga-
tions while avoiding a total collapse into pure force, must be able to claim
that their rules arejust.5 68 As this essentially involves political/moral crite-
ria, the question of legitimacy resides in the political processes of the soci-
ety, which is never resolved for all times. Legitimacy of a state or a legal
order, by definition, is an open-ended question to be perpetually raised
and answered. As such, it eludes the jurisdiction and competence of the
judiciary.569 Thejudiciary, being an agent and instrument of the state and
the legal order, lacks the jurisdiction to question the legitimacy of its prin-
cipal. Institutionally, it does not possess the yardsticks necessary to fashion
responses to essentially open-ended political/moral questions.
The validity of a norm, on the other hand, may be a legal question,
amenable to adjudication. But the parameters of this exercise need to be
clearly demarcated. For example, Harris classifies the different senses in
which the adjective 'valid' may be used to qualify a legal norm: whether it
(i) conforms to a higher order; (ii) is a consistent part of a normative field
of meaning; (iii) corresponds with social reality; and (iv) has an inherent
claim to fulfillment.570 However, this article's position is that validity is a
legal question only in the first sense. The other three senses are theoreti-
cal, meta-legal, and political questions.
Conformity with a higher norm is the usual sense in which the term
validity is used in common law, as when a rule is found not to be in con-
flict with the constitution that furnishes the higher norm. Kelsen uses the
term in the second sense, i.e., that of a norm being a consistent part of a
normative field of meaning, with the grundnorm furnishing the ultimate
foundation. This, however, is a theory of validity, not a rule of decision to
568. SeeJoseph Raz, Authority and Consen4 67 VA. L. REv. 103 (1981). See also Yash
Ghai, The Rule of Law, Legitimacy and Governance, 14 INT'L J. Soc. L. 179 (1986). Cf
Rober L. Holmes, State-Legitimacy and the Obligation to Obey the Law, 67 VA. L REv. 133
(1981).
569. Cf Ali Khan, A Legal Theoy of Revolutions, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1987) (a recent
attempt to fashion criteria for judicial determination of legitimacy of a revolution).
According to Khan, a revolution is legitimate if the new rule of succession prescribed by
the usurpers is accepted by the community, and the usurper regime "legitimizes itself'
under the new succession rule. Id. at 22. It is hard to see how this "theory of law, which
examines the analytical and normative significance of succession rules for understand-
ing the legitimacy of a revolution," id. at 4, can "provide a basis for courts to determine
the legitimacy of a revolution." Id. at 28. The theory does not instruct the courts how
to determine acceptance by the community. Neither does it explain why after a usurper
regime "legitimizes itself" under the new succession rule accepted by the community,
any issue is left over for adjudication as opposed to judicial acknowledgment. As the
survey of the cases above demonstrates, issues of legitimacy and validity of coups d'etat
are presented to the courts typically before any new rule of succession is enunciated. In
this situation Khan's theory implies a wait-and-see posture for the courts. My submis-
sion is that the wait-and-see posture and subsequent judicial acknowledgment of the
political resolution of the legitimacy issue is best achieved by using the political ques-
tion doctrine ofjusticiability.
570. Harris, supra note 9, at 113. See also G.C. Christie, The Notion of Validity in Modem
Jurispnudence, 48 MiNN. L. Ray. 1049 (1964); GEORGE H. VON WRIMrr, NoRM A
ACTnON, 194-200 (1963); A.F Ross, Dnucrs AND NoRMs 104-05 (1966).
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adjudicate validity. As a theoretical question, it belongs to the legal theo-
rist and not a court of law.
The post-colonial courts have often used validity in the third sense,
i.e., in the sense of correspondence with social reality, and have inter-
preted Kelsen to be doing the same, notwithstanding Kelsen's insistence
that effectiveness and validity be distinguished.57 1 This is a meta-legal
assumption about the relationship between social reality (efficacy) and
validity (legality) of norms. As a meta-legal assumption, it is available to
the legal scholar, not to a court of law.
Lastly, the question whether a norm has an inherent claim to fulfill-
ment is not a question of validity at all. It is a question of legitimacy to be
answered by political/moral criteria,5 72 and as such is outside the purview
ofjudicial determination. Consequently, validity of a norm is a legal ques-
tion subject to adjudication only where there is a higher order norm, i.e., a
constitutional order in place. Because a successful coup d'etat, by defini-
tion, destroys the constitutional order, its validity is not ajusticiable legal
question.
The question of validity of a successful coup involves meta-legal
assumptions about the relationship of law with social reality. In other
words, meta-legal assumptions about the relationship between constitu-
tional facts and constitutional law. Meta-legal inquiry properly resides in
the province of legal thought, not in judicial practice. Legitimacy of any
regime is a political/moral issue and validity of a successful coup d'etat is a
meta-legal question. As such, both legitimacy and validity of a successful
coup d'etat are beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the judiciary.
This is the most important rationale for courts to invoke the political ques-
tion doctrine of nonjusticiability when confronted with a successful coup
d'etat.
Conclusion
Courts in post-colonial common law settings are often confronted with
questions not contemplated by the constitutional order. This situation is
the product of extra-constitutional assumption of political power through
coups d'etat, which are endemic in these settings. The fait accompli of a
successful coup d'etat, coupled with the usurper's desire for judicially pro-
nounced legitimacy, presents courts with a complex dilemma. With the
status of the constitutional order in doubt, the choices available to the
courts are neither obvious nor unproblematic. Unfortunately, when con-
fronted with a successful coup, most courts have opted for the worst
571. See, eg., KELSEN, GENERAL THEORy, supra note 368, at 40, 119, 169-71; KELSEN,
PuRE THEoRY, supra note 368, at 10, 78, 211-14; Kelsen, supra note 420, at 1139-40; Hans
Kelsen, On the Pure Theory of Law, 1 IsR. L REv. 1, 2 (1966).
572. Kelsen would agree that this is not a criteria of validity of a norm because "[t]he
pure theory desires to present the law as it is, not as it ought to be; it seeks to know the
real and possible, not the 'ideal,' the 'right' law." KEISEN, PuRE THEORy, supra note 368,
at 106.
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choice, namely, validation and legitimation of extra-constitutional
usurpation.
Turning variations of an inherently flawed theory of revolutionary
legality into rules ofjudicial decision, these courts have held that the suc-
cess of usurpation is the source of its validity and legitimacy. The judicial
validation and legitimation of coups rests on an indefensible doctrinal
foundation. Kelsen's theory of revolutionary legality, which animates the
conceptual contours of the validation/legitimation option, is based on
abstract meta-theoretical assumptions not available to a court of law.
Based on a formal juridical conception of the state, this theory is immune
from the moral and sociological dimensions of the question of legitimacy,
and thus fails to distinguish between force and law. While basing validity
of usurpation on its efficacy, this theory fails to furnish any criteria to mea-
sure and evaluate efficacy. Thus, it allows judges to present their political
choices as results of principled adjudication. The experience of the post-
colonial societies shows that the validation/legitimation option encour-
ages would-be adventurers, undermines constitutional governance and the
rule of law, contributes to political instability, and diminishes the power
and prestige of the judiciary.
A few courts have taken the high road of strict constitutionalism and
have held successful coups to be illegal and invalid usurpations. The fail-
ure of these courts to take into account the gulf between constitutional law
and political reality resulted in quick and decisive rebukes from the extra-
constitutional regimes. The result was drastic curtailment of the power,
independence, andjurisdiction of the courts. A fewjudges opted to resign
their offices rather than submit to the will of the usurpers. While this
option is morally laudable, it only resulted in providing usurpers with the
opportunity to pack the courts with sympathetic judges.
This leaves the doctrine of nonjusticiability of political questions as
the only feasible option for courts when confronted with successful coups
d'etat. This course of action is dictated by both theoretical and prudential
considerations. Questions of legitimacy and validity of successful usurpa-
tion are outside the jurisdiction and competence of courts of law. Legiti-
macy involves the rationales for the right to govern and the corresponding
duty to obey. This involves political and moral questions which can be
resolved only through the political processes of the society. By their very
nature, these issues lie beyond the competence and jurisdiction of courts
of law. Validity of successful usurpation involves the theoretical question
of the relationship between constitutional fact and constitutional law.
This is essentially a meta-legal question, which can be resolved only by an
extra-legal choice concerning the nature of law itself. Courts of law, being
instruments of particular legal orders, lack the competence and jurisdic-
tion to resolve meta-legal questions.
The historical and structural reasons that make coups d'etat a perva-
sive means of transfer of political power in post-colonial societies are
beyond the power of courts of law. Faced with a successful coup, the best
that the courts can do is to deny judicially pronounced legitimacy to the
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usurpers without jeopardizing the very existence of the courts. Designat-
ing the legitimacy and validity of successful coups nonjusticiable political
questions is the best means of achieving this objective. Insulation of the
courts from extra-constitutional political conflicts is the best means of
ensuring survival of the rule of law while the political processes of the
society resolve the question of an appropriate political and legal order.
